68-17,903

IIDA, Shotaro, 1926-
AN INTRODUCTION TO SVĀTANTRIKA-MĀDHYAMIKA

The University of Wisconsin, Ph.D., 1968
Religion

AN INTRODUCTION TO SVĀTANTRIKA-MĀDHYAMIKA

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

by

Shotaro Iida

Degree to be awarded

January 19—

June 19—

August 1968

To Professors: Robinson
Kiyota
Miller

This thesis having been approved in respect to form and mechanical execution is referred to you for judgment upon its substantial merit.

Robert M. Bock
Dean

Approved as satisfying in substance the doctoral thesis requirement of the University of Wisconsin.

Richard H. Robinson
Major Professor

Minoru Kiyota

Robert J. Miller

Date of Examination, 6-24-68 19___

AN INTRODUCTION TO SVĀTANTRIKA-MĀDHYAMIKA

BY

SHOTARO IIDA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(Indian Studies)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1968

CONTENTS

PREFACE

This study aims at an investigation into the system of Bhāvaviveka (ca. 490-570), the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, which is one of the frontiers in the field of Buddhist Studies.

As for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, the system became much more intelligible after a century's effort. However, Bhāvaviveka's system is still comparatively unknown.

As Edward Conze says:

We still have no clear idea of Bhāvaviveka's Svātantrika system, which can be studied only in Tibetan translations, and which seems to have upheld the well-nigh incredible thesis that in Mādhyamika logic valid positive statements can be made. (Buddhist Thought of India, pp. 238-239).

First, a brief up-to-date history of research on Bhāvaviveka is given (Chapter I, Introduction). Next, the literary history of Bhāvaviveka (Chapter II) is presented as follows:

1). The Life of Bhāvaviveka, 2). The works of Bhāvaviveka.

Here, a list of Bhāvaviveka's works with an annotated bibliography is given.

Then, having discussed the place of Bhāvaviveka among the Mādhyamika-subschools, the validity of Tibetan siddhānta literature is examined.

Bhāvaviveka's school is the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika whose major tenet can be given from the work of

Dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po entitled The Precious Garland (Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bshag pa rin po che'i phreng ba). For this reason, a text and translation of the Svātantrika section of the Precious Garland is given. This work is precious to us for these reasons: 1. It gives us a clear bird's-eye-view of the rather complicated subschools of the later Indian Mādhyamika. 2. The work is not included in the Tōhōku Catalogue of Tibetan works on Buddhism. 3. It was utterly unknown to the modern scholarly world. However, the text is well known and is one of the important introductions to the system of Buddhist thought in the Tibetan tradition.

Having introduced the background of Bhāvaviveka, an edition and annotated translation of the third chapter (part I) of the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya is given for the first time. This manuscript was discovered by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana at the Zha-lu monastery in Tibet.

The major structure of Bhāvaviveka's system can be found only in this chapter tattvajñānaiṣaṇā (quest for the knowledge of ultimate reality). Here, we include a partial translation of the Tarkajvālā (Blaze of Reasoning) which is Bhāvaviveka's autocommentary to the Madhyamakahṛdaya.

Here, we notice the characteristics of Bhāvaviveka's reasoning. That is: he does not argue only from yukti, but also always on the basis of āgamas.

Moreover, Bhāvaviveka clearly distinguishes the realm which can be talked about from the realm which cannot be talked about. Then, he insists on the employment of clear and complete reasoning for the realm which can be discussed. He also qualifies every argument as to whether it is from samvṛti-satya or paramārtha-satya. He also separates logical negation into paryudāsa-pratiṣedha (negation for affirmation) and prasajya-pratiṣedha (total negation).

Having introduced some major tenets of Bhāvaviveka's system, a documentation of satya-dvaya and svabhāva-traya doctrines has been given. Tsong-kha-pa discusses the wider background of the problem in his Legs bshad snying po whose partial translation is also included in Chapter Five. Bhāvaviveka rightly mentions this problem in the Tarkajvālā.

Thus, it is beyond any doubt that he was at home not only with the Buddhist sūtras and śāstras, but also with those of other Indian philosophical systems. Thus, this study attempts to throw some light on Bhāvaviveka's system, which is important not only to the Buddhist thought of India, but also to the history of Indian philosophy.

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Richard H. Robinson, my major professor, who incitiated me to Mādhyamika Studies. He is also my kalyāṇamitra whose upāyakauśalya has contributed to my transformation from a mere immigrant to a scholar.

Thanks are also due to Professor Alex Wayman, who initiated me to Tibetan scholarship and introduced me to The Precious Garland of Dkon mchog 'jig med dbang po. Special mention must be made of Professor Edward Conze and his *anubhāva*, without which I would not have been able to embark upon such work as editing a text.

I would also like to acknowledge the opportunity for eighteen months study in India during 1965-1966 as a Junior Research Fellow of the American Institute of Indian Studies. During my sojourn in India, I met Professor V.V.Gokhale, then the head of the Department of Buddhist Studies at Delhi University. I am indebted to him because he not only allowed me to attend his seminar on Bhāvaviveka, but also permitted me to reproduce the copy of a rapid handcopy of the Sanskrit manuscript of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (Chapter III), prepared by Paṇḍita Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana. Another member of his department, Lha ram dge bshes Bstan pa rgyal mtshan introduced me to traditional Tibetan scholarship.

This work could never have been completed without my wife Katsuko's help, to an extent that only wives of immigrants, graduate students and university teachers can appreciate. Thanks are also due to Miss Evelyn Nagai, one of my students at the University of British Columbia, who made improvements in style and expression.

Chapter I

Introduction

The name Bhāvaviveka, along with Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, was introduced by Eugène Burnouf (1801-1852), one of the founders of scientific Buddhist studies,[1] in his magnum opus Introduction à l'Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien[2] in 1844. Alexander Csoma Körösi (1784-1842), his Hungarian contemporary in the Himalayas, had been reporting the Tibetan accounts on the school to which these ācāryas belonged---the Mādhyamika, "properly the philosophical system."[3] A decade later, Stanislas Julien (1797-1873) found the name P'o-p'i-fei-chia in his translation of Hsüan-tsang's Ta-T'ang hsi-yü-chi, which he equated with Bhāvaviveka.[4] Having translated Tāranātha's history of Buddhism, Anton Schiefner provided us with the name Legs-ldan (Bhavya) and his legend.[5]

An English sinologist, Samuel Beal, was trying to get a clear picture of the Mādhyamika utilizing the Chinese Tripiṭaka presented by the Meiji Japanese Government upon his request. Having catalogued this Tripiṭaka in London, Bunyū Nanjō (1849-1927) entered the Prajñāpradīpaśāstra-kārikā, (or vyākhya?) as No. 1185 of the catalogue. However, he had considerable difficulty and said, "Composed

by the Bodhisattvas Nāgārjuna and Nirdeśaprabha (? 'distinct-brightness' or Piṅgalanetra), the latter explaining five hundred verses of the former."[6]

Having noticed the similarity between Fen-pieh-ming and Tibetan Legs-ldan-'byed "good distinction," La Vallée Poussin solved this difficulty by rightly deciding, "Text by Nāgārjuna; commentary by Bhāvaviveka (=Tandjour Mdo, xviii, foll. 44-299)."[7]

Meantime, Wassiliew (Wassilij Pawlowitsch) (1818-1900) sorted out these Mādhyamika ācāryas into two opposing schools ——the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika and the Svātantrika Mādhyamika—— according to a Tibetan siddhānta of the Mañjughoṣa-hāsavajra.[8] This was soon to be confirmed by Stcherbatsky in his translation of the first chapter of the Prasannapadā where Candrakīrti defends the position of Buddhapālita against the criticism of Bhāvaviveka.[9] In 1910, Bhāvaviveka's wide range of knowledge was noticed when Max Walleser introduced Bhāvaviveka's own statement and refutation of the pre-Śaṃkara Vedānta doctrine known to him in the sixth century A.D.[10] In fact, Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamaka-hṛdaya together with the Tarkajvālā (autocommentary) is the earliest attempt at a critical survey of Indian philosophy. Having edited the Tibetan text of the Prajñāpradīpa,[11] Max Walleser also laid a foundation for future study of the text. On the other hand, the Chinese version of this text was translated into Japanese by Ryōtai Hatani in 1930.[12]

A small but valuable treatise called Chang-chung-lun (Jewel in the Palm), available only in Chinese, was translated into Japanese by Hatani in 1932.[13] La Vallée Poussin translated the text in 1933 with a discussion concerning the name Bhāvaviveka.[14] A Sanskrit reconstruction of this text from Chinese with a summary of the treatise was published by N. Aiyaswami Sastri in 1948.[15] He also published a study of the Msdhyamārtha-samgraha of Bhāvaviveka in 1931.[16]

The study of Bhāvaviveka's major works, i.e., the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya and its autocommentary the Tarkajvālā was commenced by Zuigan Watanabe in his brief introduction to the sixth chapter, the Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāra. This was soon to be followed by Susumu Yamaguchi in his thorough study of the fifth chapter,[17] the Yogācāratattvaviniścaya. Bhāvaviveka criticized the triple svabhāva theory of the Yogācārins in this chapter. In 1950, the eighth chapter, Vedānta-tattvaviniścaya, was similarily treated by Hajime Nakamura[18] while Yūsho Miyasaka studied the seventh chapter, the Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya.[19] Hakuyū Hadano treated the sixth chapter, the Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāra thoroughly.[20] Jōchō Nozawa is still working on the third chapter, the Tattva-jñānaiṣaṇā,[21] the largest and the most important, because Bhāvaviveka reveals his whole system in it. In the autumn of 1936, an incomplete manuscript of the Madhyamakahṛdaya-

kārikā was discovered by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana at the Zha-lu monastery in Tibet.[22] He presented this manuscript to V. V. Gokhale who published an edited text and an English translation of the eighth chapter[23] in collaboration with Hajima Nakamura, who prepared an edited text of the Tarkajvālā (found only in Tibetan).[24] The Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna, attributed to Bhāvaviveka, was also utilized by W. W. Rockhill, Enga Teramoto, Max Walleser and André Bareau for the study of subschools of Early Buddhism.[25] Having translated the twenty-fifth chapter of the Prajñāpradīpa with Avalokitavrata's commentary, Kōsai Yasui published a detailed study of the Mādhyamika in 1961.[26] Recently, Yuichi Kajiyama published a German translation of the first chapter of the Prajñāpradīpa from the Tibetan text edited by Max Walleser.[27]

This is the status of studies on the system of Bhāvaviveka. As for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, the system became much more intelligible after a century's effort.[28] However, Bhāvaviveka's system is still comparatively unknown.

As Edward Conze says:

> We still have no clear idea of Bhāvaviveka's Svātantrika system, which can be studied only in Tibetan translations, and which seems to have upheld the well-nigh incredible thesis that in Mādhyamika logic valid positive statements can be made.[29]

Therefore, this study aims to investigate the system of Bhāvaviveka, the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika,

which is still one of the frontiers in the field of Buddhist studies, in order to throw some light on this system which is important, not only in the Buddhist thought of India, but also in the history of Indian philosophy.

NOTES

Works listed in the Bibliography are cited in shortened form in the text and notes. All other works are cited in full in the first reference to them in each chapter. The followingabbreviations for names of journals,texts,and collections have been used in the notes and the bibliography.

List of Abbreviations

AKK	Abhidharmakosa-karika, edited by V.V.Gokhale
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
D	Derge (Sde-dge) Edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka
HJAS	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies (Cambridge, Mass.)
IBK	Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū or Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies
IIJ	Indo Iranian Journal
JA	Journal Asiatique (Paris)
JASB	Journal of the (Royal) Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta)
JBRS	Journal of the Bihar Research Society
JORM	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras
JRAS	The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britian (and Ireland) (London)
MCB	Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
MHK	Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā of Bhāvaviveka
N	Narthang (Snar-thang) Edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka

NB	Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti
P	Peking Edition (Tokyo-Kyoto Reprint) of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka
PS	Pramāṇasamuccaya
T	Taishō Daizōkyō
TJ	Tarkajvālā of Bhāvaviveka
WZKSO	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens

TIBETAN TRANSCRIPTION

In order to avoid diacritical marks, we adapt "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription" described by Turrell Wylie in <u>HJAS</u>, 22, December 1959, pp. 261-67. This system is devised by members of the Inner Asia Project at the University of Washington:

ཀ	ka,	ཁ	kha,	ག	ga,	ང	nga,
ཅ	ca,	ཆ	cha,	ཇ	ja,	ཉ	nya,
ཏ	ta,	ཐ	tha,	ད	da,	ན	na,
པ	pa,	ཕ	pha,	བ	ba,	མ	ma,
ཙ	tsa,	ཚ	tsha,	ཛ	dza,		
ཝ	wa,	ཞ	zha,	ཟ	za	འ	'a,
ཡ	ya,	ར	ra,	ལ	la,		
ཤ	sha,	ས	sa,	ཧ	ha,	ཨ	a,

NOTES

Chapter I

1. The founders of scientific Buddhist studies in Europe are Hodgson, Burnouf, Fausböll, Prinsep, Kern, Csoma Körösi, etc. Among them, Hodgson (1800-1894), the Indian Civil Service official and British Resident in Nepal, utilized his long stay in that country to make a valuable collection of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts which had been taken there by Buddhist monks who took refuge in Nepal from the Moslem invasion in the twelfth century. Hodgson not only procured these manuscripts, but also divided them between the libraries of Calcutta, London and Paris. Burnouf used these manuscripts for his Buddhist studies.

2. Burnouf, Eugène, Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien (Paris, Imprimerie Royale, 1844), 499. Reference here is to the 1876 reprint which differs only in pagination and has preface by Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, "Notice sur les travaux de M. Eugène Burnouf."

3. Csoma Körösi, "Notice of the different systems of Buddhism," JASB, 7,1, (1838), 144.

4. Julien, Stanislas, Mémoires sur les contrées Occidentales par Hiouen-thsang, (Paris, 1858), 112, n.2. En chinois, Thsing-pien "celui qui discute avec clarté. "P'o-pi-fei-kia paraît être l'abréviation du nom de Bhâvavivêka, que cite Burnouf (Introd. du Bouddh. p. 156)."

5. Schiefner, Anton, Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien, (St. Petersburg, 1869, Suzuki Reprint series 3), p. 136.

6. Nanjō, Bunyū, A Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, (Oxford, 1883).

7. Poussin, Louis de La Vallée, "Nanjio's 1185, Bhāvaviveka," Album Kern, (1903), pp. 581-3 and JRAS (1903), p. 581.

8. Cf. Wassiljew, W, Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur, (St. Petersburg, 1860) (This is the German translation by Schiefner from the Russian original published in 1857), cited by La Vallée Poussin in his "Bhāvaviveka," MCB 2, (1932-1933), p. 60. The name Mañjughoṣahāsavajra is a reconstruction of 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa.' The first 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa (=*Mañjughoṣa-[vajra]hāsa (1648-1721) is famous for his voluminous Grub mtha' chen mo (the large siddhānta) where the sub-schools of the Mādhyamika are treated extensively. See

Lokesh Chandra, "The Life and Works of 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa," Central Asiatic Journal, 7, 4, 1962, pp. 264-269.

9. Stcherbatsky, Theodore, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, (Leningrad, 1927), p. 120.

10. Walleser, Max, Der ältere Vedānta, Geschichte, Kritik und Lehre, (Heidelberg, 1910).

11. Prajñāpradīpa, A Commentary on the Madhyamaka-sūtra by Bhāvaviveka, ed. in Tibetan by Walleser, (Calcutta, 1914, Bibliotheca Indica first volume only).

12. Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Chūgan-bu, 2. (Tōkyō, Daitō Shuppan-sha, 1930).

13. Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Chūgan-bu, 3. (Tōkyō, Daitō Shuppan-sha, 1932).

14. Poussin, "Madhyamaka," L'auteur du Joyau dans la main; 3, traduction du Joyau dans la main. MCB, 2, (1932-1933), pp. 60-138.

15. Śāstri, N. Aiyaswami, "Karatalaratna," Visva-Bharati Annals, 2, XVI+119 + appendix. (1949).

16. Śāstri, N. Aiyaswami, "Madhyamārthasaṃgraha of Bhāvaviveka," JORM, 5, 1, (1931), pp. 41-49.

17-27. Bibliographical details will be given in II-2, "The Works of Bhāvaviveka."

28. For example, many prominent scholars such as Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Schayer, Lamotte, De Jong and May spent a good many years of their lives to translate the Prasannapadā into European languages. For a bibliography, see Johannes Rahder's article in IBK, 19, 2, 1961, p.345ff.

29. Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought of India, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp.238-239.

Chapter II

Literary History

1. The Life of Bhāvaviveka

Here, we extract some data from the legendary accounts which are available both in Chinese and Tibetan sources.

Name:- The name of Bhāvaviveka is a subject of debate, because various forms for this supposedly one ācārya appear in different texts either original or reconstructed, e.g., Bhāvaviveka, Bhavya, Bhavyaka, Bhavyakāra, Bhavyaviveka, Bhāvaviveka, Bhāvivikta and Bhagavadviveka, which can be tabulated as follows:

Reference	Sanskrit	Tibetan	Chinese transliteration	Chinese translation
Prasanna-padā	Bhāvaviveka	Legs-ldan 'byed-pa	-	-
Tarkajvālā	Bhagavad-viveka	Bha-bya	-	-
Prajñā-pradīpa	-	Legs-ldan-'byed	-	Fen-pieh-ming
Nanjō Catalogue	*Nirdeśapra-bha	-	-	Fen-pieh-ming
Nanjō Catalogue	*Bhāvaviveka	-	-	Ching-pien
Hsi-yü-chi (T2087,930-c)	-	-	P'o-p'i-fei-chia	Ching-pien
Shih-chia-fang-chih (T2088,966-c)	-	-	P'o-p'i-fei-chia	Ming-pien
Pien-cheng-lun (T2110,513-b)	-	-	P'o-p'i-fei-chia	Fen-pieh-ming
Tāranātha	-	Legs-ldan	-	-
Dpag bsam ljon bzang	-	Legs-ldan-'byed or Snang-bral		-
Mahāvyutpatti No. 3492	*Bhavyah	Skal-ldan	-	Yu-ch'ing-fen

We can easily see the three contrasting names in this chart, i.e., while the Sanskrit sources have Bhāvaviveka and Bhagavadviveka, the Chinese sources indicate only Bhāviveka (P'o-p'i-fei-chia). In order to get Bhāvaviveka from Chinese accounts, Chinese transliteration needs one extra character, e.g., *P'o-p'o-p'i-fei-chia. Moreover, *Bhāvaviveka* and the Chinese translation Ch'ing-pien do not tally. Some scholars try to solve this difficulty by saying, "The Chinese character ch'ing (清) is a mistake for ch'ing (情) which can be taken as *bhāva* in Sanskrit."[1] The Tibetan tradition has the three different ways, i.e., translated names *Legs-ldan-byed*, *Legs-ldan-'byed* and the transliterated name *Bhabya* (=Legs-ldan or Skal-ldan). They can be restored into Sanskrit as *Bhavyakara*, *Bhavyaviveka* and *Bhavya*. Shōsin Ōtake suggests the following theory: Two Chinese translated names *Ch'ing-pien* and *Fen-pieh-ming* indicate one and the identical person whose original name is Bhāviveka.[2] Due to some unknown process, *Bhāviveka* was altered to *Bhāvaviveka*. This explanation tallies with the Tibetan translation *Legs-ldan-'byed* or *Legs-ldan*.

Conclusion:

One can use any one of these three forms, i.e., *Bhāviveka*, *Bhāvaviveka*, *Bhavya*. However, it is important to discern the essential part of his name, namely *viveka* which is combined with Bhagavat, Bhā, Bhāva or Bhava. Curiously enough, nothing is more appropriate to characterize his

works than the term <u>viveka</u> (discernment) which we shall witness in due course of this study.

Date:- The only information we have about the date of Bhāvaviveka is from materials which include many legends reported in several 'Records.' However, these records differ widely and wildly. For example, I-ching (A.D. 635-715) classifies the successive generations of Mahāyāna masters of India as follows:[3]

"In ancient [times, there were the masters] like Nāgārjuna, [Ārya-]deva and Aśvaghoṣa; in the middle, [there were] the followers [of the ancients like] Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, Saṃghabhadra and Bhāvaviveka; in recent [times, there was] the generation of Diṅnāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, Śīlabhadra as well as Siṃhacandra,[4] Sthiramati, Guṇamati, Prajñagupta, Guṇabhadra and Jinaprabha."

No contemporary scholar will agree with I-ching when he places Bhāvaviveka earlier than Diṅnāga, Śīlabhadra and Dharmapāla. However, opinions are divided concerning Bhāvaviveka's relationship with Sthiramati and Guṇamati. Therefore, we shall elucidate these two points of agreement and disagreement according to the works of Ui,[5] Frauwallner [6] and Kajiyama.[7] The methods of this historical detective work are: 1) Comparison with the other 'Records,' 2) the epigraphical evidences, and 3) the inter-textual evidences.

1. Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla, Śīlabhadra.

1) According to a Chinese account[8] the thirty-year-old Hsüan-tsang (A.D. 600-664) met Śīlabhadra, a disciple of Dharmapāla, who was one hundred and six years old in A.D. 634. Therefore, Śīlabhadra was born in A.D. 529 and died in A.D.

645.

2) Having obtained the greatest fame as a Buddhist scholar, a South Indian named Dharmapāla, the son of a minister of Kāñcīpura, retired at the age of twenty-nine and dwelt at the Bödhi Tree. Spending the four remaining years of his life in meditation and composition, he died at the age of thirty-two.[9] According to Hsüan-tsang, Dharmapāla is only one year senior to Śīlabhadra. Thus, he was born ca. A.D. 530.

3) According to Hsüan-tsang, Bhāvaviveka wanted to see the retired Dharmapāla, who refused his request. Bhāvaviveka died nine years later, in South India.[10] Thus, Śīlabhadra, Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla were contemporary.

2. Bhāvaviveka, Guṇamati and Sthiramati.

It has been argued by both Tsukinowa and Ui that Sthiramati, older than Bhāvaviveka, influenced Bhāvaviveka.[11] Frauwallner placed Sthiramati A.D. 510-570 in his article "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." While accepting Frauwallner's date, Kajiyama recently presented a diametrically opposed theory that it was Bhāvaviveka who influenced Sthiramati and not vice versa in his article "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla."[12] Here, we have welcome epigraphical evidence which gives us a most important clue for determining the date of Sthiramati. However, before going into the detailed discussion of this question, it might not be out of place here to describe the Maitraka kings who

were the benefactors of Buddhist Studies in Gujerat.[13]

After the breakup of the Gupta empire around the middle of the sixth century A.D. the Maitraka kingdom was established in Saurashtra (Gujerat). The Maitraka kings were enlightened rulers under whom their capital, Valabhī, became a center of learning, i.e., 'Nālandā' in western India. Although these kings professed the Brahmaṇical Śaiva faith, they also patronized Buddhism, as they made "several money-grants and land-grants to the Buddhist monasteries that sprang up in the capital and its vicinity."[14]

One of the inscriptions dated A.D. 588 [15] states that 'Ācārya Bhadanta Sthiramati founded the vihāra of Śrī Bappāpāda at Valabhī.' Moreover, King Guhasena's grant of A.D. 565 to the Duḍḍā monasteries specifies the acquisition of 'books on Buddhism' (Saddharmasya pustakapakra).[16]

Thus, Valabhī became one of the two important centers of Buddhist Studies in India by A.D. 690, as I-ching reports:[17]

"Most of the [eminent scholars and students] reside in the Nālandā monastery or in the country of Valabhī. These two places are like Chin-ma, Shih-ch'ü, Lung-men and Ch'ueh-li[18] [in China], the talents gather there like clouds and discuss rights and wrongs [of doctrine]."

It was perhaps in one of these discussions when Sthiramati criticized Bhāvaviveka as Kajiyama has shown.

"Regarding this point, another Ācārya, Sthiramati, writes in his own commentary [MV] as follows: This probans proposed by the commentator [Bhāvaviveka] which consists of 'otherness' is fallacious because of incompatibility....."[19]

Moreover, Nozawa and Kajiyama have shown that Bhāvaviveka attacks Guṇamati, a teacher of Sthiramati,

in his Prajñāpradīpa.[20] Guṇamati is, according to Hsüan-tsang, a man of South India, 'who in his youth displayed great talents and acquired early in life a brilliant reputation.' He is also described as having won renown by victories in several religious disputations including the one with Mādhava of the Sāṃkhya school.[21]

Place of birth:- Malayagiri[22] province or Dhānyakaṭaka[23] country in South India.

Fa Lin (法琳) says in his Pien-cheng-lun (T. 2110, 513b):

The Prajñāpradīpaśāstra, about six thousand Sanskrit verses was composed by a bodhisattva Bhāviveka (Fen-pieh-ming in Chinese), of a noble lineage of Magadha.

Ui's Konsaisu bukkyō jiten, (A Concise Buddhist Dictionary) informs us that his birthplace was Dhānyakaṭaka in South India.[24]

However, Tāranātha says:[25] Ācārya Bhavya (legs-ldan) was born to an illustrious royal family of Malyara in the South. (slob dpon legs ldan ni lho phyogs malyarar rgyal rigs mchog tu skye ba brnyes).

Sum-pa-mkhan-po also says:[26] Bhāvaviveka was born in a royal lineage of Malayagiri(?) in the South. (lho phyogs ma lya rar rgyal rigs su 'khrungs te).

Hence, these accounts do not agree on the matter. Although Fa-lin's statement cannot easily be dismissed, we feel Bhāvaviveka's birth place is in South India, because his major activities took place in South India, as Tāranātha relates:[27]

Having become a monk in this very region, he thoroughly familiarized himself with the Tripiṭaka. Then, having gone to the central country, he received [instruction] in the various sūtras of the Mahāyāna and the nirdeśa of Nāgārjuna.

(yul de nyid du rab tu byung nas sde snod gsum la mkhas par byas / yul dbus su byon nas slob dpon sde 'dun srung ba las / theg pa chen po'i mdo sde du ma dang lku sgrub kyi man ngag nos te).

It is beyond any doubt that he was at home not only with the Buddhist sūtras and śāstras, but also many sūtras and śāstras of other Indian philosophical systems as we have already seen in the introduction of this study. It is also certain that Bhāvaviveka liked nyāya and studied it deeply. As N. Aiyaswami Śāstri puts it:

What Diṅnāga did for the Vijñānavāda, Bhāvaviveka did in the cause of the Madhyamaka doctrine. He is as much reputed in the field of logic as Diṅnāga. (Śāstri, "Karatala-ratna", p.vii).

The folloing statement of Hsüan-tsang should be read against the above background: [28]

Not far from the city of the South, there is a great cliff. It is here the śāstra-master, P'o-p'i-fei-chia (Ch'ing-pien in Chinese) remains in the palace of the asuras (o-su-lo), awaiting to see the arrival of Maitreya Bodhisattva as a perfect Buddha. The śāstra-master was a man of magnanimity and profound virtue. Outwardly, he made a display of Saṃkhya garb and inwardly he propagated the learning of Nāgārjuna.[29] Having heard that Dharmapāla of Magadha was propagating the teachings of [Buddha]-dharma, and had many thousand disciples, he wanted to debate with him. Having taken his religious staff, he came to Pātaliputra. Having learnt that Dharmapāla bodhisattva was staying at the Bodhi Tree, the śāstra-master ordered [his] disciples as follows: " Go to Dharmapāla bodhisattva's residence at the Bodhi Tree and convey my message---'A bodhisattva propagates the teaching left [by Buddha] and guides and inspires the adversaries. [I] have been admiring [your] virtue for a long time. And yet, failing to fulfil my long cherished desire, I was not able to have an audience [with you]. I certainly will not see the Bodhi Tree in vain. Upon seeing it, I shall certainly have a testimony [i.e., Dharmapāla] and shall be called a teacher of gods and men [as Siddhārtha had been and you might perhaps have been][30]

Dharmapāla bodhisattva answered the messenger as follows:

'The world of man is like a phantom and life is like a bubble. Although I [have been] exerting myself all day long, I still cannot find leisure for a debate. Although the messenger and message went back and forth, the meeting did not take place. Having returned to his own country,[31] the śāstra-master led a quiet [life] and reflected as follows: Until Maitreya becomes a Buddha, who is there that can allay my doubts.'

The last part of Hsüan-tang's record is in agreement with Tāranātha when he relates: [32]

Upon returning to his family in the South, [Ācārya Bhavya] saw the countenance of Vajrapāṇi and realized an excellent samādhi. After becoming the head of about fifty monasteries in the South, he greatly expounded the Dharma. After the death of Ācārya Buddhapālita, he read several treatises by him. Refuting the late ācārya's [Buddhapālita] method of discussion, he composed his commentary to the Mūla-mādhyamika-kārikā. There were not many disciples of Buddhapālita among those who faithfully adhered to the texts for the doctrine of no-own-being (niḥsvabhāvavāda) of the Madhyamaka composed by these two ācāryas. On the other hand, ācārya Bhavya had many disciples. Being followed by several thousand monks, this school [the Mādhyamika] spread far and wide.

(slar yang lho phyogs kyi rgyud du gshegs nas phyag na rdo rje'i zhal mthong bar mdzad de / ting nge 'dzin khyad par can yang bsgrubs / lho phyogs kyi gtug lag khang lnga bcu tsam gyi bdag po mdzad de chos mang du bstan / slob dpon sangs rgyas bskyangs sku 'das pa'i 'og rol tu des mdzad pa'i bstan bcos rnams gzigs / dbu ma rtsa ba'i gzhung la slob dpon snga ma'i bzhed pa de sun phyung* te / 'grel pa mdzad cing klu sgrub kyi man ngag la brten par zhal gyis bzhes nas mdo sde 'ga' zhig la 'grel pa mdzad do / ..... / de la slob dpon 'di gnyis kyis dbu ma ngo bo nyid med par smra ba'i gzhung btsugs shin sangs rgyas bskyangs slob ma ha cang mang ba ma yin kyang / slob dpon legs ldan ni slob ma chin tu mang ba dge slong stong phrag du ma rjes su 'brang ba yin pas lugs de shin tu dar bar gyur ro)

*Ms. phyin.

To sum up: There were three major centers of Buddhist Studies in sixth century A.D. India, i.e., Nālandā in the east, Valabhī in the west, and Dhānyakaṭaka in the south. The period of Indian philosophy between Nāgārjuna and Śānti-rakṣita is, as Gokhale says:

"So full of daring attempts on the part of Indian thinkers to discover new approaches and establish new formulations (such as those of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti among others) that after the earliest period of revolutionary thought-ferment in the times of the Upaniṣad, Mahāvīra and Gotama, this seems to be the most fertile and progressive period of Indian philosophy." (Gokhale, "Gotama's vision," p. 113).

It was in this period that Bhāvaviveka, a South Indian Mādhyamika master who was well equipped with the learnings of Buddhism as well as the other Indian philosophical systems, conducted a vigorous study of the Mādhyamika, both in writings and debates. In fact, he was perhaps the first Indian thinker to make a comprehensive study of the siddhāntas of other schools in defence of his own school. Bhāvaviveka was particularly impatient with anyāya (wrong reasoning).

For example, while quoting the Dkar po 'char ba (Śukla-abhyudaya or Sadabhyudaya), he says,[33]

"We do not refute Ācārya Buddhapālita's commentary on the Mādhyamika-śāstra out of jealousy (īrṣyā). We refute it because it is wrongly reasoned (anyāya). However, we do not quote Devaśarman because of courtesy (anunaya), but because we are overwhelmed by the thoroughness of his work."
(gang gi phyir bdag gis phrag dog gis slob dpon buddhapālita'i rnam par bshad pa sun dbyung bar byas pa ma yin gyi / 'di ltar mi rigs pa'i phyir sun dbyung ngo / slob dpon de ba, sharma la rjes su chags pa yang ma yin mod kyi / de'i rnam par bshad pa 'di la skyon med pas de'i phyir bdag 'di la rjes su yid rang bas de'i gzhung yang 'dir smos so /[34]

Thus, he left us the voluminous systematic treatises which are valuable to us because they explain not only his unique position in the Mādhyamika systems, but also many other systems of Indian philosophy as well.

II.2 The Works of Bhāvaviveka.

Among many works attributed to Bhāvaviveka, the following are authentic.

(1). Skt.: Madhyamakahṛdaya-[kārikā] and its autocommentary (svavṛtti) called the Tarkajvālā.

An incomplete manuscript of the kārikā was discovered and hand copied by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana at the Zha-lu monastery in Tibet. He presented this manuscript to V. V. Gokhale of Poona, India. The Sanskrit manuscript of the Tarkajvālā is not extant.

Chin.: Nil.

Tib.: Dbu ma'i snying po and Dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel ba rtog ge 'bar ba.

Tōhoku Catalogue, Nos. 3855 and 3856, trsl. by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and Tshul-khrims-rgyal-ba, in the monastery of Ra sa 'phrul snang in Lhasa.

Eng.: Heart of the Mādhyamika and the autocommentary called Flame of Reasoning.

The Sanskrit Mādhyamika-hṛdaya-kārikā, consisting roughly of 930 anuṣṭubh verses, is divided into the following eleven chapters.

Chapter One.

Skt.: Bodhicittāparityāga.

Tib.: Byang chub sems mi btang ba.

Eng.: Non-abandonment of the thought of enlightenment.

Chapter Two.

Skt.: Munivratasamāśraya.

Tib.: Thub pa'i brtul zhugs la yang dag par bsten pa.

Eng.: Resorting to the vows of the Muni.

Chapter Three.

Skt.: Tattvajñānaiṣaṇā.

Tib.: De kho na nyid kyi shes pa 'tshol pa.

Eng.: The quest for the knowledge of ultimate reality.

Tib. to Jap.: Nozawa, Jōshō, Mikkyō Bunka, 28, (1954), pp. 46-53, 29/30, (1955), pp. 44-56, 31, (1955), pp. 26-38, 34, (1956), pp. 31-43.

Skt. & Tib. to Eng.: See Chapter IV of this study.

Skt. to Eng.: Gokhale, V. V., IIJ, 5, (1961-2), pp. 271-275. An edition and annotated translation of verses 275-284.

Chapter Four.

Skt.: Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra.

Tib.: Nyan thos kyi de kho na nyid 'jug pa.

Eng.: Introduction to the ascertainment of the tattva of the Śrāvaka.

Tib. to Jap.: Nozawa, Jōshō, "Shōben no Shōmon Hihan" (Bhāvaviveka's criticism of the Śrāvakas), Mikkyō Kenkyū, No. 88, (1944), pp. 45-71. This is a study on the basis of this chapter. Cf. Nozawa, "Indo ni okeru Daijō Hibussetsuron,"

(Criticism of the authenticity of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India).
Otani Gakuhō, Vol. 22, No. 2, (1941), pp. 45-71.
A portion of this chapter, which contains a description of the eighteen schools of Buddhism, has been treated as an independent work of Bhāvaviveka as follows.

Skt.: Nikāyabhedavibhaṅga-vyākhyāna.

Tib.: Sde pa tha dad par 'byed pa dang rnam par bshad pa.

Eng.: An exposition on the schism among diverse schools.

Tib. to Eng.: Rockhill, William Woodville, Life of Buddha, (London, 1884), pp. 181-196.

Tib. to Ger.: Walleser, Max, Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus, (Heidelberg, 1927), pp. 78-93.

Tib. to Fr.: Bareau, André, "Trois traités, etc." JA, (1956), pp. 167-191.

Tib. edited text.: Teramoto, Enga & Hiramatsu, Tomotsugu, Kanzō-taishō-ibushūrinron, (A Study of the Samaya-bhedoparacanacakra-śāstra---A Comparative Study of Chinese and Tibetan texts), Kyōto, 1935.

Chapter Five.

Skt.: Yogācāratattvaviniścaya.

Tib.: Rnal 'byor spyod pa'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa la 'jug pa.

Eng.: Ascertainment of the tattva of the Yogācārins.

Tib. to Jap.: Yamaguchi, Susumu, <u>Bukkyō ni okeru Mu to U no Tairon</u>, (Buddhist controversies concerning existence and non-existence), (Kyōto, 1941). An edited Tibetan text of the <u>Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā</u> appears in the appendix of the volume.

Skt. to Eng.: Iida, Shōtarō, "Āgama (Scripture) and Yukti (Reason) in Bhāvaviveka," <u>Kanakura Kinen-ronbunshū</u>, (Kanakura Festschrift) (Tōkyō, 1966), pp. 79-96. Annotated translation and study of verses 1,7,8, & 9.

Chapter Six.

Skt.: <u>Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāra</u>.

Tib.: <u>Grangs can gyi de kho na nyid la 'jug pa</u>.

Eng.: Introduction to the <u>tattva</u> of the Sāṃkhya.

Jap.: Watanabe, Zuigan, "Chūgan Shinju no Suronha," (A refutation of Sāṃkhya theory in the Mādhyamika-hṛdaya-kārikā), <u>Shimizu Ryūzan Kinenronbunshū</u> (Shimizu Festschrift), (Tōkyō, 1940), pp. 640-667.

Hadano, Hakuyū, "Suron no pratibimba setsu ni tsuite," (On the pratibimba theory of the Sāṃkhya), <u>Bunka</u>, Vol. 11, No. 3, (1944), pp. 1-43, and Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 36-62.

———. "Suronha ni okeru Gedatsuron to Suronge," (The mokṣa theory in Sāṃkhya school and the Sāṃkhya-kārikā), <u>IBK</u>, Vol. 1, No. 1, (1952), pp. 164-171.

Honda, Megumu, "Sāṃkhya philosophy described by his opponent Bhavya," IBK, Vol. XVI, No. 1, (1967), pp. (33)-(38)

These are the studies based on this chapter.

Chapter Seven.

Skt.: Vaiśeṣika-tattva-niścaya.

Tib.: Bye brag pa'i de kho na nyid la 'jug pa.

Eng.: Ascertainment of the tattva of the Vaiśeṣika.

Tib. to Jap.: Miyasaka, Yūshō, "Shōben inyō no Vaiśeṣika tetsugakusetsu," (The Vaiśeṣika philosophy quoted by Bhavya), Bunka, Vol. 18, No. 3, (1954), pp. 24-40.

-------. "Bhavya to Vaiśeṣika gakusetsu," (Bhavya and the Vaiśeṣika doctrines), Shūkyō Kenkyū, No. 133, (1954), pp. 173-177.

-------. "Ronri no honoho ni okeru Vaiśeṣika Tetsugaku," (Vaiśeṣika philosophy in the Tarkajvālā), Kōyasan Daigaku Ronsō, (Collected papers from the University of Kōyasan), Vol. I, No. 1, (1958), pp. 1-37.

Chapter Eight.

Skt.: Vedāntatattvaviniścaya.

Tib.: Rig byed kyi mthar smra ba'i de kho na nyid la 'jug pa.

Eng.: Ascertainment of the tattva of the Vedānta.

Tib. to Ger.: Walleser, Max, Der ältere Vedānta, Geschichte, Kritik und Lehre, (Heidelberg, 1910). This is a study on the basis of chapter eight and part of chapter four of the Tarkajvālā.

Tib. to Jap.: Nakamura, Hajime, Shoki no Vedānta Tetsugaku, (The Early Vedānta Philosophy), (Tōkyō, 1950), pp. 238-332. This is a translation and analysis of this chapter. See its English summary, "Upaniṣadic Tradition and the Early School of Vedānta, as noticed in Buddhist Scripture," HJAS, Vol. 18, No. 1 & 2, (June 1955), pp. 74-104.

Skt. & Tib. to Eng.: Gokhale, V. V. "The Vedānta-philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamaka-hṛdaya," IIJ, Vol. 2, (1958), pp. 165-180. This is an edition and an annotated translation of the Sanskrit text of the first sixteen kārikās of this chapter together with its commentary, the Tibetan version of the Tarkajvālā. This part of the chapter contains the pūrvapakṣa, which is a statement of the Vedāntic position as understood by pre-Śaṃkara Bhāvaviveka.

Tib. ed.: Nakamura, Hajime, "The Tibetan text of the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti-tarkajvālā," IIJ, Vol. 2, (1958), pp. 181-190.

Chapter Nine.

Skt.: Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra.

Tib.: Dpyod pa'i de kho na ñyid gtan la dbab pa la 'jug pa.

Eng.: Introduction to the ascertainment of the tattva of the Mīmāṃsaka.

Chapter Ten.

Skt.: Sarvajñatāsiddhinirdeśa.

Tib.: Thams cad mkhyen pa nyid du grub par bstan pa.

Eng.: Exposition on the proof of the omniscience [of the Buddha].

Chapter Eleven.

Skt.: Stutilakṣaṇanirdeśa.

Tib.: Bstod pa dang mtshan bstan pa.

Eng.: Exposition on the eulogy and the marks.

(2). Tib.: Dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma, (Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti).

Tōhoku 3853, translated by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and Tshul-rgyal-ba, in the monastery of Ra sa 'phral snang in Lhasa.

Skt.: Nil

Chin.: Pan-jo-teng-lun, T. 1566, translated by Po-lo-p'o-chia-lo-mi-tiu-li (*Prabhākaramitra) at Sheng-kuang-szu in Ch'ang-an 630-632 A.D.

Chin. to Jap.: Hatani, Ryōtai, Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Chūganbu 2, (Tōkyō, Daitō Shuppansha, 1930).

Tib. ed.: Walleser, Max, Prajñāpradīpa (incomplete), Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, 1396, (Calcutta, 1914).

Tib. to Ger.: Kajiyama, Yuichi, "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñā-pradīpaḥ (1, Kapitel)," WZKSO, Vol. 7, (1963), pp. 37-62, WZKSO, Vol. 8, (1964), pp. 100-130.

Tib. to Jap.:-------. "Chie no Tomoshibi," (The lamp of wisdom), Daijō Butten, (The Mahāyāna Buddhist texts), pp. 287-328.

This is a complete and annotated translation of Chapter Eighteen of the Prajñāpradīpa.

Ichigo, Masamichi, "Chūganha to Suronha to no Tairon," (Mādhyamika's criticism of the soul-theory of Sāṃkhya as found in Prajñāpradīpa, XVIII), IBK, Vol. XV, No. 2, (1967).

-------. "Chūganha to Katsuron Shōrigakuha to no Tairon," (Mādhyamika's criticism of [the ātman] of the Vaiśeṣika and the Naiyāyika), Tōhōgaku, No. 34, pp. 95-76.

(3). Tib.: Shes rab sgron ma'i rgya cher 'grel pa, (Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā).

Tōhoku 3859, translated by Jñānagarbha, Klu'i rgyal-mtshan.

Skt.: Nil

Chin.: Nil

Eng.: The sub-commentary (ṭīkā) by Avalokitavrata on Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa.

Chapter One.

Tib.: Rkyen brtag pa shes bya ste rab tu byed pa dang po'i rgya cher 'grel pa.

Eng.: The sub-commentary on the first chapter, the examination of pratyaya.

Tib. to Jap.: Nozawa, Jōshō, "Tokue, Daibasetsuma no Chūronsho no Zankan," (The fragments of the Commentary to the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā by Devaśarman and by Guṇamati, quoted in the Prajñā-pradīpa), IBK, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1955), pp. 90-95. Nozawa's translation corresponds with the following pages of the Tōkyō Reprint of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka: 1) from Vol. 96, p. 235, Col. 4, L. 8. to 96, 236, 4, 2 (Guṇamati), 2) from 96, 246, 2, 6 to 96, 246, 5, 8 and from 97, 6, 2, 5 to 97, 6, 3, 3 (Devaśarman). No translations of chapters two to twenty-four have been published.

Chapter Twenty-five.

Tib.: Mya ngan las 'das pa....

Tib. to Jap.: Yasui, Kōsai, Chūgan Shisō no Kenkyū, (A Study of Mādhyamika Philosophy), (Kyōto, Hōzōkan, 1961), pp. 306-372. Yasui examines the details of the controversy between the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra in this chapter (Ibid., 224-304).

(4) Chin.: Chang-chung-lun, (掌珍論) (A treatise [entitled] Jewel in the Palm of the Hand) T.1578 translated by Hsüan-tsang.

Skt.: Nil

Tib.: Nil

Chin. to Jap.: Hatani, Ryōtai, Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Chūganbu 3, (Tōkyō, Daitō Shuppansha, 1932), pp.99-138.

Chin. to Fr.: Poussin, Louis de La Vallée, Le Joyau dans la main, MCB, Vol. 2, (1932-1933), pp. 68-138.

Chin. to Skt.: Śāstri, N. Aiyaswami, "Karatalaratna," Visva-Bharati Annals, Vol. 2, (Santiniketan, 1949), pp. 33-99.

(5) Tib.: Dbu ma'i don bsdus pa. (Madhyamakārtha-saṃgraha). Tōhoku 3857, translated by Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba.

Skt.: Nil

Chin.: Nil

This is a small work consisting of about twelve verses, but definitely by Bhāvaviveka.

Tib. to Skt. & Eng.: Śāstri, N. Aiyaswami, "Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha of Bhavya," JORM, Vol. 5, No. 1, (Jan.-Mar. 1931), pp. 41-9.

Yamaguchi has shown that the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (Tōhoku 3854) which is attributed to Bhavya, belongs to the later Prāsaṅgika school. His reasons are: 1) There are several places where three ācāryas, i.e., Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti are saluted, 2) Dharmakīrti's statement is quoted, 3) the Pañca-yukti-kāya of the Prāsaṅgika is mentioned. (Yamaguchi, Bukkyō ni okeru Mu to U no Tairon, pp. 54-56).

Schayer independently reached the same conclusion.

The Madhyamaka-pratītyasamutpāda (Tōhoku 3858) is wrongly attributed to Bhāvaviveka by Vaidya, because the name Nag-po-pa is clearly mentioned in the colophon of the work. Yamaguchi also dismisses this case by judging the contents of the work which, according to him, might belong to Śāntirakṣita's school (op. cit.).

II.3 <u>The place of Bhāvaviveka among the Mādhyamika-subschools.</u>

As T. R. V. Murti says:

The Mādhyamika system seems to have been perfected at one stroke by the genius of its founder Nāgārjuna. There have not been many important changes in its philosophy since that time. (Murti, Buddhism, p. 87).

Murti also distinguishes the following four periods of the Mādhyamika schools.

First period: the stage of systematic formulation by Nagarjuna (ca.A.D.150) and his immediate disciple Āryadeva.

Second period: the splitting up of the Mādhyamika into the schools---the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika, represented by Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka.

Third period: Candrakīrti (early seventh century) reaffirms the Prāsaṅgika (reductio ad absurdum) as the norm of the Mādhyamika; the rigour and vitality of the system is in no small measure due to him. Santideva (A.D.691-743), though coming a generation or two later, may be taken as falling within this period.

Fourth Period: a syncretism of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika ---the chief representatives of which are Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (op. cit.).

However, Murti also does not fail to mention that "Mādhyamika is used both for the system and its advocates. Non-Buddhist writers invariably refer to the system as well as the adherents of it as Mādhyamika. Nāgārjuna or even Ārya [illegible] do not seem to have used either of these terms" (op. cit. n.1).

We have nothing to add to Murti's Periods here, except his approbation to Candrakīrti, i.e., "the rigour and vitality of the system is in no small measure due to him."

Here, Murti agrees with Stcherbatsky who says,

" a mighty champion of the purely negative method of establishing monism."

"He succeeds in driving Bhāvaviveka's school into the shade and finally settles that form of the Mādhyamika system which is now studied in all monastic schools of Tibet and Mongolia, where it is considered to represent the true philosophic basis of Mahāyāna Buddhism." (Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 67).

Although we reserve overall evaluation of Bhāvaviveka's system until the conclusion of this study, a different picture of the place of Bhāvaviveka among the Mādhyamika schools is in order here.

Our question is simple: If Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva did not seem to have used the term Mādhyamika to indicate the established school of thought, then who was really responsible for giving "the rigour and vitality" to the [Mādhyamika] system? The answer lies between two choices, i.e., Buddhapālita or Bhāvaviveka.

Among them,

"Buddhapālita," as Murti rightly describes, "takes the essence of the Mādhyamika method to consist of the use of reductio ad absurdum arguments alone (prasaṅga-vākya). The true Mādhyamika cannot uphold a position of his own: he has therefore no need to construct syllogisms and adduce arguments and examples. His sole endeavour is to reduce to absurdity the arguments of the opponent on principles acceptable to him." (op. cit. p. 95).

However, one might contend that this method of prasaṅga alone is too meagre to establish a philosophical system, as Yamaguchi says:[35]

"It is needless to say that any school of thought or denomination of religion should have the basic text which is endowed with such contents as [basic standpoint and criticism of other schools] in their formations [of schools and denominations]."

Yamaguchi holds the opinion that perhaps the Mādhyamika did not become a full-fledged school of thought until Bhāvaviveka wrote his Mādhyamikahṛdayakārikā. Because, as we have shown in the works of Bhāvaviveka, he begins his exposition with Chapters One and Two as its introduction and states clearly his basic standpoint in Chapter Three. After formulating his basic position, he begins to refutetwo other Buddhist schools, i.e., the Sravakayana and Yogacarins, in Chapters Four and Five. Having finished with the other Buddhist schools, he proceeds to refute the other philosophical systems, i.e., Samkhya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa and Vedanta in Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine respectively.

Moreover, as Yamaguchi rightly points out,[36] Bhavaviveka's style was kept alive in such works as the Jñānasārasamuccaya, the Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa,[37] and the Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntirakṣita (eighth-ninth century Mādhyamika). Therefore, with Yamaguchi, we maintain that the rigour and the norm of the Mādhyamika system is in no small measure due to Bhāvaviveka, as will be shown in the course of this study.

As we mentioned earlier, Wassiliew sorted out the Mādhyamika ācaryas into two opposing schools---the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika and the Svātantrika Mādhyamika on the basis of the siddhānta by the first 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa (A.D. 1648-1721). The second 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa was Dkon-mchog-'jig-med-dpang-po-ye-shes-brtson-'grus-grags-pa'i-sde-dpal-bzang-po

(A.D. 1728-1791).[39] He is known by his short title Kun-mkhyen-sku-bar-ba and his short but well-written siddhānta, The Precious Garland (Grub-pa'i-mtha'i rnam-par-bzhag-pa rin-po che'i-phreng-ba).[40]

This work is utterly unknown to the modern scholarly world.[41] For example, the work is not included in A Catalogue of the Tōhoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism. However, the text is well known among Tibetans, because this is one of the important introductions to the four principal systems of Buddhist philosophy, i.e., the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika.

In fact, when I made a request, without any qualification, to my Tibetan teacher, Bstan pa rgyal mtshan to compose his own treatise on Buddhism, he produced an extensive work entitled, Grub mtha'i rnam gzhag blo gsal thar 'dod 'jug ngos zhes bya ba, (A determination (vyavavasthāna) of siddhānta, called a ford [to those who] desire liberation by clear intelligence). This 'ford' is, as far as we are aware, the newest instance of Tibetan siddhānta literature.[42]

However, here, a question might be raised: How accurately do these Tibetan Siddhāntas describe the actual subdivisions of Indian Buddhism?

Yamakami states his doubts:[43]

> These four probably represented the principal classes of Buddhists who flourished in India at the time when militant Vedantism was hurling its missiles against the moribund faith of Sugata. The works of the Buddhists—so far as I am aware, know of no such fourfold classification, so that,

if I depart from it, I shall at least have the satisfaction of erring in good company, if at all it be an error to analyse Buddhism from the Buddhist point of view. (Yamakami, Systems, p. 102).

This classification is employed not only by Mādhava of fourteenth century A.D. in his sarvadarśanasamgraha,[43] etc., but also by contemporary Indian writers when dealing with Buddhism, for example, by Krishna Warrier in his The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedānta.[44]

However, this classification is not entirely without justification, because some Buddhists use it themselves, as in:[45]

1). Ye shes snying po kun las bsdus pa shes bya ba'i bshad sbyar. (Jñānasārasamuccaya-nāma-nibandhana, Tōhoku, 3852) by post-Śāntarakṣita, Bodhibhadra.

This is a commentary to an authentic Indian Mādhyamika text- Ye shes snying po kun las bsdus pa (Jñānasāra-samuccaya, Tōhoku, 3851) falsely ascribed to Āryadeva. In these two works, as Yamaguchi has shown, having summarized the other Indian philosophical systems, they state the siddhāntas of the above four Buddhist schools in sequence.

2). The Tarka-bhāṣya by Mokṣākāra-gupta (ca. A.D. 1050-1292).[46] Having published an English translation of this text, Kajiyama notes:[47]

At the end of the third chapter, our author briefly reproduces the main theories of the four Buddhist schools, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārin and Mādhyamika (§30-33). This portion is particularly interesting and important, since we do not have many descriptions of the same kind in other Buddhist texts and since it became a model when Guṇaratna (and

probably Mādhava) wrote a summary of Buddhist doctrines in the Tarkarahasyadīpikā (and the Sarvadarśanasamgraha). (Kajiyama, Tarkabhāṣā, p. 5).

Therefore, it will not be entirely out of place here to translate the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika[48] section of the Precious Garland[49] in the following section in order to have a 'bird's-eye view' of the later Indian Mādhyamika systems.

NOTES

Chapter II

1. Ōtake, Shōsin, "Shōben to Funbetsumyō," Mikkyō Kenkyū, 39, (1930), p. 119.

2. Op. cit., p. 125.

3. Nan hai chi kuei nei fa ch'uan, (A Record of the Buddhism in the Southern Archipelago). Taishō 54, No. 2125, p. 229b. cf. translated by Takakusu: A Record of the Buddhist Religion, as practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671-95), by I-tsing.

4. This name can be reconstructed as Candra-simha, a transliterated name 旃陀羅僧訶 is mentioned as a contemporary of Hsuan-tsang in the Tz'u-en ssu san-ts'ang fa-shih-ch'uan, Taishō 50, No. 2053, p. 244c, 1-12.

5. Ui Hakuju, Indo tetsugaku kenkyū, (Studies in Indian Philosophy), Vol. 5, (Tōkyō, 1929), pp. 128-130.

6. Frauwallner, Erich, "Landmarks of Indian Logicians," WZKSO, (1961), pp. 125-148.

7. Kajiyama, Yuichi, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati, and Dharmapāla" Festschrift Frauwallner, Prof. Kajiyama kindly sent me the typescripts of this article which is soon to be published from Vienna.

8. Ta-t'ang ta-tzu-en ssu san-tsang-fa-shih-chuan, Taishō, No. 2053, p. 236c.

9. Ta-t'ang hsi-yu-chi, Taishō, No. 2087, p. 930c, 26-931b4.

10. Op. cit.,

11. Tsukinowa, Kenryū, "Anne bosatsu no daijō chūgan shakuron ni tsuite," (On the commentary of the Mādhyamika-śāstra of Mahāyāna by Bodhisattva Sthiramati), Ryūkoku Daigaku Ronsō, No. 288, pp. 68-103.
-------, "Kanyaku hannya tōron no ichikōsatsu," (An aspect of the Chinese translation of the Prajñāpradīpa), Mikkyō Kenkyū, Nos. 33, 35, 40.
Ui, Op. cit.,

12. Kajiyama, op. cit., p. 7. "Thus, we must necessarily conclude that Sthiramàti quotes from Dignāga and Bhāvaviveka. Tsukinowa's argument that Sthiramati influenced Bhāvaviveka, and Ui's supposition about Sthiramati's elderness to Bhāvaviveka are both disproved."

13. The following description of the Maitraka kings is drawn from the chapter on the Maitraka Monasteries of Valabhī in Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India by Sukumar Dutt, (London, 1962), Dutt, in turn, bases his description on the works of Girija Sanker Vallbhaji, Historical Inscriptions of Gujerat (two volumes), (Bombay, 1935). Vriji, Ancient History of Squrāshtra, (1952).

14. Dutt, op. cit., p. 225.

15. Hajime Nakamura, as Kajiyama rightly mentions in his Bhāvaviveka, etc. introduced an important study of the inscriptions of the Maitraka kings by Sylvain Lévi to Japanese scholars. See "Inmyō ni oyoboshita kūkan no eikyō," (Influence of the concept of voidness on Indian Logic). Miyamoto, Shōson ed., Bukkyō no konpon shinri, (The fundamental truths of Buddhism) (Tokyo, 1956), p. 340. See Lévi, "Les donations religieuses des rois de Valabhī," Etudes de critique et d'histoire, II, 1896, pp. 75-100.---Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes-Études, Sciences religieuses, 7=Lévi Memorial, pp. 218-234 (cited by Nakamura). While Lévi places Sthiramati's inscription to King Guhasena, Dutt writes, "The name occurs in a grant to this monastery made by King Dhruvasena II [Misprint of Dhrasena II] in ca. A.D. 588, in which he makes mention of 'Ācārya Bhadanta Sthiramati who founded the vihāra of Śrī Bappāpada at Valabhī.' Here, Dutt follows the regnal years of the Maitraka kings given by Vriji's Ancient History of Sourāshtra. Here, the year of the Christian era is arrived at by adding 319 to that of the Gupta. Thus, difference of some thirty years exists between Lévi's date and Vriji's date on Sthiramati's inscription. This difference should be investigated.

16. Dutt, op. cit., p. 228.

17. I-ching, op. cit., p. 229. We might be able to say that Valabhi was 'the Bombay of antiquity', because "On one side of Valabhī flows a stream called Ghālā. It was anciently a river of considerable width and the main artery of outward merchant traffic..... From bordering fields on the north-west of the Ghālā stream have been dug out an assortment of broken pieces

of red polished ware of non-Indian make, imports from Persia or Rome with which Valabhī was in commercial intercourse in ancient times." (Dutt, op. cit., p. 224).

18. Obviously, these places were centers of learning in China at the time of I-ching.

19. Kajiyama, op. cit., p. 6, (typescripts). See also Nozawa, "Chūronsho no zankan," pp. 444-446.

20. See Kajiyama, Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpaḥ (1. Kapitel), WZKSO, B. VIII, S. 106.
Nozawa, "Tokue, Daibasetsuma, etc." pp. 91-93.
(Cf. II- - of this study).

21. Ta-t'ang hsi-yü-chi, Taisho, Vol. 51, p. 913c.

22. The province of Malayagiri or Malayakūṭa corresponds with the modern districts of Tanjor and Madura, on the east, with Coimbator, Cochin, and Travancore, on the west. The mountain named Malaya is famous for sandal-wood as its name indicates. See Alexander Cunningham, The Ancient Geography of India, 1963 reprint, Varanasi, p. 463.

23. Chinese transliteration of this name is T'e ne ka che ka (馱那羯磔迦國) A Chinese translation of this name seems to appear in the Ta-yün-ching (Mahāmegha-sūtra, Taishō 387, p. 1170a) as Shou ku cheng (熟穀城) which means 'city of ripe grain.' Since Cecil Bendall's Sanskrit edition of the "Megha-sūtra" (JRAS, 1880, pp. 286-311) does not include this section, we cannot ascertain the Sanskrit name here. However, Lokesh Candra's Dictionary gives the following. 'bras spungs='bras dkar spungs. dhānyakaṭaka. This name Dhānyakaṭaka possibly survives in the present Dharṇikoṭa, western neighbour of present Amarāvatī. According to R. G. Bhāndārkār, Dhānyakaṭaka was the Eastern capital of the Andhra dynasty. See his Early History of the Dekkan, (Calcutta, 1957), p. 420. See also Étienne Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, (Louvain, 1958), p. 382.

24. Ui, Hakuju, ed. Bukkyō jiten, (Tōsei Shuppansha, 1954), p. 553.

25. Guru Deva, Tāranātha's Chos-'byung, (Sārnāth, India, 1964), p. 130.

26. Das, Sarat Chandra, ed., Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzang, (Calcutta, 1908), p. 94.

27. Op. cit., p. 130.

28. Hsüan-tsang, op. cit., Taishō, No. 2087, p. 930c.

29. Julien translates the latter half of this problematic sentence, "Au dehors, il laissait voir le costume d'un religieux (Littéralement; le costume de seng-khie (l'assemblée - sangha); intérieurement, il possédait le vaste savoir de Long-meng (Nāgārdjouna)." Beal translates, "Externally he was a disciple of Kapila (Sāmkhya), but inwardly he was fully possessed of the learning of Nāgārjuna."(p. 223). Here, both translations do not seem to be correct. Certainly, it is not the case that "He is said to wear even a Sāṃkhyaic robe" as Megumu Honda says in his "Sāṃkhya Philosophy, etc." Arthur Link expresses the same opinion in conversation. He suggests, "the word fu (garb) should not be taken literary, but it only shows his competence in the Sāmkhya system." Moreover, the contrasting terms, nei and wai can be taken as 'inside-[learning], i.e., Buddhism' and 'outside-[learning], i.e., the other philosophical systems. We can attest this usage in the other section of the Hsi-yü-chi where a Sāmkhya master, Mādhava's learning is described in terms of nei and wai. (Op. cit., p. 913c). Here, for Mādhava, nei is the Sāṃkhya learning and wai should be non-Sāṃkhya learning.

30. Beal says, "this passage is obscure, and I offer my translation only as tentative. He translates:..... His followers look up to him with respect and humility, and so it has been for many days; nevertheless his vow and past determination have borne no fruit! Vain is to worship and visit the Bodhi Tree. Swear to accomplish your object, and then you will be in the end guide of gods and men." (Beal's Records, p. 224 and n. 109). Here, our translation is closer to Julien's: le P'ou-sa (Bōdhisattva), c'est-à-dire vous propage la sainte doctrine qu'a léguée le Bouddha, et il sert de guide aux hommes égarés. Il y a bien longtemps que j'admire humblement votre vertu; mais comme mon ancien voeu ne s'est pas encore réalisé, j'ai manqué de vous rendre ma respectueuse visite. J'ai juré de ne pas voir en vain l'abre P'ou-ti (Bōdhidrouma). (Julien, Mémoires, p.112).

31. We infer Bhāvaviveka's birth place as South India from this statement, i.e., 'his own country.'

32. Tāranātha, op. cit., p.130.

33. Nozawa, Jōshō, "Chūgan ryōgakuha no tairitsu to sono

shinrikan," (On the confrontation between the two Mādhyamika [sub-]schools and their views on reality) in Miyamoto ed. Bukkyō no konpon shinri, (Tōkyō, Sanseidō, 1956), p. 458. Devaśarman is a disciple of the Yogācārin Dharmapāla.

34. Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Tōkyō-Kyōto reprint, (1957), Vol. 96, p. 246, 3.

35. Yamaguchi, "Indo daijō kyōgakushi ni okeru kyōsō hanjaku no tenkai,"(The development of the sectarian classifications of Buddhism in the history of Indian Mahayana Buddhist thought), Ōtani Daigaku Gakuhō, Vol. 24 & 25 (1944), p. 28.

36. Op. cit., p. 28.

37. Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa is falsely ascribed to Bhāvaviveka. See Yamaguchi, "Chūganha ni okeru chūgansetsu no kōyōsho," (The treatises on the basic standpoints of Mādhyamika in the Mādhyamika school), Ōtani Daigaku Kenkyū Nenpō, No. 2, (1943), pp. 71-133.

38. This date is given by Lokesh Chandra on the basis of a short life-sketch prepared by "Academician Dr. Rincen of Ulanbator." See Lokesh Chandra, Materials for a history of Tibetan Literature, pt. 1, (Śata-piṭaka series 28), (New Delhi, (1963), 45-46. Also see Günther Schulemann, Geschichte der Dalai-Lamas, (Leipzig, 1958), pp. 288-289. Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 260, n. 234.

39. Lokesh Chandra, op. cit., p. 49-50. See also G. N. de Roerich, "The Author of the Hor chos 'byung," JRAS, (1946), p. 194.

40. Lokesh Chandra, op. cit., p. 207, Text No. 4172.

41. Until H. V. Guenther mentioned this work in "Indian Buddhist Thought in Tibetan Perspective," History of Religion (Journal), 3, 1, (1963), 84, n. 3; 105, n. 43., Kōhō Hashimoto was the only scholar who mentioned it briefly, in his Mōko no Ramakyō, (Lamaism of Mongolia), (Tōkyō, Bukkyō Kōronsha, 1942), p. 235.

42. Our teacher Ser smad lha mkhar yongs 'dzin lha ram dge bshes bstan pa rgyal mtshan was a part-time lecturer at Delhi University at that time and was residing at the Ladakh Vihāra, Old Delhi in 1965. He is one of the more learned Lamas in India today as his distinguished title shows.

43. Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha [Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy] of Mādhava, translated by E. B. Cowell

and A. E. Gough, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. (1904), 1914.

44. Warrier, A. G. Krishna, The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedānta, Madras University Philosophical Series, No. 9, University of Madras, (1961), pp. 111-143.

45. Yamaguchi, Chūgan bukkyō ronkō, (Discussions of Mādhyamika Buddhism), (Kyōto, Kōbundō, 1944), pp. 261-351. See also Miyamoto, "Shōjōkyō no kakushū no keitai," (The various forms of the Hīnayāna), Nihon Bukkyōgaku Kyōkai Nenpō, 9, p. 251 cited by Yamaguchi.

46. This date is given by Kajiyama in his Tarkabhāṣya, p. 11.

47. Op. cit., p. 5.

48. In his vipaśyanā section of the Lam rim chen mo, Tsong kha pa presents a critical examination of the three ways of dividing the later Indian Mādhyamikas. (phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma pa 'Mādhyamika who takes the sides'). Then, he decides the third way of division is the best i.e., the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika according to the Prasannapadā. Naturally, later Tibetan siddhānta writers follow this division. See Gadjin Nagao, Chibetto bukkyō kenkyū, (A Study of Tibetan Buddhism), Tōkyō, (1954), pp. 109-111,

Chapter III

The determination (vyavasthāpana)[1] of the basic doctrines (siddhānta) called the Precious Garland (ratna-mālā) (Grub-pa'i-mtha'i rnam-par-bzhag-pa rin po che'i-phreng-ba).

22b-1. / bzhi pa ngo bo nyid med par smra ba dbu ma pa'i grub mtha'i rnam bzhag bshad pa la / mtshan nyid / sgra bshad / dbye ba / phye ba so so'i don bshad pa dang bzhi /

Fourth: As for the discussion on the determination of the basic doctrines of the Mādhyamika, who are nihsvabhāva-vādin,[2] [there are] four:

(1) the characteristic,

(2) the explanation of terms,

(3) the subdivision,

(4) the discussion on the meaning of diverse divisions.

22b-1. dang po ni / bden grub kyi chos rdul tsam yang med (line-2) par khas len pa'i nang pa'i grub mtha' smra ba'i gang zag de dbu ma pa'i mtshan nyid /

(1) The person who holds the Buddhist theory which maintains that no actually produced entity exists at all [independently] even down to dust has the characteristic of the Mādhyamika.

22b-2. gnyis pa sgra bshad ni / ci'i phyir dbu ma pa zhes bya zhe na / rtag chad kyi mtha' gnyis dang bral ba'i dbu sa khas len (line-3) pas na dbu ma pa dang / chos rnams la bden grub kyi ngo bo nyid med par smra bas na ngo bo nyid med par smra ba zhes brjod pa'i phyir /

(2) The explanation of terms: Why is he called a Mādhyamika? Because he maintains the middle which is free from the

extremes of eternalism (śāśvata) and nihilism (uccheda), he is a Mādhyamika. And also, since he says there is no actually produced intrinsic nature in the dharmas, he is called a nihsvabhāva-vādin.

22b-3. gsum pa ni / de la dbye na / dbu ma rang rgyud pa dang / thal (line-4) 'gyur pa gnyis yod /

(3) If one makes a division there, there are the two, i.e., the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika schools.

22b-4. bzhi pa phye ba so so'i don la / rang rgyud pa dang / thal 'gyur pa'i lugs bshad pa gnyis / dang po la / mtshan nyid / sgra bshad / dbye ba / grub mtha'i 'dod tshul dang bzhi /

(4) As for meaning of diverse divisions, [there are] two elucidations, i.e., the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika. As for the first [the Svātantrika], there are four: (a) the characteristic, (b) the explanation of terms, (c) the subdivisions, (d) the method of claiming their siddhānta.

22b-5. dang po ni / rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa tha snyad du khas len pa'i ngo bo nyid med par smra ba de / rang rgyud pa'i mtshan nyid /

The first: the nihsvabhāva-vādin, who retains [the notion of] the reality of the particular (svalakṣaṇa-siddha) as a conventional expression (vyavahāra),[3] has the characteristic of the Svātantrika.

22b-5. gnyis pa ni / ci'i phyir dbu ma rang rgyud pa zhes bya zhe na / tshul gsum rang (line-6) ngos nas grub pa'i rtags yang dag la brten nas bden dngos 'gog par byed pas na de ltar

brjod pa'i phyir /

The second: why is he called the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika? The reason is: if he rejects own-being in ultimate reality (paramārtha-siddha-svabhāva) by employing the correct logical marks (linga) which is established independently [by the] triple characteristic [possessed by the logical mark].[4]

22b-6. gsum pa ni / de la dbye na / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa dang / mdo sde (23a-1) spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa gnyis / phyi don khas mi len zhing / rang rig khas len pa'i dbu ma pa de dang po'i mtshan nyid / mtshan gzhi ni / slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho lta bu /

The third: if one divides it, there are two [i.e.,] the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. Among them, the Mādhyamika who maintains self-awareness (svasamvedana)[5] while rejecting the external object, has the characteristic of the first, namely, Ācārya Śāntirakṣita (ca.A.D. 725-788).[6]

23a-1. rang rig khas mi (line-2) len zhing / phyi don rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa khas len pa'i dbu ma pa de gnyis pa'i mtshan nyid / mtshan gzhi ni / slob dpon legs ldan 'byed lta bu / sgra bshad kyang yod de / gzhi'i rnam (line-3) bzhag sems tsam pa dang mthun par khas len pas na rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa dang / mdo sde pa* ltar rdul phra rab bsags pa'i phyi rol gyi don khas len pas na mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa (line-4) zhes brjod do /

*Ms. ba.

The Mādhyamika who rejects self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) but admits the external object established through its particular (svalakṣana) has the latter characteristic, namely, Ācārya Bhāvaviveka.[7] There is a further explanation of terms. As far as the most basic points are concerned, by reason of maintaining agreement with the Vijñānavādin, he is called a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. By reason of maintaining the external object as an aggregate of atoms, in the manner of the Sautrāntika, he is called a Sautrāntika-cāra-Mādhyamika.

23a-4. / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa la yang rnam bden pa dang mthun pa'i dbu ma pa dang / rnam brdzun pa dang mthun pa'i dbu ma pa gnyis yod / dang po ni / zhi ba 'tsho dang / ka ma (line-5) la shi la dang / 'phags pa grol sde lta bu'o / gnyis pa ni / slob dpon seng ge bzang po dang / dze tā ri dang / lva ba pa lta bu ste / dze tā ri ni rnam brdzun dri bcas pa dang mthun la / lva ba pa ni rnam brdzun (line-6) dri med dang mthun par bshad do /

Also in regard to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, there are two: the Mādhyamika who accepts the reality of image[s] (ākāra) [of its object] and the Mādhyamika who rejects the reality of image[s].[8] The former are for example, Śāntirakṣita (ca.725-788), Kamalaśīla (ca.740-795) and Ārya-Vimuktisena.[9] The latter are for example, Ācārya Haribhadra,[10] Jetāri[11] and Lva-ba-pa.[12] Among them, Jetāri accepts the position that ākāra is attended by illusion and defilement, whereas Lva-ba-pa takes the position that ākāra is not attended with

illusion and defilement.

23a-6. bzhi pa grub mtha'i 'dod tshul la / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa'i lugs dang / mdo sde spyod pa*'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa'i lugs bshad pa gnyis / (23b-1) dang po la / gzhi lam 'bras gsum las / dang po gzhi'i rnam bzhag la yul dang yul can gnyis las/ dang po ni / gzhi grub na rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pas khyab par bzhed do / chos gang yin (line-2) kyang btags don btsal na rnyed par 'dod pa'i phyir / des na rang bzhin gyis grub pa / rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa / rang gi stod lugs kyi ngos nas grub pa / rang ngos nas grub pa / rnams don (line-3) gcig tu 'dod /

*Ma. ba.

The fourth: as for the method of claiming the siddhānta, there are two distinctions: the Yogācāra-Svātamtrika-Mādhyamika school and the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school. In the former (Yogācāra-Svātantrika), there are the three, i.e., the foundation (sthāpana), the paths (mārga) and the fruits (phala). The first, in regard to the determination (vyasthāpana) of the foundation (sthāpana), of the two—— the sensory domain (viṣaya) and the subject (viṣayin),—— as for the first (viṣaya), if the foundation is proved, they claim pervasion (vyāpti) because the svalakṣaṇa is proved. Furthermore, whatever the dharma may be, they claim a property as far as nominal existence (prajñapti) is concerned. Therefore, they maintain that: the proof [of existence] by [its] own nature (svabhāva-siddhi), the proof [of existence]

by[its] particular[quality](svalakṣaṇa-siddhi), the proof of [existence] by [its] own right (?), and the proof of [existence] by [its] own quality (svarūpa-siddhi) are synonymous.

23b-3. shes bya la dbye na / don dam bden pa dang / kun rdzob bden pa gnyis las / rang mngon sum du rtogs pa'i mngon sum gyi tshad mas rang nyid gnyis snang nub pa'i tshul gyis (line-4) rtogs par bya ba de dang po'i mtshan nyid / rang mngon sum du rtogs pa'i mngon sum gyi tshad mas gnyis snang dang bcas pa'i tshul gyis rtogs par bya ba de gnyis pa'i mtshan nyid / bum pa bden (line-5) stong lta bu dang po'i mtshan gzhi dang / bum pa lta bu gnyis pa'i mtshan gzhi yin no /

If one divides the knowable (jñeya), of the two---ultimate reality (paramārtha-satya) and conventional reality (saṃvṛti-satya), that which is knowable by the method which is dissociated from the secondary appearance by pratyakṣa-pramāṇa which is the immediate comprehension of the particular (svalakṣaṇa), has the characteristic of the former; that which is knowable by the method which is attended by the secondary appearance of pratyakṣa-pramāṇa which is the immediate comprehension of svalakṣaṇa has the characteristic of the latter. That a jar['s essential nature is] really emptiness is, for example, the definiendum of the former[=paramārtha-satya] and that a jar exists [conventionally] is,for example, the definiendum of the latter (paramartha-satya).

23b-5. don dam bden pa la rgyas par dbye na / stong nyid bcu drug dang / bsdu na stong nyid bzhir yod / kun rdzob (line-6) bden pa la dbye na / yang dag kun rdzob dang / log pa'i kun rdzob gnyis las / dang po ni / chu lta bu dang / gnyis pa ni smig rgyu'i chu lta bu'o / lugs 'dis shes pa yin na yang dag (24a-1) kun rdzob yin pas khyab par 'dod do /
If one divides the ultimate reality fully, [there are] the sixteen śūnyatas. If briefly, [there are] four sunyatas. If one divides conventional reality into the two---real (tathya) and erroneous (mithya) conventional [realities], the first is like water and the second is like water in a mirage (marīci). If one knows this scheme (naya), one claims concomitance (vyāpti) because there is tathya-saṃvṛti.

24a-1. / gnyis pa yul can la / yid kyi rnam par shes pa gang zag gi mtshan gzhi dang / kun gzhi dang nyon yid khas mi len zhing rnam shes tshogs drug (line-2) tu 'dod pa rang rgyud pa gnyis ka mthun no / blo la tshad ma dang / tshad min gyi blo gnyis /

The second, as for the subject (viṣayin), mind-consciousness (manovijñāna) is definiendum (lakṣya) of a person. Both [kinds of] Svātantrikas are in agreement in admitting the group of six consciousness (ṣad-vijñāna-kāya) while denying the abode-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) and the defiled-mind (kliṣṭa-manas). As for understanding (mati), there are two, i.e., understanding with the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and understanding without means of valid knowledge.

24a-2. tshad ma la mngon sum gyi tshad ma dang / rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma gnyis / mngon sum la dbang po'i mngon (line-3) sum / yid kyi mngon sum / rang rig mngon sum / rnal 'byor mngon sum dang bzhir yod la / mngon sum phyi ma gnyis la ma 'khrul pa'o shes pas khyab par khas len no /

In regard to the means of valid knowledge, there are two: direct perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumāna).[13] Among the pratyaksa, there are four, (namely), the sense-perception (indriya-pratyaksa), the mental-perception (mānasa-pratyaksa), the perception through self-awareness (svasamvedana-pratyaksa), and the knowledge of a seer (yogi-pratyaksa).[14] By ascertaining that the last two pratyaksas are non-erroneous, they claim concomitance (vyāpti).

24a-3. / phyi rol don du grub (line-4) pa khas mi len pas sngon po dang sngon 'dzin mngon sum gnyis rdzas gcig tu 'dod do /

Not admitting the reality of the external object (bāhyārtha), they assert two---blue (nīla) and the apprehension of blue ---in one substance (dravya).

24a-4. gnyis pa lam gyi rnam bzhag la gsum las / dang po lam gyi dmigs pa ni / gang zag rtag gcig rang (line-5) dbang can gyis stong pa gang zag gi bdag med rags pa dang / gang zag rang skye thub pa'i rdzas yod kyis stong pa gang zag gi bdag med phra mo dang / gzugs dang gzugs 'dzin (line-6) tshad ma rdzas gzhan gyis stong pa chos kyi bdag med rags pa dang / chos thams cad bden grub kyis stong pa chos kyi bdag med phra mor bzhed do /

The second: of the demarcation of the paths, of the three, first, the object-support (ālambana) of the path: The absence of own-being in person (pudgala-nairātmya) [as the meditative object] in its coarse [form] is: a person is empty of [anything] constant, single and independent (nitya-eka-svatantrika-śūnya-pudgala). The absence of own-being in a person (pudgala-nairātmya) [as the meditative object] in its subtle [form] is: person is devoid of a self-generating entity. The absence of own-beings in dharmas (dharma-nairātmya) in its coarse [form] is: the form (rūpa) and the perception of the form (rūpa-grāha) are devoid of the difference [of subject and object] as separate entities. And the subtle dharma-nairātmya is: all the dharmas are empty from the viewpoint of ultimate reality.

24-6. gnyis pa lam gyi spang bya ni / (24b-1) gang zag gi bdag 'dzin nyon sgrib dang / chos kyi bdag 'dzin shes sgrib tu 'dod cing / shes sgrib la yang gzung 'dzin rdzas gzhan du 'dzin pa lta bu shes sgrib rags pa dang / phung sogs kyi chos (line-2) bden grub tu 'dzin pa lta bu shes sgrib phra mo gnyis su 'dod do /

The second: as for the forsakables (nivartya) on the path, grasping a selfness of a person is the obscuring by defilements (kleśa-āvaraṇa). Grasping a selfness of dharmas [as separate elements of existence] is the obscuration by the knowable (jñeya-āvaraṇa).[15] The obscuration by the knowable also has subtle and coarse [forms]. For example, grasping as different entities the object (grāhya)[of perception]

and the subject (grāhaka)[16] is the coarse [form]. Grasping the dharmas---[the five] aggregates, etc.,---as a reality in the ultimate sense is the subtle form of the obscuring by the knowable.

24b-2. gsum pa lam gyi rang bzhin ni / lam lnga gsum bco lnga khas len par 'dra la / khyad par ni / rang rgyal gyi bar chad med lam (line-3) dang / rnam grol lam la gnyis stong gi rnam pa can dgos par khas len no /

The third: as for the own-being of the path: [the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas] maintain the fifteen paths, [i.e.,] three times five, [which are] similar to [those of the Yogācārins].[17] In particular, it is necessary [for the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika] to maintain the aspect of the emptiness of two [i.e., ātma and dharma] in the unimpeded path (ānantarya-mārga) and the path of deliverance (vimukti-mārga) of the pratyeka-buddha.

24b-3. / gsum pa 'bras bu'i rnam bzhag la / rang rgyal ni shes sgrib rags pa spang bya'i gtso bor byed pa'i phyir / zhugs gnas (line-4) brgyad kyi rnam bzhag mi brtsi yang / nyan thos la gang zag ya brgyad yod par bzhed la / nyan thos rig nges rnams kyis gang zag gi bdag med rtogs pa'i lta ba bsgom bya'i gtso bor byas te / (line-5) mthar bsgom lam rdo rje lta bu'i ting nge 'dzin la brten nas nyon sgrib ma lus par spangs pa dang 'dus mnyam du dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu mngon du byed do /

The third: the determination of the fruit [of the paths].

Because the pratyeka-buddha is predominantly concerned with forsaking the coarse jñeya-āvaraṇa, the determination of the eight [stages of entering and staying][18] will not be enumerated [here]. However, as for the Śrāvakas, they maintain the same eight[stages of entering and staying],because the Śrāvakas who are sure of their spiritual lineage are mainly concerned with developing (bhavaniya) the view of pudgala-nairātmya. Depending on the adamantine concentration (vajropama-samādhi)[19] and having completely forsaken the covering of defilements, they finally realize the fruit of Arhat at the same time.

24b-5. rang rgyal rigs nges rnams (line-6) kyis gzung 'dzin gnyis stong gi lta ba bsgom bya'i gtso bor byas te / mthar bsgom lam rdo rje lta bu'i ting nge 'dzin la brten nas nyon sgrib dang / shes sgrib rags pa ma lus par spangs (25a-1) pa dang dus mnyam du rang rgyal dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu mngon du byed do /

The pratyeka-buddhas who are sure of their spiritual lineage are mainly concerned with developing (bhāvanīya) the view of the śūnyatā of both the grasped and the grasper. Finally, depending on the adamantine concentration (vajropama-samādhi) and having completely forsaken the coverings of defilements and the knowable, the pratyeka-buddha realizes the fruit of Arhat at the same time.

25a-1. theg dman gyi myang (abbrev. of mya ngan)'das la lhag bcas myang 'das dang/ lhag med myang 'das gnyis/ (line-2) dang po ni snga ma'i las nyon gyis 'phangs pa'i sdug bsngal gyi phung

po'i

lhag ma dang bcas pa'i myang 'das dang / gnyis pa ni / sdug bsngal gyi phung po dang 'bral ba'i gnas skabs la (line-3) 'dod do /

They maintain that, in the nirvāṇa of the Hīnayāna, there are two, nirvāṇa with remainder (sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa) and nirvāṇa without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa).[20] Of them, the first is nirvāṇa which has the remainder of the aggregate (skandha) of sufferings (duhkha) which are projected by karma-kleśa(?) of former[lives]. The second is the state which is free from the aggregate with sufferings.

25a-3. nyan rang dgra bcom pa yin na theg chen lam du 'jug pas khyab ste / mthar thug theg pa gcig tu grub par 'dod pa'i phyir / des na lugs 'di la nyan rang gnyis spang bya dang (line-4) rtogs rigs mi 'dra ba'i dbang gis thob bya'i 'bras bu la 'ang mchog dman yod do /

When the śrāvaka and the pratyeka-buddha are arhats, they integrate [themselves] by entering the path of the Mahāyāna, because they [=the school] maintain the culmination in the one ultimate vehicle [conducive to enlightenment]. Therefore, in this school, there are also [both] the great and the low for the fruit to be acquired, because the two---śrāvaka and pratyeka-buddha---have dissimilar capabilities for the thing to be forsaken (praheya) and for the lineage of realization.

25a-4. theg chen rigs nges rnams kyis byang chub mchog tu sems bskyed de / tshogs lam chen po'i gnas skabs (line-5) su chos rgyun gyi ting nge 'dzin la brten nas mchog gi sprul sku

las gdams dag dngos su nyan cing / de'i don nyams su blangs pa la brten nas stong pa nyid la dmigs pa'i sgom byung gi shes rab (line-6) thog mar skyes pa'i tshe sbyor lam du 'phos pa yin zhing / drod kyi gnas skabs su mthong spang* kun nas nyon mongs gzung rtog mngon gyur pa nyams smod par byed cing /

*Ms. spangs.

[First], the bodhisattvas who are sure of their Mahāyāna lineage generate the thought of supreme enlightenment (bodhicitta-parama-utpāda). [Next], depending on the srotānugata[nāma]-samādhi on the path of accumulating (sambhāra-mārga), they definitely hear instructions (avavāda) from the excellent apparitional body (nirmāṇa-kāya), and they commit[thsese instructions] to memory and comprehend their meaning. Thus, when they first produce the insight consisting of meditational development (bhāvanāmayī prajñā) and having emptiness (śūnyatā) as its object-support (ālambana), they cross onto the path of endeavour (prayoga-mārga). In the stage of heat (ūṣmagata), they relinquish the presence of the object-conception, which is a defilement to be extirpated by vision (darśana).

25a-6. rtse mo thob pa'i tshe mthong (25b-1) spang rnam byang gzung rtog mngon gyur pa dang / bzod pa thob pa'i tshe mthong spang rdzas 'dzin rtog pa mngon gyur pa dang/ chos mchog thob pa'i tshe mthong spang btags 'dzin rtog pa mngon gyur pa nyams (line-2) smod par byed do/

When they reach the climax (mūrdhagata),[they relinquish] the presence of conception (kalpa) which is to be purified and which is to be extirpated by vision (darśana). When they attain patience (kṣānti), [they relinquish] the presence of conception of cognizer as a real entity (dravya) , which is to be extirpated by vision. When they attain the highest [mundane] virtues (laukika-agra-dharma), they relinquish the presence of conception of cognizer as a nominal entity (prajñapti), which is to be extirpated by vision.

25b-2. / drod rtse bzod mchog bzhi la rim pa bzhin du snang ba thob pa'i ting nge 'dzin dang / snang ba mched pa'i ting nge (line-3) 'dzin dang / de kho na nyid phyogs gcig la zhugs pa'i ting nge 'dzin dang / bar chad med pa'i ting nge 'dzin zhes zer ro /

Corresponding to the four [stages of] heat (ūṣmagata), climax (mūrdhagata), patience (kṣānti) and the highest [mundane virtues] (laukika-agra-dharma) in serial order, they are called: the concentration of acquired light (ālokalabdha-samādhi), the concentration of the increase of light (āloka-vṛddhi-samādhi), the concentration of entering a portion of ultimate reality (tattvārthaikadeśānupraveśa) and the unimpeded concentration (ānantarya-samādhi).

25b-3. de'i 'jug* thogs su mthong lam bar chad med lam gyis nyon sgrib kun btags dang shes sgrib kun btags sa bon dang bcas (line-4) pa spangs nas rnam grol lam dang 'gog pa'i bden pa gnyis mngon du byed do sgom lam skor dgus sgom spang nyon

*Ms. mjug.

mongs bcu drug gi sa bon dang sgom spang shes sgrib brgya dang brgyad kyi sa bon (line-5) rim can du spong bar bsungs so /

Here it is said: After relinquishing the seed-possessing <u>parikalpita-kleśāvaraṇa</u> and <u>parikalpita-jñeyāvaraṇa</u> by the path of vision and the unimpeded path, they relinquish the seeds of the sixteen <u>kleśāvaraṇa</u> which are to be extirpated by <u>bhāvanā</u> by the nine stages in the <u>bhāvanā-mārga</u>. [They also relinquish] the seeds of one hundred eight defilements in sequence which are to be extirpated by <u>bhāvanā</u>.

25b-5. mthar rgyun mtha'i bar chad med lam la brten nas nyon mongs pa dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa lhan skyes gnyis gcig car du spangs nas skad cig gnyis pa la (line-6) bla na med pa'i byang chub thob par 'gyur te rigs nges kyis 'bras bu mngon du byed tshul lo /

Finally, depending on the unimpeded path which is the end of the stream, having at once forsaken the two [i.e.,] the innate <u>kleśa</u> and <u>jñeya-āvaraṇa</u>, they attain supreme enlightenment (<u>anuttara-sambuddha</u>) in the second moment. This is the method by which [the bodhisattvas] who are sure of their lineage realize the fruit.

25b-6. theg chen gyi myang 'das dang mi gnas pa'i myang 'das don gcig tu 'dod cing / sang rgyas kyi (26a-1) sku la bzhir grangs nges par 'dod la / 'phags seng gnyis kyang sku'i bstan tshul la rtsod kyi / grangs nges la mi rtsod do /

They maintain that nirvāṇa of the Mahāyāna and nirvāṇa with

no support (a-pratisthita-nirvāṇa) are synonymous. They definitely assert the four [i.e., dharma-kāya, sambhoga-kāya, nirmāṇa-kāya and svabhāvika-kāya] to be the body of the Buddha. There is a disagreement [between] the two [i.e.,] Ārya-[Vimuktisena] and Hari[bhadra] in the explānation of [the Buddha's body]. However, there is no disagreement in the assertion of numbers of [the Buddha's body].

26a-1. / sang rgyas kyi bka' la drang don gyi mdo dang / (line-2) nges don gyi mdo'i rnam bzhag byed de / kun rdzob bden pa dngos bstan bstan bya'i gtso bor byas nas ston pa'i mdo drang don gyi mdo dang / don dam bden pa dngos bstan bstan bya'i (line-3)gtso bor byas nas ston pa'i mdo nges don gyi mdo yin pa'i phyir / dgongs 'grel las bshad pa'i 'khor lo dang po drang don dang / bar ba dang tha ma gnyis la drang nges gnyis gnyis (line-4) yod par 'dod do /

They distinguish sūtras of definitive meaning (nītartha) and provisional meaning (neyārtha) in the words of the Buddha, because neyārtha-sūtra is the sūtra whose teaching is predominantly concerned with the basic points and the elucidation of conventional reality (saṃvṛti-sat) and nitartha-sūtra is the sūtra whose teaching is predominantly concerned with the doctrine and the elucidation of ultimate reality. They maintain, according to the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra, that the first wheel (cakra) is neyārtha and in the middle wheel and the last wheel, there are both the neyārtha and nītartha.[22]

26a-4. gnyis pa mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa'i lugs la / gzhi lam 'bras gsum las / dang po ni / lugs 'dis phyi don 'dod cing rang rig khas (line-5) mi len pa tsam ma gtogs gzhi'i rnam bzhag phal cher snga ma dang 'dra 'o /

Second, as for the school of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, there are three, i.e., the basis, the paths and the fruits. Firstly, the demarcation for the basis is almost identical to that of the foregoing [the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika], except this school asserts external objects (artha) while not admitting self-awareness (sva-saṃvedana).

26a-5. gnyis pa lam gyi khyad par la / nyan rang rigs nges la chos kyi bdag med rtogs pa med par bzhed cing / gzung (line-6) 'dzin rdzas gzhan gyis stong par rtogs pa'i ye shes khas mi len la / phyi rol don 'dzin gyi rtog pa yang shes sgrib tu mi 'dod do /

Secondly, as for the different [doctrine] of the paths, while maintaining the non-realization of dharma-nairātmya for the śrāvakas and the pratyeka-buddhas who are sure of their spiritual lineage, they do not admit the knowledge (jñāna) which realizes the emptiness of the differentiation of the grasped and the grasper and also do not assert that the thought-construction (kalpanā) which grasps the external world is the hindrance of the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa)

26a-6. gsum pa 'bras bu'i rnam bzhag la / nyan rang gnyis spang (26b-1) bya'i sgrib pa dang / rtogs bya'i bdag med la phra rags med pas rtogs rigs mi 'dra ba med cing / zhugs gnas

brgyad kyi rnam bzhag gnyis ka la byed do /
Thirdly, as for the demarcation of the fruit; the two[i.e.,] the śrāvaka and the pratyeka-buddha having no[differentiation] of subtle and coarse in their defilements to be extirpated and nairātmya to be realized, there is no dissimilarity in the lineage of realization. Amd the demarcation of the eight[stages,i.e.,] the entering and staying of [the srotāpanna, sakrdāgamin, anāgāmin, and arhat] is made in both[the śrāvaka and the pratyeka-buddha].

26b-1. theg chen rigs nges rnams kyis sgrib (line-2) gnyis rim can du spong bar bzhed de / sa brgyad pa thob pa'i tshe nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa zad par spangs pa rtog ge 'bar ba las bshad pa'i phyir/ 'on kyang thal 'gyur ba ltar nyon sgrib ma (line-3) zad par du shes sgrib spang ba'i mgo mi rtsom par bzhed pa 'ang min no/

Because it is said in the Tarkajvālā:

Those who are sure of their lineage [i.e., the bodhisattvas] claim the forsaking of two coverings [i.e., kleśa and jñeya] in succession. And at the time of attaining the eighth stage [of bhūmi], they completely forsake the kleśāvarana.

However, as in the case of the Prāsaṅgikas, they maintain that as long as kleśāvarana is not completely forsaken, the cessation of jñeyāvarana does not begin.

26b-3. mi 'dra ba'i khyad par de tsam zhig ma gtogs gzhi lam 'bras gsum gyi rnam bzhag phal che ba rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang (line-4) rgyud pa dang mthun no /

The demarcation of the three---the basis, the path and the fruit---[of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika] agrees in general with the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, except for some specific differences.

smras pa /

/ rang mtshan yod kyang bden pa med bzhed pa'i /

/ rang rgyud smra ba'i grub mtha'i rnam dbye kun /

/ rang bzo spangs te legs par brjod pa 'di /

/ rang nyid mkhas 'dod rnams kyis zungs shig kye /

/ zhes bya ba ni bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa'o //[23]

[Here], I [=Dkon mchog 'jig med dbang po] say:

Here, I have well explained, without
any personal fabrication, all the divisions
of the siddhāntas of the Svātantrika-[Mādhyamika]
school which maintains---[as long as] there is
a particular (svalakṣaṇa), [that is] not real
[in ultimate reality (paramārtha)].

This is to be known as the intermediate verse [= the concluding verse of this section of this treatise, the Precious Garland].

NOTES

Chapter III

1. Vyavasthā——maryāda (limit), Nyāyakośa, p. 825. Hence vyavasthāpana may also be translated as demarcation.

2. The actual occurrences of the term nihsvabhāva-vādin, see the Prasannapadā, p. 24, line 2 and the Bodhi-caryāvatāra-pañjikā, p. 411, line 13 etc.
According to Robinson, logical implication of **nihsvabhāva** is:
"By definition, own-being [svabhāva] is incompatible with existence. Whatever is spatial and temporal has components, whether discrete or continuous. Thus it must stand as a term in the whole-part relation. But own-being is indivisible." (Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 48).

3. As we shall see later, Bhāvaviveka emphasizes the stand-point of the 'common-sense philosopher,' i.e., "things really exist there." Bhāvaviveka happily agrees with this position, except with a qualification saying, "as the locus of vyavahāra or saṃvṛti-sat.

4. For the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, nothing can stand by itself in the locus of paramārtha. He tries to prove this thesis by a logical mark or probans which has three necessary conditions (tshul gsum rang ngos grub pa'i rtags yan dag) which is set forth by Dignāga. Consider the following classical example formulated by Potter:

Hypothesis:	That mountain (is) fire-possessing.
Reason:	(Because) that mountain (is) smoke-possessing.
Examples:	(a) (as in) kitchen.
	(b) (unlike) lake.

(Potter, Presuppositions, p. 60).
Here, smoke is the logical mark (liṅga, rtags), because the inference is operated through this mark just as a car stops and moves through the signals or marks of red and green. However, the correct signal or mark (rtags yan dag pa) must satisfy the following three conditions (tshul gsum) as follows:
1) pakṣadharmatva: That is to say, the correct liṅga should be a dharma of the pakṣa, i.e., smoke (dharma) should come from that mountain (=dharmin) not

from somewhere else.

2) sapakṣe sattva: The correct liṅga must be in the positive example (sapakṣa), either in full or in part, i.e., as in the case of fire in a kitchen.

3) vipakṣe 'sattva: The correct liṅga must be completely excluded from the negative example (vipakṣa) as in the case of fire in a lake.

See Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. 2, pp. 109-120; Potter, Presuppositions, pp. 56-74; Kitagawa, Indo koten ronrigaku, pp. 126-150; Kajiyama, Tarkabhāṣya, §10, etc.

5. Svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa. Dignāga says: svasaṃvedya-anirdeśya-rūpam indriya-gocaraḥ (The object of the sense-organ is self-cognizable and indeterminable).
See Masaaki Hattori, "Dignāga's theory of direct knowledge," Bulletin of the University of Ōsaka Prefecture, Ser. C, vol. 7, (1959), p. 13.
See Kajiyama, Tarkabhāṣya, §6, 2.

6. This date is given by Frauwallner, "Landmarks," pp.141-146. Regarding svasaṃvedana, Śāntirakṣita says:
"Knowledge is by nature opposed to insentient matter; this immateriality is nothing but the self-consciousness of knowledge.[101] The self-consciousness of knowledge is not to be analysed into action and its agent, since knowledge, being a single unity without compartments, cannot be divided into the three parts [i.e., the knower, the known and the knowing].[102]
101=TS v. 2000: vijñānaṁ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate, iyam evâtmasaṁvittir asya yâjaḍarūpatā.
(Kajiyama, op. cit., p. 48).
Thus Śāntirakṣita belongs to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.

7. In the Fifth Chapter of the Tarkajvālā, Bhāvaviveka refutes the Yogācārin's svasaṃvedana from the standpoint of ultimate reality. See Yamaguchi, Mu to U, pp. 571-572.

8. Regarding Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda of the Yogācārins, see Kajiyama, op. cit., § 43, 1. Also, a brief description of the development of the sākāra and nirākāra in Mahāyāna Buddhism is given by Kajiyama, op. cit., pp. 154-158.

9. Ārya-Vimuktisena (flourished after the eighth century A.D.*), wrote the Abhisamayālaṅkāravyākhyā, according to Tāranātha (138-140), he came from the South.
*Mochizuki, Bukkyō Daijiten, vol. 8, p. 24b.

10. Haribhadra (ca. 770), the author of the Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka learned the Mādhyamika from Śāntirakṣita (Bu-ston II, 157-9).

11. Jetāri---According to Tucci, "it is an established fact that in the colophons of the two extant Sanskrit originals of his works, the name is spelt Jitāri (in Tibetan dgra las rnam rgyal) which is certainly the right form." He is the author of the Hetutattvopadeśa. See Giuseppe Tucci, "Hetutattvopadesa," Minor Buddhist Texts, Part I, (Rome, 1956), pp. 250-253.

12. According to our Tibetan teacher Bstan pa rgyal mtshan (see note II-42 of this study), the name Lva-ba-pa is also spelt as la-ba-pa (i.e., a man in a woolen blanket or cloth).

Lokesh Candra's Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary has an entry of la-ba-pa-kambalapāda, p. 2288; according to George N. Roerich, he is called---"sleeping Bhikṣu" (i.e., La-ba-pa who is said to have slept for three years at the gate of King Indrabhūti's palace). Blue Annals, pt. 1, p. 362.

13. Having eliminated śabda and upamāna, Dignāga made his celebrated pronouncement, "there are [two and only two] means of valid knowledge [i.e.,] pratyakṣa and anumāna." (Pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe, cited by Kajiyama from Hattori's typescripts of The Pramaṇa-samuccaya of Dignāga. Kajiyama, op. cit., note 23). Because all things are known by these two there is no need for any other pramāṇa, for the object to be known has two aspects, i.e., sva-lakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, (cf. PS I-vv. 2,3).

14. Cf. Kajiyama, op. cit., §6.

15. These two terms may be interpreted as 'the emotional obstacles' and 'the intellectual obstacles' which lie in the way to liberation.

16. Literally, grāhya=grasped or cognitum, grāhaka=grasper or cognizer. These terms have the Vijñānavāda flavour, because as Mokṣākaragupta rightly mentions: "Consciousness freed from cognitum and cognizer is the ultimate reality (grāhyagrāhakanirmuktaṁ vijñānaṁ paramārthasat)." Kajiyama, op. cit., p. 147.

17. According to the Vijñānavāda section of the Precious Garland (Ms. 21b, line-6), the fifteen paths mean sa bcu lam lnga or the Ten stages and the Five ways. They are pramuditā-bhūm, vimalā-bh, prabhākari-bh, arcismati-bh, sudurjayā-bh, abhimukhī-bh; dūraṁgamā-bh, acalā-bh, sādhumatī-bh and dharmamegha-bhūmi; and the five ways, i.e., saṃbhāra-mārga, prayoga-mārga, darśana-mārga, bhāvanā-mārga and aśaikṣa-mārga.

18. The entering and staying of the srotāpanna, sakṛdāgāmin, anāgāmin and arhat. For a detailed map for 'the Progress of the Saint, see Conze, "Marginal Notes to the Abhisamayālaṅkāra," Liebenthal Festschrift, Sino-Indian Studies, vol. V, Nos. 3-4, (1957), pp. 1-15.

19. Diamond-like-concentration. This samādhi is the final stage of the bodhisattva progress, where the most subtle defilements are destroyed by this sharp samādhi.
Cf. ābhavā'grā'grā'ṣṭabhāgakṣid arhattvapratipannakaḥ / navamasya'py anantaryapathe vajropamaś ca saḥ // AKK. IV-45// Gokhale, Kośa, p. 94.

20. Candrakīrti has the following analogy:
sopadhiseṣa-nirvāṇa - a town in which all of the criminals have been executed.
nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa - a town which, after all of the criminals have been executed, has itself been annihilated. (Prasannapadā, p. 519).

21. The Indian Mahāyāna ācāryas never discard any Mahāyāna sūtra as a forgery. They only make grades among them by distinguishing neyārtha from nīthārtha or by distinguishing the first, second and the third dharma-cakra-pravartanas.

22. Here, it should be noted that some parts of the second and the third cakra-pravartanas of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra are nītartha for the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school according to the Tibetan tradition. However, our normal understanding is that the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra is the āgama for the Yogācārins and not for the Mādhyamika. The reason is that two major tenets of the Sūtra are the teaching of the three aspects of existence (svabhāva-traya) and the abode-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). This question will be treated in detail in section V.2 of this study in due course.

23. Our manuscript is a xylograph from the uncatalogued Lessing collection of the rare book section of the University of Wisconsin Library.
Some terms in this section were adopted from Obermiller's, "The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā, etc." Acta Orientalia, 11, (1933), 1-131, 334-354. One of the sources utilized by Obermiller was Sa lam gyi rnam bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan of Dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, the writer of this siddhānta.

Chapter IV

Quest for tattvajñāna (knowledge of ultimate reality), the third chapter of the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya (Heart of the Madhyamaka) by Bhāvaviveka, and his autocommentary called the Tarkajvālā (Blaze of Reasoning), Part 1, (vv. 1-136ab).

Sanskrit Text: The Sanskrit manuscript of the *Tarkajvālā* is lost, but that of the *Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā* was discovered by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana at the Zha-lu monastery in Tibet in the autumn of 1936. (See p.4 of this study). The manuscript of the third chapter has never been edited except vv. 275-284 by V.V. Gokhale with his annotated translation of them. (IIJ,5, (1961-2), pp. 271-275). A copy of the rapid handcopy of the manuscript, prepared by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana, can be found pp. 301-305 of this study. Numbering is made by Iida which is subject to change.

Tibetan Text: P(eking Edition, Tokyo-Kyoto Reprint), Vol.96,25,3,1ff.

D(erge Edition, in the Asian Library of the University of California, Berkeley). dza,536ff.

N(arthang Edition, in the Library of His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, Dharmasala, Punjab, India).

The Tibetan verses of the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (MHK) have been given from the Tohoku Catalogue No.3855.

Previous translation: From Tibetan to Japanese:

Jōshō Nozawa, *Mikkyō Bunka*, 28, (1954). 46-53, 29/30, (1955), 44-56. 31, (1955). 26-38, 34 (1956), 31-43. incomplete.

Nozawa's translation is very careful and we have greatly benefited by it.

The contents of the third chapter (part 1) may be divided into the following sections:

Introduction

Refutation of own-being (=Discernment)

A. <u>The saṃskṛta-dharmas</u>

(part 1)

(96,25,1-1) da ni de nyid shes pa 'tshol pa'i skabs su bab pas de bstan pa'i phyir le'u gsum pa brtsom pa'i dbang du byas nas /[1]

Now, the quest for the knowledge of ultimate reality, as the topic of discussion (prastuta), is being introduced [here]. Thence, in order to show this [tattvajñāna] having commenced the third chapter, [Bhāvaviveka says]:

yasya jñānamayaṃ cakṣuś ca[kṣu]s tasyāsti netarat /
yatas tasmād bhaved dhīmāṃs tattvajñānaiṣaṇāparaḥ //1//
/ gang la shes pa'i mig yod pa /
/ de la mig yod gzhan ma yin /
/ des na gang phyir blo ldan dag /
/ de nyid shes pa 'tshol ba* brtson //1//
*TJ la, MHK ba.

(1) Whoever has the eye consisting of knowledge,
has the eye; the other [eye] is not [it].
Therefore the wise man should be dedicated to
the quest for knowledge of ultimate reality
(tattva-jnāna).

(96,25,1-2) zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras te / shes pa'i ngo bo nyid ni mig yin te / 'das pa dang / ma 'ongs pa dang / da-ltar dang / thag ring ba dang / nye ba dang / rags pa dang / *phra ba'i dngos (line-3) po dag la thogs pa med par 'jug pa'i phyir ro / gang la shes pa'i mig de yod pa de la ni mig yod pa yin no / gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba ni ha cang nye ba dang ring ba dang dbang po las 'das pa la

*D. cha phra ba.

sogs pa'i dngos po (line-4) dag la long ba dang 'dra bas de yod du zin kyang ci la yan mi phan pas de yod kyang mig dang ldan pa ma yin no / des na gang gi phyir blo dang ldan pa dag ni sha'i mig ngan pa de 'tshal ba spangs te / de nyid shes pa 'tshol ba la brtson (line-5) par byed do / don de nyid bstan pa'i phyir

Thus he said:

The intrinsic nature of knowledge is the eye, because it penetrates unimpeded into entities---past, future, present, far, near, subtle and gross [alike]. Whoever has the eye [consisting] of knowledge, has the eye. " The other [eye] is not [it] "---Even though he has that [eye], it is useless (ahita), since the eye of the flesh is as of the blind toward entities which are extremely near or far, and imperceptible (atīndriya). Thence, even though he has that [flesh eye] he is not an eye-possessor. Therefore, forsaking the quest for the inferior (hīna) eye of the flesh, wise men should strive in the quest for knowledge of ultimate reality. In order to elucidate the same meaning:

paśyaty a[ndho]'pi matimān [didṛkṣor viprakṛṣītakān]/
sūkṣma-vyavahitān arthān trailokyāhata-darśanaḥ //2//

/ blo ldan 'jig rten gsum po dag /
/ thog* med mthong ba long bas kyang /
/ blta 'dod thag ring cha 'phra** dang /
/ bsgribs pa'i don yang mthong bar 'gyur //2//

*TJ thogs, MHK thog. **D. phra.

(2) Even a blind man, who is wise and with an unblemished vision [of the things] in the three worlds, perceives the distant, the subtle and the concealed objects (artha), if he wishes to see [them].

gzhan yang. On the other hand:

sahasreṇāpi netraṇā[m anetro]buddhivarjitaḥ /
svargāpavarga-sa[dbhū]ta-mārgāmargāsamīkṣaṇāt //3//

/ mig stong pa yang blo med na /
/ mig dang ldan pa ma yin te /
/ mtho ris dang ni byang grol gyi /
/ lam dang lam min mi mthong phyir //3//

(3) One bereft of intelligence is as if eyeless even with a thousand eyes,
Because he does not see the real path to heaven and release.

(96,25,1-7) mig stong pa ni lha'i dbang (line-8) po yin zhes grags te / de ni yul la re ba'i zhags pas blo gros yongs su dkris pas / gal te shes pa'i mig gi blo med na mig dang ldan pa ma yin te / de ci'i phyir zhe na / mtho ris dang byang grol gyi lam dang lam ma yin pa yang dag (96,25,2-1) pa ji lta ba bzhin du mi mthong ba'i phyir ro / de la mtho ris kyi lam ni dge ba bcu'o / byang grol gyi lam ni 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad po'o / gang gis na mig dang ldan par 'gyur ba'i shes pa de gang zhe na /

"A thousand eyes"---Devendra is well known for that. His [Devendra's] intelligence is completely encircled by a noose

(pāśa) i.e., longing for sense-data. If he has no intelligence, which is the eye of insight, then he has no eye. If one asks why; it is because he does not see as they really are, the path and what is not the path to heaven and release. Here, the path to heaven is the ten auspicious [karma paths](daśa-kuśala-karmapatha) and the path to release, the eightfold path (aṣṭāṅga-mārga). What is that knowledge whereby one becomes an eye-possessor?

> dṛṣṭādṛṣṭi-[viśi]ṣṭeṣu phalāśāviṣakaṇṭake /
> pravartate na dānādau prajñonmīlita-locanaḥ //4//
> / shes rab mig bye mthong ba dang /
> / ma mthong khyad par 'dod pa yi/
> / 'bras bu re ba dug tsher gyi/
> / sbyin pa sogs la'jug mi byed //4//

(4) He whose eye is opened by insight (prajñā) does not proceed in giving, etc.,[just as] in the poisonous thorn which is longing for the fruits in this life, future life and desire for special [fruits].

(TJ is omitted here).

> 'o na ji lta bu zhig la rtson par byed tsa na.
> Now then, one might ask: how should one strive?
> trimaṇḍala-viśuddhe hi dānadāv abhiyujyate /
> kāruṇyāt sarvavittvāya tatrāpy asthita-mānasaḥ //5//

/ snying rjes* tham cad mkhyen pa'i phyir**/

/ 'khor gsum yongs su dag pa yi /

/ sbyin la sogs la rtson***byed cing /

/de la'ang yid ni gnas mi byed//5//

*TJ rje, MHK rjes. **TJ phyir ro, MHK phyir

*** TJ brtson, MHK rtson.

(5) He strives for the threefold purity in giving, etc., out of compassion, for the sake of omniscience. [And yet,] his mind is not fixed there, either.

(96,25,2-6) ces bya ba ste / snying rjes grags pa dang bde ba dang 'gran pa la sogs pa'i phyir ma yin par thams cad mkhyen pa nyid kho na la gcig tu dmigs nas de thob par bya ba'i (line-7) phyir 'khor gsum yongs su dag pa'i sbyin pa la sogs pa* brtson par byed do / / 'khor gsum ni 'khor gsum po dag go / yongs su dag pa ni dri ma med pa ste / lus kyi mi dge ba rnam pa gsum dang / ngag gi rnam pa bzhi dang / (line-8) yid kyi rnam pa gsum po de dag dang bral zhing dri ma med pa'i sbyin pa la sogs pa* brtson par byed pa'o / yang na sbyin pa dang sbyin pa po dang / len pa la sogs pa mi dmigs pas stong pa nyid kyis** rjes su song ba'i 'khor (96,25,3-1) yongs su dag pa dang / 'jigs*** tshogs la lta ba dang / log par lta ba dang / mthar 'dzin par lta ba dang bral bas mtshan ma med pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i 'khor gsum yongs su dag pa dang 'dod pa dang / gzugs dang gzugs med

*D. pa la brtson. **D. kyi. ***D. 'jig tshogs.

pa'i khams mngon par mi 'dod pas smon pa med pa'i sngon du 'gro ba'i 'khor gsum yongs su dag pa'o / / de la'ang yid ni gnas mi byed ces bya ba ni thams cad mkhyen pa nyid de la yang chags pa (line 3) med pa ste / de ltar yang ji skad du / de la byang chub sems dpa'i 'dod pa chung ba nyid gang zhe na / gang byang chub kyang mi 'dod pa nyid do zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o / shes rab med na sbyin pa la sogs pa bskal pa stong snyed du nye bar (line 4) bsags pas kyang pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa'i rgyur mi 'gyur ro / zhes gsungs pas de'i phyir shes rab kyi mthu ston pa ni /

That is:

It is not for fame, ease and pleasure. Having fastened[his mind] to omniscience, in order to realize it, he strives for giving, etc.,in the threefold perfect purity. "Threefold"---three circles. "Perfect purity"---immaculate; avoiding bad [conduct], three kinds,i.e., with body, avoiding bad [conduct], three kinds with body, four kinds with speech, and three kinds with mind, he should strive for immaculate giving,etc. Moreover, there are: [4] (1) threefold purity conforming to śūnyatā, on account of nonapprehension of giver, gift,and recipient (2) threefold-purity conforming to animittatā, because it is free from the satkāyadṛṣṭi, the mithyādṛṣti and the antagrahadṛṣṭi[5], and (3) threefold purity proceeded by apraṇihitatā, because it does not crave for [the three worlds,i.e.,] the world of sense-desire, the world of form and the world of formlessness. "His mind is not fixed there, either"---

It is not fixed even to omniscience. Moreover, as it has been said [by the Buddha]: What is the fewness of wishes (alpecchatā) of the Bodhisattva? 6 It consists in that he does not wish even for enlightenment.

As it is [also] said: If there is no prajñā, even the accumulation of [the merit] of giving, etc., for nearly one thousand kalpas would not turn into a cause of fulfillment of prajñāpāramitā.

prajnāmṛtaṃ tṛptikaraṃ dīpo 'pratihata-prabhaḥ/
mokṣaprasādasopanaṃ kleśendhanahutāśanaḥ // 6//

/ shes rab bdud rtsi ngoms byed dang /
/ sgron ma snang ba thog med dang /
/ thar pe'* khang bzangs thems skas dang /
/ nyon mongs bud shin bsreg pa'i me //6//
*TJ pa'i, MHK pe'.

(6) Prajnā is the ambrosia, giving contentment, a lamp of unimpeded light, the stairs to the palace of emancipation, and the fire [which burns down] the firewood of defilements.

(96,25,3-5) zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras te / shes rab ni shes pa rab po / de nyid bdud rtsi ste / rga shi med pa'i gnas 'thob pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir ro / de nyid ngoms byed kyang (line-6) yin te / yul la mngon par 'dod pa ldog pas shin tu sbyangs pa bskyed pa'i phyir te / gang dag 'phags pa'i shes rab kyis ngoms ba de dag ni ngoms pa yin no / zhes

gsungs pa'i phyir ro / shes rab de nyid sgron ma ste / mi (line-7) shes pa'i mun pa 'joms pa'i phyir ro / de nyid snang ba thogs med yin te / phas kyi rgol ba dang bdud kyi phye ma leb dang nyes pa'i rlung dag gis* snang ba mi choms pa'i phyir ro / de nyid thar pa'i khang bzangs kyi them skas yin te (line-8) mya ngan las 'das pa'i grong khyer 'jig rten thams cad la** mngon par 'phags pa dang / byang chub kyi yan lag gi ka bas brgyan pa bzang po'i gnas su 'jog pa'i ya gad lta bur gyur ba yin no / de nyid nyon mongs pa'i bud shin (96,25,4-1) sreg pa'i me yin te / nags mes sreg*** pa bzhin du nyon mongs pa'i tshan tshin ma lus pa sreg pa'i bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir ro /

*N. gi. **D. las. ***D. bsregs.

.....Thus he said:

Prajñā is the highest knowledge. That itself is the ambrosia, for it is the cause of obtaining the abode where is no old age and death. It brings contentment, because a refreshed feeling is produced by breaking up longing for the sense-object. For it is said: those who are satisfied by prajñā of the ārya are [truly] satisfied.[7] That prajñā is a light, for it conquers the darkness of ignorance. It is the unobstructed illumination, for it is not eclipsed even by the outsider (para-pravāda), the māra's butterfly or the wind of wrong [views?].

Prajñā is the stairs [going up] to the palace of emancipation, [because] it becomes as the stairs up to the

city of nirvāṇa which stands apart from the whole world.[8] [The palace] is decorated by the [thirty seven] pillars of enlightenment and is where the good people dwell. It is as the fire which burns down the firewood of defilement. The reason is: it is the [fire] itself which burns down completely the dense jungle of defilements, just as a forest struck by fire.

sa ca satya-dvayāpekṣā dvividhā'pi matiḥ /
tathya-saṃvṛti[r] bhūtārtha-pravivekānuguṇyataḥ //7//

/ blo gros de yang bden gnyis la /
/ bltos nas rnam pa gnyis su 'dod /
/ yang dag don rtogs rjes mthun phyir /
/ yang dag kun rdzob shes pa yin //7//

(7) And that 'mati' is twofold regarding two [aspects] of reality.

By reason of conformability to the discretion of the real object,---it is tathya-saṃvṛti.[9]

(96,25,4-2) shes rab* blo gros de yang kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i bden pa gnyis la bltos** nas rnam pa gnyis su 'dod do / de la re zhig yang dag pa'i kun rdzob shes pa ni dag pa 'jig rten pa'i (line-3) ye shes zhes bya ba yin te / yang dag pa'i don rtogs pa'i rjes su mthun pa'i phyir yang dag pa'i kun rdzob shes pa yin no / de nyid rnam par dbye ba'i sgo nas ston pa ni /

*D. kyi. **D. ltos.

Moreover, that mati, which is prajñā, falls into two parts with regards to the twofold aspects of reality (satya-dvaya), i.e., paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya. Tathya-saṃvṛti-jñāna is called also viśuddhi-laukika-jñāna, by reason of conformability to the discretion of the real object. Elucidation of that [tathya-saṃvṛti-jñāna] according to the different classification is [as follows]:

dānādi-puṇya-jñānā[nāṃ] sambhāra-pari[pūr]ye /
tad-d[dh]etu-phala-sambandha-lakṣaṇādi[vi]*niścayate //8//

/ sbyin dang bsod nams**ye shes kyi /
/ tshogs rnams yongs su rdzogs byed dang /
/ rgyu de dag gi 'bras bu dang /
/ 'brel dang mtshan nyid la sogs shes //8//

**TJ rnams, MHK nams. *Ms. vi , hypermeter.

(8) When equipment of [the sextad of] giving, etc., knowledge, and merit is fulfilled, the characteristics and the connection between that cause and fruits are ascertained.

mahāmaitrī-kṛpā'bhyāsa-sat[t]va-saṃgraha-pācane /
prajñā saṃketikī jñeyaḥ dvādaśāyatanāśrayā //9//

/ byams dang snying rje bsgoms* pa dang /
/ sems can sdud smin byed dang /
/ skye mched bcu gnyis brten pa yi /
/ shes rab brdar btags shes par bya //9//

*D. bsgom pa.

(9) The maturation [of sentient beings] by the perpetual exercise (abhyāsa) of friendliness and pity; the insight which has the basis of the twelve sense fields are to be known as the conventional [insight].

(96,25,4-5) zhes bya ba dag ste / sbyin pa'i tshogs ni gtong ba dang gtong ba chen po dang shin tu gtong ba'o / / bsod nams kyi tshogs ni dang pa dang bag yod pa dang yang dag pa'i lta ba la sogs pa'o / / ye shes kyi tshogs ni thos pa dang (line-6) bsam pa dang bsgom pa goms pa'i shes pa'o / / de rnams yongs su rdzogs par byed pa ni / / shes rab brdar btags pa yin par shes par bya ste / yang dag pa'i kun rdzob shes pa yin no / / zhes bya bar sbyar ro / / rgyu de dag gi (line-7) 'bras bu zhes bya ba ni tshogs zhes bya ba rgyu gsum po de dag 'bras bu dang ji ltar 'brel pa shes pa yang yang dag pa'i kun rdzob shes pa yin te / de la sbyin pa'i tshogs kyi 'bras bu ni skyes bu chen po'i mtshan sum bcu rtsa gnyis (line-8) dang dpe byad bzang po brgyad cus legs par brgyan pa'i gzugs kyi sku'o / bsod nams kyi 'bras bu ni chos kyi sku'o / ye shes kyi tshogs kyi 'bras bu ni skad cig gcig dang ldan pa'i shes rab bo /

They are:

The accumulating merit of giving is the renunciation (tyāga), the great renunciation, and the greatest renunciation. The accumulating merit is faith, vigilance and the right view, etc. "The accumulating merit of knowledge (jñāna-sambhāra)" ---the knowledge [acquired by] repeated practice of listening,

pondering and creative contemplation. [The thing whereby] these are to be fulfilled should be understood as prajñā belonging to the conventional signs. This [knowledge] is tathya-samvṛti-jñāna.[9] [The above terms] are related in this way. "The fruit of these causes"----- is also tathya-samvṛti-jñāna which knows the manner in which these three causes, called the accumulation, are connected with the fruit. Among them, the fruit of the accumulating [merit] of giving is [acquisition] of the physical body adorned with the thirty-two marks of the great person (dvātriṃśan-mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa) and the eighty secondary distinctions.[10] The fruit of puṇya-sambhāra is dharma-kāya. The fruit of jñāna-sambhāra is the prajñā, the single instantaneous insight.

(96,25,4-8) 'brel ces* bya ba ni (96,25,5-1) rgyu dang 'bras bur 'brel pa ste / de la sems kyi skad cig ma mang pos rgyu nye bar bsags pa'i rgyun gyis ma du lun ga'i me tog gi ze ba dmar ba lta bu 'am / sa bon dang myu gu'i rgyun ltar sems kyi skad cig ma (line-2) gzhan la 'bras bu bskyed pa'i nus yod pas de ltar rgyu dang 'bras bur 'brel pa zhes pa yang dag pa'i kun rdzob shes pa yin no / mtshan nyid ces bya ba ni chos rnams kyi mtshan nyid ni rang spyi'i bye brag las rnam pa gnyis te / de la (line-3) rang gi mtshan nyid ni dngos po rang gi ngo bo spyod yul ldan pa rnam par rtog pa med pa'i shes pas nges par gzung bar bya'o / spyi'i mtshan nyid ni

*D. zhes.

rjes su dpog pa'i shes pa rnam par rtog pa can gyis rtogs par bya'o/ sogs pa (line 4) zhes bya ba'i sgras ni ngo bo nyid dang brda dang gdags pa dang mtshan ma dang stsal pa* dang blang ba la sogs pa dag bsdu'o/ shes zhes bya ba ni rab tu rnam par dbye ba de dag shes pa'i blo gros te/ de yang yang dag pa'i kun rdzob shes pa (line 5) yin no/

* brtsal ba.

" Connection (sambandhana)"---the connection between the cause (hetu) and the fruit (phala). Among them, knowing the following connection between hetu and phala is the tathya-saṃvṛti-jñāna: just as the continuity from the red pollen of the matulunga flower[11], to [its] seeds and [its] sprouts, there is [a connection] between the [passing] series of thought and the next single thought, because [the former[has a fruit bearing [kinetic] force. "Lakṣaṇa" ---the marks of the constituents of reality (dharma), which falls into two parts according to the difference of the unique particular (sva) and the universal (sāmānya). Among them, the unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) is the reality itself (bhāva-svarūpa) with the realm (sagocara)— which should be ascertained by non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpa-jñāna).[12] The universal characteristic (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) is [the thing which] cognized by the inferential knowledge which has discrimination. The own-being and conventional symbol (saṃketa), designation (prajñapti) , mark (nimitta), refusal and acceptance (heya-upādeya) are

in the term 'et cetera'(ādi). "Knowing"---the intelligence (mati) which knows those differences. This is also the tathya-samvrti-jñāna.

(96,25,5-5) byams dang snying rje* bsgom zhes bya ba ni byams pa dang snying rje dang dga' ba dang btang snyoms chen po goms par byed pa'o / sems can sdud ces bya ba ni bzhi po de dag dang / bsdu ba'i dngos po bzhis sems can sdud (line-6) pa'o / smin byed ces bya ba ni sems can de dag gi rgyud la dge ba'i chos 'jog pas gang dag yongs su smin par byed pa'o / de dag shes pa'i shes rab gang yin pa de yang yang dag pa'i kun rdzob shes pa yin no / / skye mched (line-7) bcu gnyis brten pa'i zhes bya ba ni mig la sogs pa skye mched bcu gnyis po dag rab tu rnam par 'byed nus pa'i shes rab gang yin pa'o / ji skad smos pa de dag shes pa'i shes rab ni brdar btags pa yin par shes (line-8) par bya ste / yang dag pa'i kun rdzob shes pa yin no / don dam pa'i shes rab bstan pa'i phyir /

*D. °rje che ba.

" Perpetual action (abhyāsa) of friendliness and pity"---the perpetual action of the great friendliness, pity, rejoice and even-mindness. "Acceptance of sentient beings"---acceptance of sentient beings by these four (maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekṣa) and the four means of conversion [saṃgraha-vastu, i.e., giving, kind words, helpfulness and consistency between words and deeds]. "Maturing"---maturation by means of planting the auspicious dharma into

the stream-line of [thought] (citta-saṃtāna) of sentient beings. "Having the basis of the twelve sense fields"---the insight which is able to discern the twelve sense fields, i.e., eye, etc. It should be known that the insight, which knows the above, belongs to the conventional signs. That is: tathya-saṃvṛti-jñāna.

In order to show the knowledge of ultimate reality (paramārtha-jñāna), [it is said]:

aśeṣa-kalpanā-jāla-pratiṣedha-vidhāyinī /
śānta-pratyātma-saṃvedya-nirvikalpa-nirakṣare//10//
vigataikatva-nānātve tat[t]ve gagana-nirmale /
apracāra-pracārā ca prajñā syāt pāramārthikī //11//
/ rtog pa'i dra ba ma lus pa /
/ dgag pa sgrub par byed pa dang /
/ zhi dang so so rang rig dang /
/ rnam rtog med cing yi ge med //10//
/ gcig nyid tha dang nyid bral dang /
/ mkha' ltar dri med de nyid la /
/ 'jug pa med pas 'jug pa yi /
/ shes rab don dam shes pa yin //11//

(10,11) [If] prajñā has the fuction of the complete break-through of the net[-work] of thought[-construction] and has the 'penetrationless penetration' into the ultimate reality which is free from [the marks of] sameness and multiplicity, immaculate[as]space; wordless, without thought-construction, quiescence which is to be

realized alone, [then it is the prajñā] belonging to the ultimate reality.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,26,1-6) de gnyis las dang po kho nar gang la brtson par bya zhe na / de dag gi go rim bstan pa'i phyir /

One might ask: between these two [prajñā], which [prajñā] should be pursued? In order to show the progressive steps (krama) of these, he said the following:

(ta)ttva-prāsāda-śikharārohaṇaṃ ca* viyujyate /
tathya-saṃvṛti-sopānam antareṇa yatas tataḥ //12//
pūrvaṃ saṃvṛti-satyena praviviktam matir bhavet /
tato dharma-sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇe suviniścitaḥ //13//

*Ms. na.

/ yang dag kun rdzob rnams kyi skas /
/ med par yang dag khang ba yi /
/ steng du 'gro bar bya ba ni /
/ mkhas la rung ba ma yin no //12//

(96,26,2-3) de lta yin pa de'i phyir dang por kun rdzob kyi bden pa blo gros kyi (line-4) rab tu rnam par dbye bar bya'o / (line-6) de'i 'og tu chos rnams kyi rang dang spyi'i mtshan nyid la shin tu rnam par nges (line-7) par 'gyur te //13//

(12,13) Also, without the stairs of the tathya-saṃvṛti, the ascension to the top of the palace of ultimate reality (tattva) is lost. For this very reason, firstly, the saṃvṛti-satya should be discerned by the

intelligence. Thence, one proceeds to investigate thoroughly the unique and the universal characteristics of dharmas.

(96,26,1-7) zhes bya ba smras te / de nyid khang (line-8) bzang shes bya ba ni thar pa'i gang bzang* sa gsum gyi gnas las mngon par 'phags pa dge ba'i bjo bo dpag tu med pas brtsigs** pa / byang chub kyi yan lag gi ka ba shin tu mthon pos legs par brgyan pa / / dge ba'i (96,26,2-1) chos mtha' yas pa'i dkar rtsis byugs pa / bde bar gshegs pa'i zla ba'i zhal gyi 'od zer gyis snang bar byas pa rab rib kyi rim pa ma lus pa rnam par bsal ba thams cad mkhyen pa'i gnas so / (line-2) de'i thog du 'dzeg pa ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i them skas bskal ba grangs med pa 'dun bo dag tu spyod pa med par pha rol tu phyin pa dang / dban dang mngon par shes pa yongs su ma rdzogs pas gya tshoms kho (line-3) nar nus par rung ba ma yin te / bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang kun rdzob kyi chos rnams med par don dam par rtogs par mi nus zhes gzungs so / gang gi phyir de lta yin pa de'i phyir dang por kun rdzob kyi bden pa blo gros kyi*** (line-4) rab tu rnam par dbye bar bya'o /

*P. bzangs. **P. btsigs. ***D. kyis.

[That is:]

"The palace of <u>tattva</u>"---the palace of emancipation which pierces [the sky] apart from the three worlds. This is the residence of the omniscient, whose coats of the eyes

are completely cleared; constructed by the countless craftsmen of kuśala, well decorated by the soaring pillars of the [thirty-seven] wings of enlightenment (bodhi-pakṣa), painted by the white paint of the endless śukla-dharma, illuminated by the light from the moon's countenance of the Sugata. The ascension towards this summit is impossible in an entirely sudden way. The reason is: without ascending the stairs of the tathya-saṃvṛti-satya for seven countless kalpas, the complete perfection of the [six] pāramitās, [ten] powers [of a Tathāgata] and [the six] superknowledges,(abhijñā) is impossible. Bhagavat also proclaimed: Apart from the saṃvṛti-dharmas, it is impossible [for us] to realize the ultimate. For this reason, firstly, the saṃvṛti-satya should be discerned by the intelligence.[13]

(96,26,2-4) kun rdzob ces bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa'i dngos bo kun rnam par 'byed pa'i don gyis te / 'jig rten gyi tha snyad phyin ci ma log pa'o / de nyid bden pa ste / rnam par bzhag* pa thams cad (line-5) la 'gro ba'i tshad ma yin pa'i phyir ro / / de la dang por gzugs ni rnam pa gnyis dang rnam** nyi zhu zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang / de bzhin du yig 'bru dang bstan bcos dang lag rtsis dang shod thabs dang / nor brgyud pa'i rgyud (line-6) dang / sman dpyad*** dang rtsis dang / gsang sngags dang rig sngags la sogs pa gang dag 'jig rten na grags pa dag rab tu rnam par dbye ba byas nas de'i 'og tu chos rnams kyi rang dang**** spyi'i mtshan nyid la

*D. gzhag. **D. rnam gnyis rnam pa. ***P. spyad, D. dpyad.
****D. rang bzhin.

shin tu rnam par nges (line-7) par 'gyur te / de'i phyir des ni mtshan nyid med pa don dam pa'i rjes la thob pa dag pa 'jig rten pa'i shes pa'i spyod yul yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi rab tu rnam par dbye ba bstan to / de la chos rnams kyi rang gi mtshan nyid ni (line-8) gzugs su rung ba dang / myong ba dang / mtshan mar 'dzin pa dang / mngon par 'du byed pa dang / rnam par shes par byed pa la sogs pa'o / spyi'i mtshan nyid ni mi rtag pa dang sdug bsngal ba dang stong pa dang / bdag med (96,26,3-1) pa la sogs pa'o / yang rang gi mtshan nyid ni sngon po dang ser po dang ring po dang / thung du la sogs pa dang gzugs dang sgra la sogs pa'o / spyi'i mtshan nyid ni rigs mi mthun pas stong pa nyid do / / de la shin tu rnams par nges (line-2) par gyur nas /

"Saṃvṛti---it is so called in the meaning of discernment (vibhāga) of all entities, like colour, etc. It is true mundane activity. This is satya, because it is a pramāṇa which leads to establishment of all things in the world. Firstly, form (rūpa) has two kinds (dvidhā), and twenty kinds (viṃśatidhā).[14] Likewise, one [should] thoroughly study [the subjects which are] well known in the mundane world, i.e., grammar (akṣara-śāstra) palmistry (mudrā), enumeration, alchemy(?), medical science (cikitsā), arithmetic (gaṇanā),[15] charms (mantra), spells (vidyā), etc. After this, one proceeds to investigate thoroughly the unique and the universal characteristics of all dharmas. Therefore, [we] show the investigation of the tathya-saṃvṛti, the realm (gocara) of the viśuddha-laukika-jñāna

which is acquired after [the realization] of the markless ultimate reality.[16]

Among them, the particular (svalakṣaṇa) of dharmas is: breaking [of rūpa], perceiving, [of vedanā], image making, (citrī-kāra) [of saṃjñā], together-making, (abhisaṃskāra) [of saṃskāra], differentiating, [of vijñāna]. The universal characteristics are: impermanence, pain, voidness, selflessness, etc. Furthermore, the svalaksana is: blue, yellow, long, short etc., and sight-object, sounds, etc. The universal characteristic is voidness by reason of not belonging to any particular things (vijātīya).

Having finished with the thorough investigation there;

abhiyujyeta medhāvī samādhānāya cetasaḥ /
tathā śrutamayajñāne tad anya-jñāna-hetutaḥ //14//

/ mkhas pas sems ni mnyam gzhag phyir /
/ mngon par brtson pa nyid du bya /
/ de bzhin thos byung shes pa la /
/ de las gzhan shes rgyu* phyir ro //14//

*TJ: rgyu, MHK sdu.

(14) A learned person should practice concentration of mind,
Likewise, in the knowledge consisting of erudition,
Because that is the cause of the other knowledge.

(96,26,3-2) zhes bya ba la ji ltar sems mnyam par gzhag* par bya zhe na / dbugs (line-3) 'byung ba dang rdub pa dran

*P. bzhag, D. gzhag.

pas so / de la dbugs 'byung* ba dang rdub pa ni dbugs phyir 'byung* ba dang dbugs nang du rdub ba'o / de gnyis sna'i rtse** mor dran pa nye bar gzhag*** nas bgrang bar bya ste / dang po 'byung* ba nas bcu la sog (line-4) pa dang brgya'i bar du rjes su mthun pa dang rjes su mi mthün par bgrang ngo / yang 'byung ba dang 'jug pa la dran pa btang bar bya ste / 'byung ba ni dri nga ba dang ring ba dang / dro bar dbugs dbyung ba'o / 'jug pa ni dri zhim pa dang / (line-5) thung ba dang grangs bar dbugs 'jugs pa'o / lte ba'i phyogs nas 'byung zhing sna'i rtse mor thugs pa de lta bur rkang ba'i the bo**** nas lus thams cad la dran pa 'jug par bya'o /

*D. dbyung. **N. rtses. ***D. bzhag. ***D. mthe bong.

For this, one might ask: how should one concentrate his mind? It is by means of mindfulness of inspiration and expiration (anāpana-smṛti). There, inspiration and expiration are outbreathing and inbreathing (āśvāsa-praśvāsa). Having attended these two [inspiration and expiration] on the tip ofthe nose,one should count [numbers]. Firstly, while outbreathing, one counts [numbers] (gaṇanā-paricaya) between ten and one hundred both in direct order (anulomagaṇanā) and reverse order (pratiloma-gaṇanā). Moreover, at the time of out[breathing] and in[breathing], one should remind himselfof [the following]: outgoing is the emission of musty smell, long, and hot breath. Incoming is sweet smell, short and cold breath. Having started from the navel region, it reaches the tipofthe nose. Likewise, mindfulness should be

collected from the big toe to the entire body.

(96,26,3-5) gang gi tshe des lcags mgar gyi sbud pa bzhin du (line-6) lus gang bar mthong ba de'i tshe na lus thams cad so so yang dag par rig pa zhes pa'i chos kyi sgo thob cing lus dang sems las su rung bar yang 'gyur ro / kha cig ni dbugs dbyung ba dang rdub ba 'gag* pa na chos kyi sgo (line-7) skye bar yang 'dod do / de ltar de dag la sogs pas sems mnyam par bzhag** pa'i phyir mngon par brtson pa nyid du bya'o / de bzhin du sgra dang / gtan tshigs dang gso ba dang / nang zhes bya ba'i rig pa'i gnas bzhi bo (line-8) dag la yongs su 'dris pa'i mtshan nyid kyi thos pa las byung ba'i shes pa la yang mngon pa rab rtson ba nyid du bya ste / de ni de las gzhan pa bsams pa dang / bsgoms pa las byung ba bla na med pa'i shes pa dag (96,26,4-1) 'thob pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir ro / sems mnyam par bzhag** pas de nyid rtogs par 'gyur gyi gzhan gyi*** ma yin par bstan pa'i phyir ro /

*D. 'gags. **D. gzhag. ***D. gyis.

Analogous to the skin-bellows of a blacksmith (lohā-kāra), whenever [a yogin] experiences the filling up of his body by this [breathing practice], his body and mind become energetic (karmaṇya) by getting a gate of dharma (dharma-mukha) called the sarvakāya-pratisaṃvid. Some maintain that when the outbreathing and the inbreathing stop, a dharma-mukha generates. In this way, one should constantly practice (abhiyoga) concentration of mind by these and other [methods]. Likewise, one should constantly apply it

for knowledge arisen from listening which has the indication of mastery over (parijaya) the four subjects, (vidyā-sthāna) i.e., grammar (śabdavidyā), logic (hetu), medical science (cikitsā) and Buddhist philosophy. The reason is: this (śrutamaya-jñāna) is the cause of acquiring the supreme knowledge which is arisen from cintāmayī and bhāvanāmayī-jñāna. It is taught that: tattva can be realized by concentrated mind, but not by others.

na paśyati yathā vaktraṃ kaluṣapracala-jale /
tathā 'sa[māhite] citte tat[t]vaṃ nivaraṇāvṛ[t]te //15//

/ ji ltar chu rnyog gyo ba la /
/ bzhin ni mthong bar mi 'gyur ba /
/ de ltar sems mnyam ma bzhag dang /
/ sgrib pas bsgribs la de nyid do //15//

(15) Just as [one] does not see a face in muddy and
swaying water,
Likewise, tattva in the unconcentrated mind
which is covered by hindrance.

(TJ is omitted here).

nibadhyālambana-stambhe smṛti-rajjvā* mano-gajaṃ /
unmārga-cāriṇaṃ kuryāt prajñāṅkuśa-vaśaṃ śanai[ḥ] //16//

*Ms. rajvā.

/ yid gyi glong po log 'gro ba /
/ dmigs pa'i khab brtan po la /
/ dran pa'i thag pas nges bcings nas /
/ shes rab lcags kyus rim dbang bya //16//

(16) Having been bound with the rope of mindfulness
to the post of meditative object,
An elephant-[like]-mind, which has gone astray,
should be brought under control slowly with the
hook of prajñā.

(TJ is omitted here).

anityatā-manaskārair uddhataṃ śamam ānayet /
vipulālamb*anābhyāsāt saṃkṣiptaṃ vipulātmatāṃ //17//

*Ms. °v.

/ rgod pa mi rtag la sogs pa /
/ yid la byed pas zhi bar bya /
/ zhum pa dmigs pa rgya chen dag /
/ bsgom pas spangs* pa nyid du bya //17//

*TJ yangs, MHK spangs.

(17)Haughtiness should be pacified by a mental orientation
to impermanence;
A depressed (mind) should be uplifted by the repeated
meditational practice by means of a vast meditative
object.

(TJ is omitted here).

vikṣiptaṃ saṃharet kṣipt*a-nimittādinavekṣaṇāt /
vīryānuśaṃsa-darśitvāl līnam uttejayed api //18//

*Ms. °r.

/ gyengs pas gyeng ba'i mtshan ma la /
/ nyes dmigs blta bas bsdu bar bya /
/ zhum pa yang ni brtson 'grus kyi /
/ phan yon mthong bas gzengs bstod bya //18//

(18) The scatterlings should be concentrated by observing
the danger in the symptom caused by straying,
the timorous should be stimulated by observing the
benefit of vigour.

(TJ is omitted here).

rāga-dveṣa-tamas*-[paṅkā]d malīmasam asaṃyataṃ /
kṣālayed aśubhā maitrī pratīyotpāda-vāriṇā //19//

*Ms. °ḥ

/ 'dod chags zhe sngang gti mug gi /
/ rdzab dris sbags zhing ma bsdums pa /
/ mi sdug byams pa rten 'byung ba'i /
/ chu dag gis ni bkur bar bya //19//

(19) The uncontrolled and impure [mind]
owing to the mire of greed, hatred and delusion
should be cleansed by water of repulsion,
friendliness and dependent co-arising.

rim pa de dag gis. By the foregoing process:

viviktam acalaṃ śāntam ālambanā-parāyaṇaṃ* /
karmaṇyam mṛdu ca jñātvā tatra samyag-upekṣayet //20//

*Ms. naṃ.

/ dben zhing mi gyo zhi ba dang /
/ dmigs pa dag la gzhol ba dang /
/ las su rung zhing mnyen shes nas /
/ de la legs par btang snyoms bya //20//

(20) Having known the purity, immovability,
quiescence, total involvement with the
meditative object, then one should
rightly stay detached there.

(96,26,5-7) zhes bya ba la dben pa ni bkru bas so / mi gyo ba ni mi gyeng bas so / zhi ba ni nang du bsdu bas so / dmigs pa dag la gzhol ba ni dmigs pa mtha' dag la 'jug pas so / las su rung ba ni dga' mgur (line-8) 'jug pas so / mnyen pa ni nga rgyal dang khengs pa med pas so / sems de ltar bsgrims pa med kyang lam log pa de dag tu 'gro bar mi 'gyur bar shes na* / / de la legs par btang snyoms su bzhag par bya'o /

*D. nas.

That is:

It is pure by cleansing, immovable by freedom from lassitude (atandrita), quiescence by inner restraint, total involvement with the meditative object (ālambanā-parāyaṇa) by entering into all meditative objects, energetic by entering into the places he likes ; and gentle by absence of conceit and haughtiness. Although the mind is impassive as above, knowing that it is not heading for the wrong paths, it rightly stays there detached.

samāhitā matiḥ paścat prajñayaivaṃ parikṣayet /
yo'yam svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ gṛhyeta vyavahārataḥ //21//
/ blo gros mnyam gzhag 'og tu ni /
/ tha snyad sgo nas bzhung* bya yi /
*TJ gzung, MHK bzung.

/ chos rnams dngos po 'di dag la /

/ shes rab kyis ni 'di ltar brtag //21//

(21) After [his] intelligence (mati) is concentrated,

[a yogin] should annihilate [own-beings] with his insight in this way:

On these 'own-beings' of dharmas, which can be grasped by the conventional expression (vyavahāra), as follows:

(96,27,1-1) ces bya ba ni gang gi tshe de'i sems kyis blo gros mnyam par bzhag* pa'i ting nge 'dzin skyes par (line-2) gyur pa de'i 'og tu tha snyad kyi sgo nas gzung bar bya ba kun rdzob kyi bden ba'i tshul gyis rnam par bzhag* pa'i chos sa dang chu dang me dang rlung la sogs pa rnams kyi dngos po sra ba dang gsher ba dang tsha ba dang gyo ba la sogs pa 'di (line-3) dag la shes rab kyis 'di ltar brtag par bya'o /

*D. gzhag.

That is:

After [a yogin] generates concentration of intelligence, he should investigate, with his insight, these [natures], i.e., solidity, wetness, heat, motion, etc., which arethe properties (vastu) of earth, water, fire, wind, etc. These dharmas are established by the method of saṃvṛti which can be understood by the conventional expression (vyavahāra) [of the mundane world].

vicāryamāṇās tu dhiyā kim ayam paramārthataḥ /22a-b/

/ blo yis rnam par dbyad* pa na /

*TJ spyad, MHK dbyad.

/ 'di dag don dam yod dam ci /22a-b/

(22a-b) While analyzing with [his] intelligence (<u>dhī</u>),

[he ponders]:

How is this [possible] from the ultimate point of view?

(96,27,1-3) zhes bya ba ni de blos yongs su rtogs pa na dngos bo 'di dag don dam par yang 'thad dam 'on te ji ltar snyam pa'o/

That is:

While he is making investigation with his intelligence, he ponders in this manner: whether or not these entities are acceptable from the ultimate point of view?

yadi syāt ta[ttva]m e[tat cet anyatra etad] mṛgya[Ms.°dhya]te/

/ gal te yin na 'di de nyid /

/ gal te gzhan na de btsal bya //22c-d//

(22c-d) If it is acceptable, then this is a <u>tattva</u>.

Otherwise, that [reason] should be searched for.

(96,27,1-4) zhes bya ba ni gal te re zhig don dam par yang chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid 'di dag yod par rigs pa nyid yin na ni de lta na ni dngos po 'di dag nyid don dam pa de nyid yin no /

That is:

If the existence of these entities is accepted from the ultimate point of view, then these entities are <u>paramārtha-tattva</u>.

(96,27,1-4) gal te (line-5) 'di dag brtag mi bdzod pa'i phyir / / 'di dag las don dam pa'i de nyid gzhan yin na ni / / phyogs su lhung ba med pa'i blos de btsal bar bya'o /

If these [entities] are inadequate for the examination [from the ultimate point of view], then, the paramārtha-tattvas are other than these [entities]. If so, one should search for that [reason] by the intelligence, without any inclination to [one] side.

gang gi phyir zhe na. If the reason is asked:

na pakṣapāta-saṃtaptaḥ śāntim arhati karh(i)cit /23a-b/

/ phyogs su lhung bas* sems gdungs pas /

/ zhi ba nam yang rtogs mi 'gyur /23a-b/

*TJ ba, MHK bas.

(23a-b) Due to the irritation [caused by] the inclination to [one] side, he never deserves quiescence.

(96,27,1-6) zhes bya ba ste / gang gi phyir 'jig rten ni pha la cher phyogs su lhung bas sems kyi rgyud gdungs bas log par gzung ba la dam du nye bar 'dzin bas de dag gis ni nam yang zhi ba rtogs par mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro / /

That is:

The reason is: worldlings are usually attached strongly to the bias, due to irritation (saṃtapta) in [their] streams of consciousness (citta-saṃtāna), they never deserve quiescence.

(96,27,1-6) dbu ma'i snying (line-7) po'i 'grel ba rtog ge 'bar ba / bam po gsum pa / de la mdor bsdus na /

The Madhyamakahṛdaya-vṛtti-Tarkajvālā, section three. Here, if we summarize

saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtā dharmāḥ skandhāyatana-dhātavaḥ

//23c-d//

/ 'dus byas* 'dus ma byas chos ni /

/ phung po skye mched khams rnams ni** //23c-d//

*TJ 'dus byas is lacking. **TJ so.

(23c-d) The conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are

the aggregates, the sense-fields and the elements.

(96,27,1-7) / zhes bya ba la 'dus byas kyi chos ni rgyu dang rkyen gyis bskyed pa rnams so / / 'dus ma byas kyi chos ni skye (line-8) ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig pa dang bral ba rnams so / / de dag kyang gang zhe na / de dag ni phung po lnga dang skye mched bcu gnyis dang khams bco brgyad po rnams so / de dag kyang bcom ldan 'das kyis nyan thos kyi theg par ni /

/ kye ma 'du byed mi rtag ste /

/ skye zhing 'jig pa'i chos can yin /

/ skyes nas 'gag par 'gyur ba ste /

/ de dag nye bar zhi bar bde //

That is:

The conditioned dharma[s] are impregnation (ādhāna) by the initial cause and the associate conditions. The unconditioned dharmas are the things which are separated from

production, continuation and annihilation. What are they (conditioned dharmas)? They are: the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields and the eighteen elements. In the Śrāvakayāna, they are also [described] by Bhagavat as follows:[24]

The conditioned events are impermanent, indeed,
And have the nature of appearance and disappearance;
Having appeared, they vanish,
Their appeasing is the [only] bliss.

Thus (zhes de ltar),

kleśāvaraṇa-hānāya śrāvakāṇāṃ prakāśitāḥ /24a-b/

/ nyon mongs sgrib pa spang pa'i phyir /

/ nyan thos rnams la rab tu bshad /24a-b/

(24a-b) He (Bhagavat) proclaimed [thus] the forsaking of the covering of affliction for the Disciples.

(TJ is omitted here),

[On the other hand], for the Mahāyāna: (theg pa chen po ni) (96,27,2-3) byung ba med pa dang / dngos po med pa dang / skye ba med pa dang / 'gag pa med pa dang / mngon par 'du bya ba med pa dang / gnyis su med pa'i tshul gyis shes bya yod pa ma yin na / / nyon mongs pa rnams ga la (line-4) 'byung ste / de ltar bag chags dang bcas pa'i /

According to the guiding principle (nīti)[25] [which teaches that] no origination, no entity, no production, no annihilation, no formative influence (nirabhisaṃskāra), and no covering of the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa) exists, then whence is

[the covering of] the afflictions (kleśāvaraṇa) generated?
Thus, [in regard to] the one with residue:

kleśa-jñeyāvṛti-mala-prahāṇāya kṛpālūnāṃ//24c-d//

/ nyon mongs shes bya'i sgrib dri ma /

/ spang phyir snying rje ldan rnams la //24c-d//

(24c-d) For the removal of stain caused by the coverings of affliction and the knowable [it was preached] to the compassionate ones [= Bodhisattvas].

Thus, [these verses] are [to be] linked (zhes bya bar sbyar ro) (96,27,2-4) / dngos po la mngon par zhen pa rags pa spangs na dngos por 'dzin pa phra mo (line-5) dang bral bar sla bas de'i phyir /

If the gross inclination towards existence is eliminated initially, then it is easy to get rid of the subtle inclination toward existence (bhāva-abhiniveśa).

Therefore,

audārikatvāt prathamaṃ rūpaskandhaḥ parīkṣyate

tathā'pi pūrvaṃ bhūtāni yathoktād eva kāraṇāt //25//

/ rags phyir dang po kho nar ni /

/ gzugs kyi phung po brtag par bya /

/ de l'ang* dang por 'byung ba rnams /

/ ji skad bstan pa'i gtan tshigs kyis //25//

*TJ de 'ang.

(25) First, the form aggregate is examined, by reason of its grossness,

Moreover, the gross elements [are examined] to begin

with, because of that very reason which is mentioned already.

(TJ is omitted here).

tatra [bhūtasvabhāvaṃ hi] norvyādi[r] paramārthataḥ
kṛtakatvād yathajñānaṃ hetumatvādito'pi vā //26//

/ 'dir ni sa la sogs pa dag /
/ don dam par na 'byung ba yi /
/ ngo bo nyid min byas phyir dang /
/ rgyu ldan sogs phyir shes pa bzhin //26//

(26) Here, earth, etc., do not, indeed, have the own-being of the gross elements, from the standpoint of ultimate reality. The reasons: they are manufactured like knowledge, or are cause possessing, and so forth.[26]

(96,27,2-8) zhes bya ba la 'dir ni zhes bya ba la ni de nyid shes pa tshol ba'i skabs 'dir ro / / 'dir ci zhig zhe na / sa la sogs pa dag ces bya ba smras te / sa zhes bya ba ni gtos che (96,27,3-1) / pa'i phyir ro / sogs pa zhes bya ba ni sa de chu la sogs pa 'og ma dag gi dang por smos pa'i yan lag gis bsdus pa sbyir bsdu ba'i don te / sogs pa'i sgras chu dang me dang rlung rnams kyang bsdu'o /

That is:

"Here"---in this chapter of the quest for tattvajñāna. One might ask: "What is [concerned] here?" It is concerned with the earth, etc. "The earth (urvī)"---because of its huge dimension. "And so forth"---that earth, which is the first

member of earth, water, etc., to be mentioned later. By the term, 'so forth', water, fire, and wind are all included. (96,27,3-1) / don dam pa zhes bya (line-2) ba la don zhes bya ba ni shes par bya ba yin pa'i phyir / don de brtag par bya ba dang go bar bya ba'i tha tshig go / dam pa zhes bya ba ni mtshog ces bya ba'i tshig gi sgra yin te / don dam pa zhes bsdu ba ni / de don yang yin la dam pa yang yin pas (line-3) don dam pa'o / / yang na dam pa'i don de rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes dam pa'i don yin pas dam pa'i don to / yang na don dam pa dang mthun pa ste don dam pa rtog pa dang rjes su mthun pa'i shes rab la don dam pa de yod pas don dam pa (line-4) dang mthun pa'o / / don dam par na zhes bya ba ni don dam pa de nyid du 'am don dam par ro / 'byung ba zhes bya ba ni rang nyid du 'byung ba 'am gzhan 'byung bar byed pas 'byung ba dag go / ngo bo nyid ces bya ba ni 'byung ba de dag nyis sa la sogs (line-5) pa'i ngo bo nyid yin pas 'byung ba'i ngo bo nyid do / min zhes bya ba ni dgag pa ston pa'i sgra ste / ma yin zhes bya bar sbyar ro / / gang zhig ci zhig ma yin zhe na / sa la sogs pa dag don dam par na 'byung ba'i ngo bo nyid ni ma yin no / / zhes (line-6) bya bar sbyar ro /

As for "paramārtha"; "artha"—the object to be known (jñātavya) and hence the object which should be examined (parīkṣaṇīya) and understood (pratipādya). "Parama" is the term which means "the most excellent." For the compound parama-artha, [three interpretations can be made]. [First,

karmadhāraya]: the most excellent object, since it is the object as well as the most excellent. [Second, tatpūruṣa]: the object of the most excellent, since it is the object of the most excellent non-discriminating knowledge (parama-nirvikalpa-jñāna).[27] [Third, Bahuvrīhi]: it is 'in accordance with paramārtha,' because the paramārtha exists in the knowledge of the paramārtha which is conformable to discrimination (kalpanā-anulomika-paramārtha-jñāna). "From the standpoint of paramārtha"---this very paramārtha [Bahuvrīhi compound], it is called "from the standpoint of paramārtha." "Bhūta"---they are 'the things which came into being,' since they generate by themselves or they generate other [things]. "Own-being (svabhāva)"---since these bhūtas are the own-being of the earth, etc., [it is called] the own-being of bhūta. In regard to "not (na)"---the term which indicates a negation, and it is connected as na-asti, one might ask: What are they which are not? They are the earth, etc., which are not the own-being of bhūta from the standpoint of ultimate reality. [These words] are related this way. (96,27,3-6) / 'dir min zhes bya ba'i dgag pa 'di ni med par dgag pa'i don du gzung gi ma yin par dgag pa'i don du ni mi gzung ngo // med par dgag pa dang ma yin par dgag pa zhes bya ba de grangs kyi bye brag ji lta bu zhe na / ma (line -7) yin par dgag pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo nyid dgag pas de dang 'dra ba de las gzhan pa'i dngos po'i ngo bo nyid sgrub par byed pa ste / dper na 'di bra ma ze ma yin no // zhes dgag

pas bra ma ze de 'dra ba de las gzhan pa bra ma ze ma yin pa (line-8) dka' thub dang thos pa la sogs pas dman pa'i rigs yin par sgrub pa lta bu'o / / med par dgag pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo nyid tsam zhig 'gog par zad kyi de dang 'dra ba de ma yin pa gzhan gyi dngos po sgrub par mi byed pa ste / dper na (96,27,4-1) bra ma ze chang btung bar mi bya'o / / zhes bya ba de tsam zhig 'gog par zad kyis de las gzhan pa'i btung ba btung ngo / / zhe 'am mi btung ngo zhes mi brjod pa lta bu'o / / des 'dir ni 'jig rten pas yongs su btags pa'i sa la sogs pa (line-2) don dam par na 'byung ba'i ngo bo nyid ma yin par dgag pa tsam zhig byed par zad kyi gzhan gyi ngo bo nyid yin pa 'am / dngos bo med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin par mi sgrub pa yin no /

Here, the negation, i.e., 'not' should be taken as the total negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha) and not as the negation for affirmation (paryudāsa-pratiṣedha).[28] One might ask: What is the difference between the total negation and the negation for affirmation? The negation for affirmation: by negating an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of an entity (vastu), it affirms [at the same time] the other intrinsic nature of an entity which is similar to that [entity which is negated]. For example, by the negation, "he is not a brahman," one affirms: although he looks like a brahman, he is something else [i.e.,] a non-brahman ascetic or: he belongs to a lower class by reason of lack of learning, etc. The total negation:

by simply negating an intrinsic nature of an entity, it does not affirm the other entity which is similar but not identical. For example, by saying, "Brahman, do not drink liquor," having simply negating [it], it does not say whether he should drink or not drink something other than liquor. Thereby, by saying, here, "the earth, etc., which are imagined by the worldlings, are not the own-beings of the [Mahā]-bhūta[s]," totally negates [the own-beings]. It does not affirm either another own-being or the own-being which has no own-being.

(96,27,4-2) 'dir sa la sogs pa dag ces bya ba ni chos can yin la / don (line-3) dam pa(r*na) 'byung ba'i ngo bo nyid ma yin zhes bya ba ni de'i chos yin no / / chos can dang chos bsdus pa ni phyogs yin te / rig(s**) pa la mkhas pa dag na re gzhan la gsal bar byed pa'i phyir phyogs zhes bya'o/ / zhes zer ro 'dir gzhan dag (line-4) gis brgal ba khyed cag gi ston pa'i tshig las 'di skad ces kye bra ma ze thams cad thams cad ces bya ba ni phung po lnga dang skye mched bcu gnyis dang khams bco brgyad po dag go zhes bya ba dang / de bzhin du gzugs kyi mtshan nyid ni (line-5) gzugs su rung ba'o/ / zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'byung la / khyed kyis kyang de khas blangs nas / de nyid 'gog par byed na khas blangs pas gnod do / / de bzhin du yul so sor nges pa la 'jug pa nyid ni dbang po rnams kyi mngon sum ma yin (line-6) par grags te / mthong

*D. par na. **D. rigs.

ba las lhag pa'i tshad ma gzhan med la / khyed rang nyid kyi mig gis kyang 'byung ba'i dbyins dang / gzugs dag mthong zhing de'i ngo bo nyid kyi reg pa brtsub pa dag kyang tshol la 'dzin pa la sogs pa'i bya ba byed pa (line-7) 'jig rten pa thams cad kyis kyang nye bar gzung ba yod bzhin du de dag 'gog pa la mngon sum gyis kyang gnod do / / de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa gang yin pa 'di dag dang / de dag gi sra ba dang gsher ba dang tsha ba dang gyo ba la sogs (line-8) pa'i ngo bo nyid gang yin pa dag ni ri khrod pa dang gdol ba yan chad la yan grags te / de ltar 'jig rten thams cad la grags pa'i dngos po'i ngo bo nyid gsal bar byed pas grags pas kyang gnod do zhe na /

Here, "earth, etc.," are dharmin (=subject) and "there is no own-being of the [four] elements in ultimate sense,"---is dharma (=predicate). The combination of dharmin and dharma is pakṣa. Those who are well versed in nyāya say: pakṣa is so called, because it clearly shows something to others.[29]

Here, the opponents object:

1). There is the following verse in the saying of the great teacher of yours; "Oh! Brahman, by saying 'all,' 'all' indicates the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields and the eighteen elements."[30] [Likewise] "The property (lakṣaṇa) of form (rūpa) is molesting, etc." You also maintain the bhūta, [which is taught by your teacher] and if you negate that very thing, then [your pratijñā] is hurt by what you

[already maintain] (=svavacana-viruddha).[31]

2). Likewise, it is a well-known fact that the nature of proceeding to fixed objects (pratiniyata-viṣaya) is the immediate experience (pratyaksa) of the organ. There is no other superior means of knowing than seeing. However, having seen the shape and form of the [four] elements [i.e., fire, water, wind and earth] with your own eyes, you still search for smooth (cikkana) touch of that own-being. And also, everybody in the world recognizes that [the four elements] do the works of sustaining (dhṛti) etc. However, by negating what is generally known in the world, [your pratijñā] is also impossible to maintain. (=pratyakṣādi-viruddha).

3). Likewise, this rūpa, etc. and the nature of them, i.e., solidity, wetness, heat and motion, etc., are well known even for any savage in the mountain (śavara) and caṇḍāla. Thus, by negating the own-being which is well known to everybody in the world, [your pratijñā is hurt] by [the fallacy of contradiction of] what is generally known (=loka-prasiddhi-viruddha).

(96,27,4-8) bshad pa don dam par zhes (96,27,5-1) dam* bcas pa'i khyad par yod pa'i phyir khas blangs pa dang mngon sum dang grags pa'i gnod pa med de / / gang gi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis bden pa gnis bka' stsal pa / de la kun rdzob tu ni

*P. sam.

chos rnams (line-2) kyi ngo bo nyid dang / mtshan nyid rnam par bzhag pa yang mdzad la / don dam par ni ngo bo nyid de med par gsungs te / de ltar yang ko shi ka chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid kyis stong ste / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa gang yin pa de (line-3) ni dngos po med pa'o / / dngos po med pa gang yin pa de ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'o / zhes gsungs ba la sogs pas dngos po nyid kyang med na de'i ngo bo nyid lta ga la yod de / de'i phyir khas blangs pas gnod pa yang med do / (line-4) mngon gsum gyis gnod pa yang med de / yul rnams log pa yin pa'i phyir dang / dbang po rnams blun pa yin pa'i phyir mthong ba la sogs pa'i nus pa med bzhin du yang rab rib can la skra dang sbrang ma dang sbrang bu la sogs pa snang (line-5) blta bu dang / brag ca la sogs pa ltar mngon sum du yang mngon pa'i nga rgyal yin pas de'i phyir gang la ci zhig mngon sum du gyur na / des gnod par 'gyur grags pa'i gnod pa yang med de / gang gi phyir 'jig rten ni mi shes pa'i (line-6) ling tog gi mdongs pa yin pas don dam par dpyad pa'i skabs su de ni nor bu rin po che brtag pa dag la dmus long ma brtags pa bzhin du mi rtogs pas grags pa'i gnod pa med do 'o na don dam pa ni gang dag blo thams cad las 'das (line-7) pa yin la / dngos bo'i ngo bo nyid dgag pa ni yi ge'i yul yin pas de'i phyir dgag pa med par mi 'gyur ram / zhe na don dam pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / de la gcig ni mngon par 'du byed pa med par 'jug pa 'jig rten las 'das pa zag (line-8) pa med pa spros pa

med pa'o / gnyis pa ni mngon par 'du byed pa dang bcas par 'jug pa bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi rjes su mthun pa dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes zhes bya ba spros pa dang bcas pa ste / 'dir de dam bcas pa'i (96,28,1-1) khyad par nyid bzung bas nyes pa med do /

To these objections we reply:

There are no contradictions (viruddha) with our own position, no contradictions from immediate experience and the well-known tradition. We make a qualification to our assertion (pratijñā) by saying "from the standpoint of ultimate reality." [We do this], because there is the āgama concerning the satya-dvaya by the Bhagavat. Among them, as for the saṃvṛti-satya, he established the own-being and the lakṣaṇa of the dharmas. However, as for the paramārtha-satya, the Bhagavat proclaimed the no-own-being [of the dharmas] as follows:[32]

"Kauśika! Thus, indeed, all dharmas are empty in their essential original nature (svabhāvena-śūnya). And all dharmas, which are empty by their essential nature, are non-existent. The thing which is non-existent is the Prajñāpāramitā."

According to these āgamas, no entities exist. Let alone the own-being[s] of these entities! Thus, svavacana-viruddha does not occur. Pratyakṣādi-viruddha [also] does not occur. The reasons are: [a] The object-spheres are perverted. [b] The organs are senseless, hence, seeing ability, etc. [really] do not exist. Likewise, the immediate experience is also subjective (abhimāna). For, the [unreal shapes of] honey bees and hair, etc. appear in the blurred

eyes. Also, an echo [sounds like an utterance of a real person], etc. Therefore, [in ultimate reality] where is that pratyaksa which becomes pratyakṣādi-viruddha ? By virtue of this, the loka-prasiddhi-viruddha also does not occur. For, worldlings are as good as blind man with the cornea of eyes being ignorance. Hence, in the time of the ultimate analysis, worldlings do not understand [the ultimate reality], just as the blind cannot see the precious jewel (maṇi-ratna). Therefore, loka-prasiddhi-viruddha does not occur. [Here one might object:] then, the ultimate reality transcends every intelligence, while the negation of own-being is [still] in the object sphere of the expressed (letters). Therefore, the negation itself [will] be annulled. Would it not? We reply:

[First of all, the paramārtha is of two kinds. The one is without volition, supramundane, devoid of [mental] impurity and beyond conceptual differentiation. The other is the parama-artha with volition, with correct worldly knowledge, confirming to moral and intellectual equipment and conceptual [activities]. Here, we qualify our pratijñā with [the latter paramārtha]. Hence, no difficulty arise here.

(96,28,1-1) / gal te rang gi phyogs bzhag pa med pa'i phyir dang / gzhan gyi phyogs sun 'byin pa'i co 'dri ba nyid ma yin nam zhe na / kho bo cag gi phyogs la ni ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid yin te / chos rnams kyi ngo bo (line-2) nyid ni de yin

pa'i phyir de na co 'dri ba nyid ma yin te / re zhig de ltar phyogs kyi skyon med par rnam par bzhag go /

One might ask: Since it is without an own thesis and [only] refuting the other thesis, is not [your objection] a false objection (vitaṇḍā)? No, it is not a vitaṇḍā, because our thesis is svabhāvaśūnyatā ---the intrinsic nature of all dharmas is voidness. Thus, we have indeed established the faultlessness of our pakṣa in this manner.

(96,28,1-2) rigs pa can dag gtan tshigs med pa ni tshad ma ma yin no / zhes bya ba de ltar kun tu zhugs pa yin pas de'i phyir dam bcas (line-3) pa'i 'jug thogs su bsgrub par bya ba 'khrul pa med pa'i shes par byed pa bstan pa'i phyir gtan tshigs nye bar 'jog pa ni byas phyir zhes bya ba yin te / byas pa zhes bya ba ni rgyu dang rkyen rnams kyis mngon par bsgrubs pa'o / de'i dngos (line-4) bo ni byas pa nyid de / de'i phyir byas pa nyid kyi phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs kyi don du phyir zhes smras so / / 'o na gtan tshig[s] 'di ma grub pa yin te mngon par gsal ba smra ba la 'di ma grub pa'i phyir ro zhe na / skabs 'di nyid du 'og nas (line-5) mngon par gsal ba 'gog par 'gyur pa'i phyir skyon med do / / mthun pa'i phyogs su rjes su 'gro ba bstan pa ni gang dang gang byas pa nyid yin pa de dang de 'byung ba'i ngo bo nyid ma yin te / dper na shes pa bzhin no / / shes pa ji ltar byas pa (line-6) nyid yin zhe na / mtho ris dang byang grol la sogs pa'i rtog ges yongs su bsgrub pa'i phyir ro / / 'dir shes pa yang byas pa nyid kyi phyir 'byung ba'i ngo bo

nyid ma yin no / / zhe ba yang med par dgag pa'i don nyid dang sbyar ro /

The Naiyāyikas cherish (the thesis) "no hetu, then no pramāṇa." For this reason, directly after the pratijñā, in order to show [the term] which clearly indicates the errorless sādhya, it is said 'because it is produced (kṛtakatvād)' which is the determination of hetu [in this reasoning]. "kṛtaka" means "consummated (abhinirhṛta) by a direct cause and the associate conditions." The abstract noun (vastu?) of that (kṛtaka) is kṛtakatva. Therefore, kṛtakatvāt is said in order to show the sense of hetu. One might say: Now, this hetu does not work, because it does not work for the Abhivyakti-vādin.[34] We shall refute the Abhivyakti-[vādin] later in this very chapter, thence, there is no error [for this hetu]. The statement is in accordance with the sapakṣa (sapakṣa-anvaya-upadeśa): "Everything which is produced does not have bhūta as its intrinsic nature, as knowledge (jñāna) does not." One might ask: In what manner is knowledge (jñāna) sometning which is produced? Because it is accoplished by inquiry (tarka) into svarga and apavarga. Here, the negation---"knowledge does not have bhūta as its intrinsic nature, because it is something which is produced"---ties up with the total negation.

(96,28,1-6) tshul gsum (line-7) pa'i rtag las 'dir mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa nyid kyi tshul ma bstan pa ni 'dir smra bar 'dod pa'i tshul gnyis kho na'i gtan tshigs kyi tha

snyad byed do / / phyogs kyi chos nyid mthun pa'i phyogs kho na la yod par zad kyi / de dang mi (line-8) mthun pa'i dngos bo gang la ngo bo nyid yod pa gzhan rdul phran tsam yang med pas mi mthun pa'i phyogs nyid med pa'i phyir des na 'dir mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa'i dpe dang gtan tshigs bstan pa ma byas so / / gtan tshigs kyi (96,28,2-1) rnam grangs gzhan bstan pa'i phyir rgyu ldan sogs phyir zhes bya ba smras te / rgyu ldan zhes bya ba ni 'di la rgyu yod pa'i phyir rgyu dang ldan pa'o / / rgyu dang ldan pa'i dngos po ni rgyu dang ldan pa nyid do / sogs pa zhes bya ba'i sgras ni (line-2) dngos po nyid dang / shes bya nyid dang / brjod par bya ba nyid la sogs pa'i gtan tshig[s] gzhan dag kyang bzung ngo / / 'di yang rgyu dang ldan pa la sogs pa nyid kyi phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs kyi don du phyir zhes smos te / gang dang gang rgyu (line-3) dang ldan pa nyid dang / dngos po nyid dang / shes bya nyid dang brjod par bya ba nyid la sogs pa gang yin pa de dang de ni 'byung ba'i ngo bo nyid ma yin te / dper na shes pa bzhin no / de bzhin du sa la sogs pa dag kyang don dam par na 'byung (line-4) ba'i ngo bo nyid ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro / de ltar phyogs 'dis tsad ma thams cad kyang rnam par bshad par bya'o / 'dir gang dag go sla ba dang rnam par bshad zin pa'i don de dag ni 'og nas kyang yi ge mangs kyis dogs nas rnam par mi 'chad do /

Here, we intend to set up our reasoning procedure [employing] only two rules [i.e., existence in the pakṣa and sapakṣa] to prove our point, while not stating the rule of absence

from vipakṣa (vipakṣād vyāvṛtti)[35] in the [correct] liṅga [which is conditioned by] the three aspects (trirūpa-liṅga).[36]

The reasons (hetu) are:

[1] Pakṣa-dharmatva exists only in the sapakṣa.

[2] The existence of own-being [found] in some contrasting entity (viruddha-vastu) never occurs even down to dust.

[3] Hence, a vipakṣa is totally absent in this case.

[4] For this reason, then, we do not state the example and hetu [for the rule of] the absence from vipakṣa in this instance.

In order to state this in another manner, it is said, "cause-possessing." "Cause-possessing" i.e., it is cause-possessing, for there is a cause. The abstract noun (vastu) of hetumat is hetumattva. The term 'etc.' includes the other reasons, i.e., objective reality, knowableness (jñeyatva) and expressibility (vācyatva), etc. In this case also, by saying "cause-possessing," the meaning of the hetu is indicated. Whatever has cause, objective reality, knowableness and expressibility etc., does not have bhūta as its own-being. For example, like knowledge. Likewise, the earth, etc., also do not have bhūta as its own-being from the standpoint of ultimate reality---[these terms] are related in this way. Thus, all the following pramāṇa should be interpreted according to this pakṣa. [Therefore], we shall not, hereafter, attempt the raising and explaining of questions by many words (literally, letters), concerning

those meanings which are either previously explained or easily understood. Having shown the refutation of [own-being or bhūtas] in general, we are [in a position] to show the refutation of [own-being of bhūta] separately. For this: (spyir dgag pa bstan nas de dag bye brag tu dgag pa bstan pa'i phyir).

khara-svabhāvo na mahī bhūtatvāt tadyathānilaḥ /
dhāraṇaṃ na bhuvaḥ kāryaṃ kṛtakatvād yathāmbhasaḥ //27//
/ sa ni sra ba'i ngo bo ni /
/ 'byung ba nyid phyir rlung bzhin no /
/ sa yi las ni 'dzin ma yin /
/ byas pa nyid phyir chu bzhin no //27//

(27) The earth has no own-being of solidity, because of its state of being an element, just like wind; retaining is not the function of the earth, because of its factitious nature, just like water.[37]

(TJ is omitted here).

kharaṃ svabhāvā yady urvī tat[t]vato 'pi'satī matā /
yoginas tatra yujyete nonmajjana-nimajjane //28//
/ med kyang gal te de nyid du /
/ sa yi dngos nyid sra snyam na /
/ rnal 'byor pa dag de la ni /
/ 'byung dang 'bying ba mi rigs so //28//

(28) If one thinks, "even though there is no [own-being], the earth has solidity as [its] own-being from the standpoint of the ultimate reality, then [acts] of emerging and submerging will not be possible for the

yogins there [on the earth]."

(96,28,2-8) zhes bya ba ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yin na yang de'i mtshan nyid de lta bu yod par sems na rnal 'byor pa dag sa la chu la bya ba bzhin du steng du 'byung ba dang 'og tu 'bying ba dag mi rigs so /

That is:

If one thinks even though [the earth] has no own-being, that there is such an essential property [as solidity], then it is not tenable: yogins emerge upwards and submerge downwards as if it were action in the water.[38] If one thinks: "[yogins] transform even solidity to wetness," then: (gal te bsam gtan gyis mthus sra ba nyid kyang gsher ba nyid bsgyur byed do zhe na /

dhyāyinām dhyāna-sāmarthyā na yu[jyate] dravatā
kṣite(ḥ) /29a-b/

/ bsam gtan pa yi bsam gtan mthus /
/ sa ni gsher ba nyid mi rigs /29a-b/

(29a-b)"Fluidity of the earth by power of the meditators' meditations"---is untenable.

One might ask the reason why: (de ci'i phyir zhe na)

svabhāvasyānapāyitvā(t) na vāsyāḥ kaṭhīnātmanā //29c-d//

/ ngo bo nyid la 'gyur med phyir /
/ yang na de sra nyid ma yin//29c-d//

(29c-d) Since own-being is unchangeable. Or [if changeable, then], earth has no solidity.

(96,28,3-2) ngo bo nyid ces bya ba ni byas pa ma yin pa dang /

'gyur ba med pa yin pas sus kyang nam yang gzhan du bsgyur bar mi nus pa'i phyir (line-3) ro / / yang na gal te rnal 'byor pa dag gi sa'i sra ba nyid gzhan du bsgyur du rung na ni de'i ngo bo nyid sra ba yin no zhes bya ba de ji lta bur rung bar 'gyur /

"Own-being"---is not factitious and changeless. Hence, no one is capable of changing [it]. Moreover, if yogins are capable of changing the solidity of the earth, then how is it possible to say that the own-being of that (earth) is solidity?[39]

evaṃ jalānilāgnināḥ na dravādi svabhāvatā /
yujyate nāpi tat kāryaṃ saṃgraha-vyūha-pak(Ms.paṅk)
tayaḥ//30//

/ de bzhin chu dang me rlung dag /
/ gsher la sogs pa'i dngos nyid min /
/ de dag las kyang sdud pa dang /
/ smin dang gyo bar byad mi rigs //30//

(30) Likewise, water, wind and fire do not have fluidity, etc., [as their] own-being-ness.
It is also untenable that its function is cohesion, displacement and ripening.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,28,5-7) kha cig 'byung ba mkha' rlung me chu sa / / yon tan dag ni lhag pa yin / sgra dang reg pa gzugs dang ro / / dri dang de yi yon tan yin / / zhes bya bar 'dod bas de dgag pa'i phyir /

Some wish to maintain:

There are superior (and inferior) qualities of the elements: space, wind, fire, water and the earth. The qualities of [elements] are sounds, touchables, sight-objects, tastes and smells. Hence, for the rejoinder:

na hi tulyaṃ guṇā neṣṭā saṃvṛtyā pavadanādayaḥ /
kāyendriyopalabhyatvād bhūtatvād api bhūmivat //31//

/ rlung la sogs pa kun rdzob tu /
/ yon tan mnyam par mi 'dod min /
/ lus kyi dbang pos dmigs phyir dang /
/ 'byung ba yin phyir sa bzhin no //31//

(31) It is not that we do not maintain: wind, etc., [all] have qualities in such manner from the viewpoint of conventional [reality], since it has a perceivable nature by tactile organ and of being an element like the earth.

(96,28,5-8) zhes bya ba smras te / rlung la sogs pa de dag ni kun rdzob tu yang thams cad yon tan cha / (96,29,1-1) mnyam pa yin te / lus kyi dbang pos dmigs pa'i phyir dang / 'byung ba nyid yin pa'i phyir dper na sa bzhin no / / nam mka' nyid ma yin te / 'byung ba nyid yin par mi rigs pa'i phyir ro / / la la yon (line-2) tan kha cig shes che ba yod do / / la la yon tan kha cig bag la zha ste / ha cang cha phra ba'i phyir nges par gzung bar mi nus so / /

Thus:

Those [elements], wind, etc. are, from the viewpoint of conventional truth, all equal [as far as] a part of their

quality (guṇa) [is concerned]. The reason is: [They have] a perceivable nature and the nature of being an element, like the earth. [However, from the viewpoint of ultimate truth], there is no nature of space.

The reasons are:

[1] Bhūtatva is untenable.

[2] We are not able to decide for sure that some [elements] have many (utsadatā) [in their superior quality] and some [elements] are inferior. For they are extremely subtle. (96,29,1-2) kha cig ni sa la sogs pa 'dus pa'i bdag nyid kyang yin la / / rdzas su yod pa kho nar 'dod de / 'di (line-2) ltar gang rdul phra rab tu bshig kyang de'i blo yod pa nyid yin pa de'i rdzas su yod pa nyid yon no / / zhe na de ni rigs pa ma yin te /

Some might maintain:

Earth, etc. have the nature of compactness (saṃghātātmaka) and indeed are real entities (dravya-sat). Thus, whatever retains its buddhi, although being smashed to atoms, has the nature of a real entity.

This is untenable, because:

dravya-san na pṛthivyādi sāmagryāṅgāgrahe 'grahāt /
yad yathoktaṃ na tad dṛṣṭaṃ[dravya]sat tadyathā vanam//
32//

/ sa la sogs pa rdzas yod min /
/ tshogs pa'i yan lag min med phyir /

/ gang dag ji skad bstan pa de /

/ rdzas yod ma mthong nags tshal bzhin //32//

(32) Earth, etc. are not real entities, because [they are] not grasped, when the constituents of the collection are not grasped. That real entity, which is mentioned [by you], cannot be seen, for example, [a real entity of] a forest.

(96,29,1-4) zhes bya ba la sa la sogs pa ni rdzas su yod pa ma yin te / chu la sogs pa'i tshogs pa'i yan lag ma gtogs par sa zhes bya ba dmigs su med pa'i phyir ro / (line-5) gang tshogs pa'i yan lag ma bzung du med pa de ni rdzas su yod pa ma yin te / dper na nags tshal bzhin no / / shing dha pa dang seng ldeng dang pa la sha la sogs pa ma gtogs par nags tshal zhes bya ba gzung du med pa bzhin no / (line-6) 'dus pa la ni nags tshal zhes tha snyad gdags su rung ngo / gang gi phyir sa la sogs pa rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa de'i phyir de'i yul can gyi blo gros kyang rdzas su yod pa ma yin te / rgyu yod pa'i phyir dang / 'jig pa'i phyir (line-7) nags tshal gyi blo bzhin pas de'i phyir / /

Thus:

Earth, etc. are not real entities, because apart from the constituents of the collection, which is water, etc., the so-called 'earth' [itself] cannot be apprehended. Apart from the constituents of the collection, it does not exist. (Sāmagrāṅgāgrahe'grahāt). Therefore, it is not a real entity.

For example, like a forest---apart from dhava trees, khadira trees and palāśa trees, etc., a so-called 'forest' cannot be seized. It is possible (only) as a conventional designation, "forest" referring to the collection. Since the earth, etc. are not real entities, therefore the 'perception' (mati) which has [the earth, etc.] as its domain, also is not a real entity. It is like 'perception' (mati) of a forest, by reason of having a cause (hetumat) and [being doomed to] destruction.

For this reason:

dravyasad viṣayā ceyaṃ na kṣityādi matir matā /
sakāranatvān nāśād vā tadyathā kānanādi dhīḥ //33//

/ sa la sogs pa yul gyi blo /
/ de yang rdzas yod ma yin 'dod /
/ rgyu dang bcas phyir 'jig pa'i phyir /
/ nags tshal la sogs blo bzhin no //33//

(33) We maintain: that perception, having earth, etc., as its objects, is also not a real entity, because it is cause-possessing or [doomed to] destruction, for example, perception of forest, etc.

(96,29,1-7) / zhes bya ba smras so / / sgra ni gnas dang byed (line-8) pa dang / / rtsol ba dag las mngon par 'grub pa'i phyir gang gi sa la sogs pa brjod pa'i sgra de yang /

Thus:

Sound is produced from [the combination of] a [vocal] basis, [vocal] organ and effort. Hence, in regard to that sound,

which indicates the earth, etc., also:

dravyābhidhāyako neṣṭo dhvaniḥ kṣityādi vācakaḥ /
śrāvaṇatvād yathā neṣṭo dhvaniḥ senādi sūcakaḥ //34//

/ sa la sogs pa ston pa'i sgra /
/ brjod pa rdzas su mi 'dod de /
/ mnyan pa yin phyir dmag la sogs /
/ ston pa'i sgra dag mi 'dod bzhin //34//

(34)"The denominating sound, which is the naming of the earth, etc. is a real entity" is not maintained [by us], since it is something to be heard, for example the sound which is the indicator of an army, etc., is not regarded [as real entity].

(96,29,2-1) / 'dir bye brag pa dag phyir zlog par byed de / gang dag la nags tshal dang dmag la sogs pa rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa de dag la skyon 'di lta bur 'gyur te / kho bo cag gi tshig-las phrad pa rnams kyi rdzas (line-2) zhes 'byung bas nags tshal la sogs pa dag rdzas su yod pa kho na yin no / / ji ltar zhe na 'di na shing pa la sha nags tshal rtsom pa ni phrad pa dang bcās pas shing can* (D.) da na dang lhan cig sbyor bar 'gyur ro / / shing pa la sha dang (line-3) can* (D.) da na gnyis kyang phrad pa dang bcas pa shing dha ba la sogs pa dang lhan cig sbyor bar 'gyur ro / / de bzhin du glang po che dmag rtsom pa na yang phrad pa dang bcas pas rta dang lhan cig sbyor bar 'gyur ba glang po che dang rta gnyis kyang phrad pa dang bcas pas shing rta la

*P. pa na da.

sogs pa dang lhan cig sbyor bar 'gyur bas de'i phyir nags tshal dang dmag la sogs pa dag rdzas su yod pa'i phyir khyed kyi dpe la bsgrub par bya bas stong pas dpe med do zhes zer ro / /

Here, the Vaiśeṣikas raise the objection: The following difficulties shall arise to those who [maintain], "a forest and an army, etc. are not real entities." [It is said] in our text, "by the conjunctions, (saṃyoga)[40] [the things which are] to be real entities arise." Hence, a forest, etc. are indeed real entities. The reason is: On the occasion [when] the palāśa trees form a forest, by reason of having saṃyoga (conjunction), it becomes united with the candana trees. [The combination of] both palāśa trees and candana trees also, by reason of having saṃyoga, become united with a dhava tree, etc. Likewise, on the occasion [when] an elephant forms an army, by reason of having saṃyoga, it become united with a horse. [The combination] of both an elephant and a horse also, by reason of having saṃyoga, becomes united with a carriage, etc. For there is no dṛṣṭānta [in your reasoning], because a sādhya is lacking in your dṛṣṭānta.

vānekāntikatā hetoś citta-caitasa-buddhibhiḥ /
jāyate sādhya-tulyatvaṃ tadvat tat-pratiṣedhataḥ //35//

(35) Or the inconclusiveness of hetu arises, because [it is uncertain whether] intelligence (buddhi)[belongs to] 'thought' (citta) or 'belonging to thought' (caitasa); just as sādhya-tulyatva (resemblance in the probandum)

is due to the refutation of that.[41]

(96,29,2-5) grangs can dag kyang 'di skad ces zer te / grangs ni rnam pa 'dra ste / nges pa'i grangs ni gcig pu pa'o / / ma nges pa'i grangs ni nyi shu pa la sogs pa'o / / de la gang gi tshe ma nges pa rdzas du ma dag la ma nges pa'i grangs su 'jug pa de'i (line-6) tshe na nags tshal la sogs pa'i tha snyad yod pas / nags tshal la sogs pa de dag kyang rdzas su yod pa yin te / grangs dang ldan pa'i phyir ro / / de'i yul can gyi blo dang sgra yang rdzas su yod pa kho na yin pas de'i phyir / nags (line-7) tshal gyi blo dang sgra'i dper dag sa la sogs pa rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa'i dper mi rung ngo zhes zer ro / de la re zhig bye brag pa dag la skyon 'dogs pa ltar snang ba nyid yin par bstan pa'i phyir /

The Sāṃkhyas also say as follows:
As for number, [there are two kinds, i.e.,] the diverse [class] and the unit [class]. The definite number is one unit (ekākin). Indefinite number is [something which has] twenty [parts], etc. Among them, whenever several indefinite entities are infused into one definite number, then there is a conventional entity, i.e., forest, etc. Hence, forest, etc. also are real entities by reason of having 'number' (=one unit). And, the perception and the word, which has [forest, etc.] as its object, is also, indeed a real entity. For this reason, [your] dṛṣṭānta of forest and word is improper for [your thesis, i.e.,] "the earth, etc. are not real entities." In that case, against the Vaiśeṣikas, in

order to show dosābhāsa:[42]

nārambhakāś vanasyeṣṭā palāśa-spandanādayaḥ /
hetumatvādi-hetubhyas tadyathā caraṇādayaḥ //36//
/ pa la sha pan dha la sogs pa /
/ nags tshal rtsom pa nyid mi 'dod /
/ rgyu ldan la sogs gtan tshigs kyis /
/ dper na rtsa ba la sogs bzhin //36//

(36) It is not maintained [by us] that palāśa trees and spandana trees, etc., are the initiators (ārambhakās) of a forest. The reason: [their] having a cause, etc., for example, root, etc.

(96,29,2-8) / zhes bya ba smras te / shing pa la sha dang pan dha la sogs pa dag ni nags tshal rtsom pa yin par mi 'dod de / ji ltar (96,29,3-1) / pa la sha la sogs pa ni nags tshal gyi yan lag tu gyur ba yin la / de dag gi yan lag ni rtsa ba la sogs pa yin la / yan lag nyid yin par 'dra bzhin pa la sha la sogs pa ni nags tshal rtsom par (line-2) byed pa yin la / rtsa ba la sogs pa dag ni ma yin no / / zhes bya ba 'di la gtan tshigs gyi khyad par ci yod / / de'i phyir pa la sha dang pan da la sogs pa de dag ni nags tshal rtsom par byed pa ma yin no / / de ci'i phyir zhe na / rgyu dang ldan (line-3) pa'i phyir zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs kyis te / dper na rtsa ba dang stong bu dang lo ma dang 'dab ma la sogs pa bzhin no /

Thus:

We do not maintain that palāśa, pandhana (=spandana) trees

are the initiators (ārambhakās) of a forest. The reason is: Palāśa trees, etc. are the constituents of a forest and [in turn], the constituents of those [trees] are the roots, etc. [They, i.e., palāśa trees, etc. and roots, etc.] are alike as far as the 'constituent-ness' is concerned. Then, what kind of a particular reason do you have for saying: Palāśa trees, etc. are the initiators of a forest, [but] the roots, etc. are not. For this reason, palāśa trees, pandhana trees, etc. are not the initiators of a forest. The reason is: By reason of their having causes, etc. for example, like roots, trunks, branches and leaves, etc. (96,29,3-3) / 'dir smras pa / shing dha pa dang / pa la sha la sogs pa yan lag tu gyur pa thams cad la (line-4) nags tshal yan lag can so so'i rjes su zhugs pa ltar nges par gzung du rung ste / yan lag de dag med par yan lag can nags tshal dmigs su med pa'i phyir te / de'i phyir pa la sha la sogs pa ni nags tshal rtsom par (line-5) byed pa yin la rtsa ba la sogs pa ni ma yin no /

Here, [the Vaiśeṣikas] rejoin: We can surely ascertain that a forest, which has the constituents, permeates to all the [things] which are the constituents of [a forest, like] dhava trees and palāśa trees, because without those constituents, a forest, which has the constituents, cannot be apprehended. For this reason, palāśa trees, etc. are the initiators of a forest, while the roots, etc. are not.

palāśādi 'bhirabdho na vanāvayavī mataḥ /
pratyekam asamāptatvat (Ms.°ān neṣu) teṣu-yadvat
karādibhiḥ //37//
/ yan lag can gyi nags tshal ni /
/ pa la sha la sogs brtsams min /
/ de dag re rer ma rdzogs phyir /
/ yal ga la sogs gang yin bzhin //37//

(37) A forest, which has the constituents, is not formed by the palāśa trees, etc. because it is not completed in each of them; just as the branches, etc.

(96,29,3-5) / zhes bya ba la yan lag (line-6) can zhes bya ba ni 'di la yan lag yod pa'i phyir / / yan lag can no yan lag can gyi nags tshal zhes bya ba de ni pa la sha la sogs pas brtsams pa ma yin no / / zhes dam bca'o / / ci'i phyir zhe na / pa la sha la sogs pa de dag (line-7) re re la nags tshal de ma rjogs pa'i phyir te / dper na yal ga dang yal ga phra mo la sogs pa gang dag yin pa de dag la nags tshal zhes bya ba ma rjogs pa'i phyir / nags tshal de yal ga la sogs pa de dag gis brtsams (line-8) pa ma yin pa de bzhin du pa la sha la sogs pa de dag re re la yang nags tshal zhes bya ba de ma rjogs pa'i phyir / de dag gis brtsams pa ma yin par grub pas nags tshal la sogs pa dag rdzas su yod pa ma yin no / de'i (96,29,4-1) phyir bye brag pa dag gi phyogs la dpe'i skyon yang mi 'thad do /

Thus:

"Having constituents (avayavin)"[43]---since there are con-

stituents (aṅga), it has constituents. "A forest, which has constituents (vanāvayavin) is not initiated by palāśa trees, etc."---this is [our] pratijñā. The reason is: Since the forest is not completed in each of those palāśa trees, etc. For example, a so-called forest is not completed in those branches, twigs, and so forth, hence, the forest is not completed in those branches, etc. Likewise, a so-called forest is also not completed in each palāśa tree, etc. Thus, [our pratijñā, i.e., "a forest] is not initiated by those [palāśa trees, etc.]"---is proved. Therefore, forest, etc. are not real entities. For this reason, dṛṣṭāntadoṣa,[44] which the Vaiśeṣikas advocate, is also not tenable.

ato dṛṣṭānta-doṣo'pi na pakṣa upapadyate /
dvitīye'pi yathā nāsti tathedam abhidhīyate //38//

(96,29,3-8) de'i (96,29,4-1) phyir [bye brag pa dag gi] phyogs la dpe'i skyon yang mi 'thad do / / gnyis pa [grangs can gyi phyogs la ji ltar dpe'i skyon] med pa de de ltar 'di brjod de /

(38) Hence, [the Vaiśeṣikas'] pakṣa, i.e., "an improper use of dṛṣṭānta [by us]" also is not proved. Second, [the Sāṃkhyas] the same [charge against us] does not exist either. It is explained [as follows]:

nāneka-niyata-dravya-saṃkhyā vṛttir vana-dhvaniḥ /
viśiṣṭa-buddhi-hetutvā[t ghaṭa]kuṇḍādi śabdavat //39//

/ nags tshal sgra ni ma nges pa /

/ du ma'i rdzas grangs 'jug ma yin /

/ khyad par can gyi* blos brtag phyir /

/ bum bzang la sogs sgra bzhin no //39//

*TJ gyis.

(39) The word 'forest' is not a measure of indication which has an indefinite number (=many) of entities. For it is caused by a special buddhi, just as the word 'jar' [or] 'pot' is.

(96,29,4-2) / zhes bya ba la nags tshal gyi sgra ni pa la sha la sogs pa ma nges pa du ma'i rdzas kyi grangs brjod pa la 'jug pa ma yin no / / zhes dam bca'o de ci'i phyir zhe na (line-3) khyad par can gyi blos brtag pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs nyid kyis rtogs pa'i phyir te / dper na bum pa dang / zangs dang / phru rtog la sogs pa gcig la sogs par nges par grangs la 'jug pa'i sgra bzhin no / / de ltar (line-4) re zhig rigs pa'i sgo nas sa la sogs pa dag mtshan nyid yod pa ma yin pa dang / rdzas su yod pa ma yin par gnas so / / lung gi sgo nas kyang bcom ldan 'das nang gi sa'i khams gang yin pa dang / pha rol gyi sa'i khams (line-5) gang yin pa de ni de bzhin gshegs pas gnyis su med pa'i don dang / gnyis su med pa dang / gnyis su byar med pa dang / 'di lta ste / mtshan nyid med par mtshan nyid gcig par mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so zhes (line-6) bka' stsal cing / de bzhin du / blo yis rnam par sbyad pa na gang phyir dngos nyid gzung med pa / de phyir 'byung ba

med pa dang / dngos nyid med par smra'o / / zhes gsungs so /

Thus:

Pratijñā: "The word (*śabda*) 'forest' does not express the indefinite numbers of various entities like *palāśa*, etc."

Hetu: Because it is observed by a special *buddhi*.

Dṛṣṭānta: For example, a word which reduces a water-jar, a pot, and a pan, etc. into a definite number (i.e., utensils].

Thus, [having considered the matter] for some time from *yukti*, we have established the following: earth, etc., have no [*sva*]-*lakṣaṇa* and they are not real entities. [This point can be affirmed] by *āgama*, when Bhagavat proclaims:[45] "The Tathāgata has fully known that the *dhātus*, both external and internal, have only one mark, i.e., no-mark. That is: They are non-dual entities, inseparable and undivided."

Likewise:

Having analyzed dharmas with *buddhi*, the own-being [of *dharmas*] cannot be found. Therefore, [I] declare that a [mahā-]bhūta and an own-being do not exist.

(96,29,4-6) 'dir chos mngon pa dag gis smras pa / 'byung (line-7) ba'i bye brag rnams ni ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin no / de dag rgyur byas nas kha dog dang dbyibs kyi bdag nyid kyi gzugs rnam pa nyi shu 'byung ba'i phyir te / 'di na gang ngo bo nyid med pa ni de rgyur byas nas ci yang mi 'byung ste / dper na (line-8) / ri bong gi rva bzhin no / / 'byung ba rnams rgyur byas pa las ni kha dog dang / dbyibs

kyi bdag nyid kyi gzugs gang mig gis gzung bar bya ba dag 'byung ste / de'i phyir 'byung ba rnams ni ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin no zhe na /

Here, the Ābhidhārmikas object:

As for diversities of bhūta, there are, indeed, own-being[s]. The reason is: Having been caused by these [elements], twenty kinds of form[s],[46] which have the own-nature (ātmaka) of colour and shape, arise. Here, nothing whatsoever arises based on the absence of own-being, for example, a hare's horn. What [is called] form, which has the own-nature of colour and shape and is perceivable by the eye-[organ], arises through [its] cause, i.e., the elements. For this reason, the elements indeed, have own-being.

(96,29,5-1) / 'dir bshad ba / kun rdzob tu gzugs kyi skye mched ces bya ba yang dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pas kun nas bslang ba de yod pa kho na yin te / de la yang byis pa rnams ni sgyu ma dang smig rgyu dang / dri za'i (line-2) grong khyer la sogs pa la blta ba bzhin du blta ba rnam par rmongs la / 'phags pa rnams ni de lta ma yin te / gang gi phyir 'jig rten pa'i rnal 'byor pa nam mkha' [mtha']* yas skye mched dang / rnam shes mtha' yas skye mched dang (line-3) ci yang med pa'i skye mched kyi snyoms par 'jug pa bsgom pa la gnas pa dag kyang re zhig gzugs kyi du shes dang / thogs pa med pa'i 'du shes rnam pa thams cad du nub cing de bzhin du rnam par thar pa brgyad dang / zil (line-4)

*Added.

gyis gnon pa'i skye mched dang / zad par gyi skye mched dag sgom pa goms pa 'jug tu yang gzugs kyi 'du shes spong bar 'gyur na / theg pa chen po bla na med pa'i rnal 'byor pa bskal pa dpag tu med pa dngos bo'i rang gi ngo bo (line-5) nyid du bsgoms pa stong pa nyid dang / mtshan ma med pa dang / smon pa med pa bsgom pa mthar phyir pa la gnas pa rnams gzugs su 'dzin par gyur ba lta smos kyang ci dgos te / de rigs pa ma yin pas de nyid kyi phyir (line-6) bshad pa /

Here, we reply:

The so-called conventional sense-field of form (*saṃvṛti-rūpa-āyatana*) is triggered by the imagining of what is unreal (*abhūta-parikalpa*) and it is, indeed, existent. The foolish people are perplexed there, just as by seeing a mock show (*māyā*), mirage (*marīci*) and the village of fairy castles, etc. However, the saints are not. Even the worldly yogins also---who dwell in the contemplation of the attainment of the station of unlimited space (*ākāśānantya-āyatana*), the station of unlimited consciousness (*vijñāna-ānantyāyatana*), the station of nothing-whatsoever (*ākiñcanya-āyatana*)[47]---vanquish, for a while, the idea of form (*rūpa-saṃjñā*) and the idea of non-resisting (*apratigha-saṃjñā*) in all aspects. Likewise, having repeatedly contemplated the eight emancipations,[48] [the eight] stations of mastery[49] and [the ten] all-stations (*kṛtsna-āyatana*),[50] they forsake the idea of form. Therefore, how much more should we mention [the fact] that those yogins of the supreme Mahāyāna who dwell on the [razor's] edge of the contemplation of

emptiness, the signless and the wishless, after having contemplated the own-being of entities for immeasurable kalpas, would seize on the form? [Since the above] is not a reasoning (nyāya), we reply [in reasoning]:

na cakṣur-indriya-grāhyaṃ rūpaṃ hi paramārthataḥ /
pratidhātād yathā śabdo bhautikatvād athāpi vā //40//
/ gang phyir gzugs ni don dam du /
/ mig gi dbang po'i gzung ba min /
/ bsags phyir dper na sgra bzhin dang /
/ 'byung las gyur phyir de nyid bzhin //40//

(40) In ultimate reality, form is not the object of the eye-organ, since it is restored, like sound. Also it is produced from the elements, like that [=sound].

(96,29,5-6) / zhes bya ba la mig gi yul gyi gzugs ni don dam par na mig gi (line-7) dbang po'i gzung ba ma yin no zhes dam bca'o / / mig ces bya ba ni lta ba'i phyir mig ste / don rnams gsal bar 'dzin pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go / dbang po zhes bya ba ni bsdus pa 'di la rang gi yul bye brag tu 'byed pa'i sgo nas (line-8) dbang byed pas dbang po'o / / gzugs ni des gzung zhing brtag par bya ba ma yin te / de ci'i phyir zhe na / bsags pa'i phyir te / rdzas brgyad bsgas pa'i phyir / dper na sgra bzhin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro / / yang na 'byung ba las gyur (96,30,1-1) pa'i phyir dper na sgra de nyid bzhin te / gzugs dang sgra gnyis ga bsgas pa dang 'byung ba las gyur pa nyid yin par 'dra bzhin du gzugs ni mig gi yul yin la / sgra ni ma yin no zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs

kyi khyad par med (line-2) pa'i phyir ro / / zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go / yang rnam grangs gzhan du na /

Thus:

"In ultimate reality, form is not the object of the eye-organ"---is [our] pratijñā. "The eye-[organ]"---since it sees, is the eye-[organ]. It implies "clearly grasping the different objects." "Organ (indriya)"---since it freely differentiates its own object in these conglomerated [objects], it is indriya.[51] And form is not something to be grasped and examined by this [eye-organ]. One might ask the reason. The reason is: it is something accumulated, i.e., the accumulation of the eight real entities, as for example, sound,---[the terms] are related [in this way]. Moreover, since it is produced from the elements (bhūta-bhautika), as for example, sound. It means that: because there is no differentiation of hetu, i.e., although both form and sound are alike as far as their nature of production from elements is concerned, while form is the object of the eye-[organ], but sound is not. There is another way of [formulating a reasoning]:

na cakṣu(ḥ) prekṣate rūpaṃ bhautikatvāt svarūpavat /
sukhādy utpatti-hetutvād vācyatvād vā rasādivat //41//

/ gzugs ni mig gis gzung min te /
/ 'byung las gyur phyir rang gzugs bzhin /
/ bde la sogs 'byung rgyu phyir dang /
/ brjod bya yin phyir ro sogs bzhin //41//

(41) The eye-[organ] does not behold form, since it has the nature of production from the elements, just as own-form. [Also] since [the feeling of] pleasure, etc. arises or since it is something expressible, just as taste, etc.

(96,30,1-3) gzugs ni mig gis gzung ba ma yin te / 'byung bas gyur pa'i phyir rang gi gzugs bzhin no zhes bya ba sbyar te/ khyed kyi lung las gzugs gang yin pa ci yang rung ste / de thams cad mig gi yul yin no zhes (line-4) bya ba de yang rang gi gzugs dang gzhan gyi gzugs kyi bye brag las rnam pa gnyis su dbye ste / de la 'dir ni gzhan gyi gzugs chos can nyid du gzung ngo / / de mig gis gzung ba ma yin no / / zhes bya ba ni de'i chos so / / 'byung ba (line-5) las gyur ba'i phyir zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni gtan tshigs so / / rang gi gzugs bzhin no / / zhes bya ba ni dpe ste / 'di ltar mig gi rang gzugs ni u t pa la 'i 'dab ma ltar sngo ba / 'bras bu cung zad bkra ba / rdzi ma bung ba'i (line-6) tshogs ltar gnag cing mdzes pas bkab pa mig sman gyi sdug mdzes pas mdog bsgyur ba ste / de lta bu'i mig gi gzugs kyang mig nyid kyis gzung ba ma yin pa de bzhin du gzhan gyi gzugs kyang mig des gzung ba ma yin no / / (line-7) gzhan yang bde ba la sogs pa 'byung ba'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir dang / brjod par bya ba yin pa'i phyir dper na / ro la sogs pa bzhin no / / de ltar gzugs yul gyi dngos por yod pa ma yin pas de yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir mig kyang (line-8) yul can nyid du yod pa ma yin la / de dag gi sgra yang dag brjod pa nyid ma

yin no / / de dag gyur byas nas gzugs 'byung ba'i phyir te / zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs de don ma grub pa nyid du bstan pa'i phyir /

"The eye-[organ] does not behold form, since it has the nature of production from the elements, just as the own-form" ---thus it is related. It is said in your āgama: Whatever form it may be, all [form] is the object of the eye-[organ]. That [form] also can be divided into two aspects, i.e., the own-form and the other-form. Among them, in this case, the other-form is taken as dharmin. "That [other-form] is not grasped by the eye-[organ]"---is its dharma. "Produced from the elements, etc."---is the hetu. "Just as the own-form"---is the dṛṣṭānta. Thus, the own-form of the eye: blue as a leaf of a blue lotus, twinkling of an eye (=lit. pupil), covered by the beautiful eyelashes like a crowd of bees and the change of colours through the beautification by applying [black or blue] ointment (añjana) [to the eyelashes or the inner coat of the eyelids], such a form of the eye also cannot be grasped by the eye-[organ] itself. Likewise, the other-form also cannot be grasped by that eye-[organ]. Moreover, since the [feeling of] pleasure, etc. arises. Also, since it is something expressible for example, just as taste, etc. are. Thus, a form is not existent as the entity of the object-sphere (viṣaya). Hence, when [form] is not existent, the eye-[organ], as a possessor of the object-sphere (viṣayin), is also non-existent. Hence, when

[form] is non-existent, the eye-[organ], as a possessor of the object-sphere, is also non-existent. Then, the sounds (=words) of these also do not have [the power] of expressing them (vācaka). In order to show the impossibility of the meaning of [the opponent's] hetu, i.e., "since [form] arises caused by these [elements]."

tathā na bhautikaṃ rūpam utpatter jvalanādivat /
hetumatvādi-hetubhyaś cittavad vetti lakṣayet //42//

/ de bzhin gzugs ni 'byung 'gyur min /
/ 'byung phyir me la sogs pa bzhin /
/ rgyu ldan la sogs gtan tshigs kyis /
/ yang na sems bzhin shes par bya //42//

(42) Likewise, rūpa is not real (bhautika), because it is produced. For example, fire, etc. [are produced.] [Also], because it has a cause, as thought has a cause. [Thus], it should be known.

(96,30,2-1) / zhes bya ba smras te / gzugs ni 'byung ba las gyur ba ma yin te / 'byung ba dang (line-2) ldan pa'i phyir me la sogs pa bzhin te / 'byung ba las gyur pa ni 'byung ba rnams las mngon par grub pa'o / / de yang 'byung ba dang ldan pa'i phyir dang / rgyu dang ldan pa la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs kyis 'byung ba'i rang gi gzugs (line-3) bzhin nam / yang na sems bzhin du 'byung ba las gyur ba'i ngo bo nyid ma yin te / gang gi phyir 'byung ba rnams ma gtogs par 'byung ba las gyur pa'i gzugs dmigs su med de / 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir ro / (line-4) de'i phyir 'byung ba

dag kho na bzhin du 'byung ba las gyur pa'i de'i ngo bo nyid kyang rdzas su yod pa nyid ma yin no / / zhes bya bar bsams so /

Thus:

Form is not produced from the element. Since it has production, for example, fire, etc. Produced from the element means resulted (abhinirvṛtta) from several elements. That [form] also has no own-being of production from the element[s], by reason of having production and having cause, etc., just as the own-form of the element[s] or like thought. What is the reason? Since apart from the elements, the form which is produced from the element[s] cannot be apprehended, it is a conglomeration. For this reason, [the author] had the following thoughts: Similar to the element itself, that own-being of production from the element also, has no real entity.

ete [hi]* varṇa**-saṃ[sthā]naṃ saṃcitatvādi lakṣaṇāḥ (Ms. °aḥ) / **Ms. varṇṇa

sūkṣma-audārika-bhedaś ca yāvat (Ms. yābāt) rūpasya kalpitāḥ //43//

*Metri causa.

/ des ni kha dog dbyibs dang ni /

/ bsags dang 'phra dang rags sogs kyi* /

/ dbye bas gzugs kyi mtshan nyid dag /

/ ji snyed rnam par brtags**pa rnams //43//

*TJ kyis. **TJ brtag.

(43) Then, whatever the properties of form they may be, they are imagined by the difference among the colour of form, the shape of form, the conglomeration, etc., subtle and gross,

(96,30,2-5) / zhes bya ba la / kha dog gi gzugs ni rnam pa zhi ste / sngon po dang ser bo dang dmar po dang dkar po'i dbyibs kyi gzugs ni rnam pa brgyad de / thung du dang ring po dang (line-6) zlumb pa* dang / gru bzhi dang mnyam pa dang mi mnyam pa dang / mthon po dang dma' ba'i bye brag gis so / / bsags pa ni rdul phra rab la sogs bdag gis bsags pa'o / / phra ba ni sro ma dang yungs kar la sogs pa'o / / rags (line-7) pa ni ri la sogs pa'o / / de bzhin du thag ring ba dang nye ba dang / lha dang mi dang ngan ba dang / bzang po la sogs pa'i bye brag gi dbye bas rdul phran gyi gzugs kyi mtshan nyid ji snyed gzhan dag gis rnam par btags pa rnams / zhes bya bar sbyar te / ji ltar zhe na /

Thus:

As for the colour of form (varṇa-rūpa), there are four kinds, i.e., blue, yellow, red and white; as for the shape of form (saṃsthāna-rūpa), there are eight kinds, i.e., due to the differences, of short, long, round, square, equal, unequal, convex and concave.[52] The conglomeration is the conglomeration by means of the atoms, etc. The subtle is [something like] a nit, and white mustard, etc. The gross is mountain, etc. Likewise, the essential properties (lakṣaṇa) of the subtle

*P. ldan pa.

form[s]---far, near, god, man, ill and good, etc., which are imagined by the opponents---are:

pratiṣiddho' (Ms. no avagraha) vaboddhavyo yathāyogaṃ prayogataḥ /44a-b/

/ ji ltar rig[s]* pa'i sbyor ba yis /

/ bkag par khong du chud par bya /44a-b/

*D. rigs.

(44a-b) Through the application of the reasoning as explained, the negation [of these forms] is to be understood.

Thus, related. One might ask: How [should one apply?] Likewise, rūpa is not real (bhautika), because it is produced. For example, fire, etc. are produced. [Also], because it has a cause, as thought has a cause. [Thus], it should be known. (Repetition of verse 42)

(96,30,3-1) zhes ji ltar rigs pa'i sbyor bas bkag pa khong du chud par bya'o /

Thus, according to the application of the reasoning [shown in verse #42], the negation should be understood.

śabda-gandha-rasa-sparśa-pratiṣedhe'py ayaṃ nayaḥ //44-c-d//

/ sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg /

/ dgag pa'i tshul yang de bzhin no //44//

(44c-d) The negation of sound, scent, taste and touch is also this method.

(TJ is omitted here).

na cakṣur-indriyaṃ rūpam īkṣa(Ms.ṣya)te paramārthataḥ / citta-caitāsika-anyatvāt tadyathā rasanendriyam//45//

/ mig gi dbang po don dam du /

/ gzugs la blta bas* ma yin te /

/ sems dang sems byung las gzhan phyir /

/ dper na ro yi** dbang po bzhin //45//

*TJ ba. **D. ri pa'i.

(45) In ultimate reality, the eye-organ does not see form, by reason of having a different nature from thought and its constituents, just as the taste-organ.

(96,30,3-8) /zhes bya ba smras te / don ji lta bu zhe na / gal te mig de la blta ba'i mthu yod par gyur na ni gnyid log pa dang myos pa dang shi ba la sogs pa'i gnas (96,30,4-1) / skabs dag dang / mun khung dang dus thams cad tu yang thams cad mthong bar 'gyur ro / / gal te mi mthong na ni de la blta ba yod pa ma yin no / / zhes bya bar tshad ma rnam par bzhag go / / gal te rnam par shes (line-2) pas mthong ngo zhe na ni / dmus long gis kyang gzugs mthong bar thal bar 'gyur ro / / gal te mig ma nyams pas yid kyis mthong ngo zhe na ni de lta na mig byed pa po nyid ma yin par 'gyur ro / gal te rnam par shes pa dang bcas (line-3) pa'i mig gis mthong ngo zhe na / de ni kun rdzob tu kun kyang 'dod pa kho na yin te / de la yang mig 'ba' zhig byed pa po ma yin gyi / mthong ba ni gzugs dang snang ba dang / nam mkha' dang yid la byed pa tshogs pa la rag lus pa'i phyir (line-4) des na mig 'ba' zhig byed pa po nyid yin par bstan dka'o / / de ltar byed pa po med pa'i phyir las kyang gal yod pas gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub ba nyid do / / gang dag tshogs pa las

blta ba'i bya ba skye bas de dag thams cad la (line-5) lta ba'i nus pa yod pa nyid ma yin te / de'i phyir blta ba'i bya ba skyes pa'i mig gis mthong ngo zhes bya ba de ltar 'dod pa de dag gis phyir rab tu bshad pa /

Thus:

One might ask: What is the purpose [of this verse]? Here, the following pramāṇa is established: If there is a power of seeing in the eye-[organ in itself], then [it] sees everything anytime [i.e.,] the times of death, sleep, intoxication, and death, etc. and [in] a dark cave. If it does not see, then the act of seeing does not exist there (=the eye-organ). If one says, "the vijñāna sees [it]," then the following difficulty will arise----a blind man also sees form! If one says, " a man with unimpaired eye sees with his mind, then the eye-[organ] loses the state of being the agent [of seeing]. If one says, "the eye-[organ], endowed with vijñāna, sees," then that is, indeed, maintained by all. In that case also, the eye-[organ] alone is not the agent. Because the act of seeing depends on the group of agents, i.e., form, light, space and mind. Thereby, it is difficult to maintain that the eye-[organ] alone has the state of being the agent of [seeing]. Thus, where is the action, when there is no [absolute] agent? Hence, [your] hetu cannot be proved. Since the act of seeing arises from this group of agents, there never exists [separately] the power of seeing everyone of these [agents]. Therefore, in order to refute those who

maintain: the eye-[organ] sees:

na rūpam īkṣate cakṣur atha vā paramārthataḥ /
avijñāna-svabhāvatve 'saty utpatter tvagādivat //46//
/ yang na mig gis don dam du /
/ gzugs la blta ba ma yin te /
/ rnam shes dngos med mi skye'i phyir /
/ pags pa dag la sogs pa bzhin //46//

(46) Moreover, in ultimate reality, the eye-[organ] does not see form, for [seeing] does not exist where no consciousness arises, just as the skin, etc.

(96,30,4-6) / zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don ni gang gi phyir rnam par shes pa med par blta ba'i bya ba mi skye ba'i phyir mig gis kyang mi mthong ngo zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go / / chos mngon (line-7) pa las mig gis dbang po ni go snyod kyi me tog lta bu 'am zho ga chu lta bu yul kha dog gzugs dang ba'o / / zhes de'i mtshan nyid bstan pa de ni kho bo cag kyang kun rdzog tu 'dod do /

The meaning of the foregoing verse is: Since vijñāna does not exist, then the act of seeing does not arise. Hence, the eye-[organ] does not see---thus maintained. From the viewpoint of conventional truth we also maintain the following elucidation on lakṣaṇa, i.e.: the eye-organ is the subtle material (rūpa-prasāda) which has colour as [its] object, just as the ajājī-flower or whey (dadhi-maṇḍa).

However, in ultimate reality (don dam par ni),

na varṇa*-viṣayo rūpa-prasādas cakṣur-indriyaṃ /
kṛtakatvādi hetubhyo dṛṣṭāntāc ca tvagādivat //47//
(No Tibetan translation). *Ms. varṇṇa

(47) The eye-organ is not the subtle material (rūpa-prasāda), having colour as [its] object-sphere, by reason of having the nature of creation, etc. And dṛṣṭānta: like skin, etc.

(96,30,4-8) / de'i yul kha dog dgag pa byed pa ni /
The refutation of colour which is the object-sphere of that [eye-organ]:

na cakṣū-rūpaṃ viṣayaṃ svarūpāgrahaṇān mataṃ /
śrāvaṇādi-indriyaṃ yadva(t) rūpitvād vā rasādivat //48//
/ mig ni gzugs kyi yul can min /
/ rang gi gzugs la mi 'dzin phyir /
/ nyan la sogs pa'i dbang bo dang /
/ gzugs can yin phyir ro sogs bzhin //48//

(48) We maintain:

[As its] object-sphere, since it cannot grasp own form, just as the organ of ear, etc. or by reason of having nature of form, like taste, etc.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,30,5-5) 'dir grangs can dang bye brag pa (line-6) dag gis smras pa / 'dis mthong ngo zhes blta ba'i byed pa la 'dis zhes bya bar brjod pas lta ba'i byed pa mig gis blta ba pos mthong ste / dper na sta res gcod do zhes bya ba yang sta re 'ba' zhig gis gcod par mi byed do / / 'o (line-7) na ji lta

bu zhe na / byed pa sta res bcad pa po mis gcod pa shing gcod pa de bzhin du mi 'ba' zhig gis mthong ba ma yin te / 'o na ji lta bu zhe na / byed pa mig gis blta ba po mis blta bar bya ba gzugs la lta bar byed do zhe na / de dag gi (line-8) phyir bshad pa/

Here, the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika object: In "[he] sees with it," an instrument is expressed by "with it." Hence, the agent of seeing, i.e., a viewer, sees with his eyes which are instruments of seeing. For example, "he cuts [a tree] with an axe," does not mean to say that a tree is cut with an axe alone. One might ask how? A man, the cutter, cuts a tree, an object of cutting, with an axe, an instrument of cutting. Likewise, a man alone does not see. And how? A man, the viewer, sees a form, an object of seeing, with his eyes, the instruments of seeing. We reply for them.

tadvad vā'cakṣuṣo draṣṭur darśanam na-anidarśanam /49a-b/

/ de bzhin blta bo mig med pa /

/ dpe yang med pas mthong ma yin /49a-b/

(49a-b) Or, likewise, there is no seeing for the eye-less viewer, [because there is] no <u>dṛṣṭānta</u> (=<u>nidarśana</u>).

(96,30,5-8) / zhes bya ba ni mig gis mthong ba bkag pa de bzhin du blta ba pos mthong ba yang dgag par bya ste / ji ltar zhe na / 'di ni gzugs mthong ba (96,31-1-1) las rjes su dpags nas lta ba po zhes bya na / gzugs mthong ba de yang mig dang / gzugs dang / nam mkha' dang / snang ba

dang / yid la byed pa dag tshogs na yod par 'gyur ba yin pas / de'i phyir (line-2) lhas byin zhes bya ba lta bu tshogs pa nyid la lta ba po zhes bya bar rigs kyi gzhan mthong ngo zhes bya ba'i dpe yang med pas mthong bar mi rigs so ...../

Thus:

Similar to the refutation against, "the eye-[organ] sees," "a viewer sees," also should be refuted. One might ask: How [should it be refuted]? Having made an inference "the eye-[organ] sees," if a so-called viewer [is postulated], then: [the act of] seeing form is existent where there is the group of agents, i.e., form, light, space and mind. For this reason, it is reasonable to say: [a person] named Devadatta can be called a viewer when there is the group [of agents, i.e., form. etc.]. However, there is no such case as a jar, etc. which has no eyes, seeing [something] with eyes. Therefore, [the act of] seeing is invalid.

.....(96,31,1-5) ci ste sta re med pa'i gcod pa (line-6) pos gcod pa po nyid mi 'grub kyi / sta re dang ma bral bar gcod pas gcod pa po nyid du 'grub pa bzhin du blta ba dang ma bral bar blta ba'i blta ba pos mthong bar 'gyur ro zhe na / de'i phyir bshad pa byed pa dang ma phrad (line-7) pa'i snga rol dang / byed pa dang bral ba'i 'og rol na blta ba med pas /

However, if one says: While a [wood]-cutter without an axe does not exist, the state of being [wood]-cutter exists

when he cuts [a tree] with an axe. Likewise, a viewer sees when he is not deprived of seeing. In order to refute, we say: before getting the means of [seeing] and after releasing [it], the viewer does not exist.

Hence:

kathaṃ vā'draṣṭū-rūpasya yujyate rūpadarśanam //49c-d//

/ blta ba'i* ngo bo nyid yin pas /

/ ji ltar gzugs la blta bar rigs //49c-d//

*TJ ba.

(49c-d) How is it possible for [a thing], which does not have the nature of seeing, to see a form?

(96,31,1-7) blta ba po'i ngo bo nyid ma yin pa la ni blta ba'i nus pa med pa'i phyir / dmus (line-8) long la blta ba med pa lta bu yin pas / blta ba'i ngo bo nyid min* pas / ji ltar gzugs la blta bar rigs / gzhan yang ji ltar blta ba po gang yin pa de nyid nyan pa po dang / snom pa po dang / myang pa po dang / reg pa po dang / (96,31,2-1) shes pa po yang yin nam 'on te tha dad pa yin / de la gal te tha dad pa yin na ni bdag mang po nyid du 'gyur te / de ni gcig tu zad do / / 'on te de nyid

*P. yin.

As for [an agent], without having the own-nature of seeing, there is no ability of seeing. Hence, it is just as a blind man does not see. When there is no own-nature of seeing, how is it tenable to see form? Moreover, in what manner is a viewer itself [united with], a listener, an agent which smells,

an agent which tastes, an agent which touches and an agent which cognizes? Or [a viewer] is separated [from them]? Then, many selves appear. [However], that [self] is only one [thence, one cannot say it is separated]. And yet, [if] it is united, then:

drastaiva ced bhavec chrotā śrotṛtvaṃ tasya kiṃ kṛtaṃ /50a-b/

/ gal te blta po nyan po na /

/ ci phyir de ni nyan por 'gyur /50a-b/

(50a-b) Even if we suppose a viewer is a listener, how is the listening nature made for him (=viewer)?

(96,31,2-1) gal te blta (line-2) ba po'i ngo bo nyid yin na ji ltar de rang gi ngo bo nyid bral nas ngo bo nyid gzhan 'byung bar 'gyur te / des na ngo bo nyid dang bral bar 'gyur ro / skyon 'di yang yod de /

If there is own-being of a viewer, how do the other own-being[s] arise, after separating from that own-being? Thereby, [if they are united], then own-being[s] are separated---[which is untenable]. There is also this fallacy.

na cādheya-viśeṣatvād iṣṭaṃ [Ms.iṣṭe] [taj jñā]tva-nityate /50c-d/

na caikatvād virūpatvād dehāntara-śarīravat //51a-b//

/ de shes nyid dang rtag mi 'dod /

/ bsgyur rung khyad par yin pa'i phyir /50c-d/

/ gcig nyid ma yin tshul gnyis phyir /

/ lus gzhan dag gi gzugs bzhin no //51a-b//

(50c-d, 51a-b) "That [viewer] is intelligent and perpetual"---
is not maintained. Because [the viewer has these attributes, i.e.,], an inherent change, not a monoform but a multiform, just as a body of another being (=body).

(TJ is omitted here).

rūpopalabdhau karaṇaṃ neṣyate cakṣurindriyaṃ /51c-d/
amanastve sati draṣṭur anyatvāc chravaṇādivat//52a-b//
/ de bzhin mig gi dbang po ni /
/ gzugs la dmigs pa'i byed mi 'dod /51c-d/
/ yid bral nyid na blta po las /
/ gzhan phyir nyan la sogs pa bzhin//52a-b//

(51c-d,52a-b) "The eye-organ is an instrument of apprehending form"---is not maintained. Because if it is separated from mind, then it is a different state from the viewer, just as hearing etc.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,31,3-2) / grangs can dag gis smras pa / kho bo cag gi grub pa'i mtha' ni 'di yin te / dbang po ni yul dang phrad par byed do / / (line-3) dbang po dang phrad pa'i yul la yid kyi rjes su gcod par byed do / / yid kyis bcad pa la nga rgyal gyis rlom par byed do / / nga rgyal gyis rlom pa la blos sems par byed do / / blos bsams pa'i yul de skyes bu la snang bar 'gyur te (line-4) dper na chu rnyog pa med pa nye bar gnas pa tsam gyis phan 'dogs par gnas pa'i nang du zla ba'i gzugs kyi gzugs brnyan shar ba la blta ba_la sogs pa'i tha snyad du brjod pa yod pa de bzhin du skyes bu'i

rdzas nges par gnas pa nyid (line-5) la chos gzhan 'byung ba dang / chos gzhan 'gag pa na skyes bu'i ngo bo nyid nyams par yang mi 'gyur la rang bzhin dang bral bar yang mi 'gyur bas de'i phyir skyes bu ni mi rtag pa yang ma yin la / ngo bo nyid med pa yang ma yin du (line-6) ma yang ma yin zhing byed pa ma yin pa yang ma yin no / /

The Sāṃkhyas object: [53]

Our siddhānta is as follows: [First], the sense-organ makes a contact (saṃnikarṣa) with the object-sphere.[54] [Next], mind (manas) discriminates the object-sphere which is a combination of indriya and viṣaya. Ahaṃkāra[55] makes individuation (abhimāna) [on the basis of] the discrimination made by manas. Buddhi makes a judgement (adhyavasāya) on [the basis of] the individuation made by ahaṃkāra. And the object-sphere which was judged by buddhi makes its reflection[56] in the puruṣa. For example, [although the moon is a thousand miles away], it is [possible] to say, "the moon's face (rūpa) appears," if there is clear water, which is useful because it is near. In the same way, although the other entity rises and perishes in the real entity of puruṣa whose essence neither perishes nor departs from him. Therefore puruṣa is neither impermanent nor devoid of own-being; neither many nor devoid of [the nature of] the agent.

na cāsya draṣṭṛtā yuktā cakṣurādi-vyapekṣaṇā(t) /52c-d/
manovat pariṇāmitvāt pratibimbodayāt tathā//53a-b//

/ de ni blta bo nyid mi rigs /

/ mig la sogs la bltos pa'i phyir /52c-d/

/ yid bzhin yongs su 'gyur phyir dang /

/ de bzhin gzugs brnyan 'phyar* phyir ro//53a-b//

*TJ 'char.

(52c-d,53a-b) The state of being viewer of this [puruṣa] is untenable, the reasons are: [its] dependency on the eye-[organ], etc., the state of transformation, reflected image [or the moon in the water], like mind.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,31,4-1) yid nyid kyang blta ba po'i ngo bo nyid ma yin na de dang 'dra bar bdag blta ba por 'gyur ba lta ga la yod de de'i phyir bshad pa /

When mind itself also has no own-being of a viewer, how could 'I,' like that [mind], be a viewer? For this reason, we refute:

akṣāntareṇa vā'dṛṣṭer manovad draṣṭṛtā katham //53c-d//

/ blta po ji ltar yid dang 'dra /

/ dbang po gzhan gyi* mi mthong phyir //53c-d//

*TJ gyis.

(53c-d) How is it possible [for ātman] to be a viewer like mind, since it cannot be seen by the other-eye.

(96,31,4-1) zhes bya ba la dbang po ni (line-2) dbang po rnams so / / gzhan zhes bya ba ni dbang po gzhan las gzhan pa'i dbang po gzhan gyis so / / don lhag ma ni smras par zad do gzhan yan /

Thus:

The organ is the [eye]-organ, etc. "Other"---through other organ (=manas) which is other than these [eye,etc.] organs.

manasas tattvato (Ms. manasasta(?)stvato) neṣṭaṃ

ātmavad rūpadarśanaṃ /54a-b/

/ yid ni yang dag nyid du na /

/ blta* bar mi 'dod bdag bzhin no /54a-b/

*TJ lta.

(54a-b) "Mind manifests"---is not maintained in ultimate reality, just as ātman.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,31,4-4) ji ste mig dang gzugs dang / snang ba dang nam mkha' dang yid la byed pa tshogs pa'i dbang gis (line-5) yid lta bar byed do / / zhe na bshad pa

If one says:

Mind sees through the organ of the conglomeration of eye, form, light, space and attention (manasikāra), then we reply:

adravyasatvāt sāmagryās tadvad vā nāsti darśanaṃ //54c-d//

/ de mi blta* min tshogs pa dag /

/ rdzas su med phyir de nyid bzhin //54c-d//

*TJ lta.

(54c-d) Likewise, there is no seeing [for mind], because there is no real entity for the things which are assembled.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,31,4-7) / gal te (line-8) bdag med na gang gi mthong zhe na / kho bo cag ni tha snyad du na sems nyid kyis mthong bar 'dod do / / gal te sems ni skad cig ma yin pa'i phyir byed pa po nyid ma yin no zhe na / bshad pa

One might ask:

If there is no ātman, then who does the seeing? [We reply]: We also maintain that citta does the seeing in conventional expression. One might ask [again]: If citta is a momentary entity, then it has no agent-ship.

dharm(ā)ntar-abhinirvṛtter ghaṇṭāvat kartṛtās tu vā

/55a-b/

/ byed po nyid rung chos gzhan dag /

/ mngon par 'grub phyir dril bu bzhin /55a-b/

(55a-b) [Citta can be] a state of being of the agent, by reason of the production of the other dharmas, just as a bell.

(96,31,5-1) / zhes bya ba ni gzhan mu stegs can gyis yongs su btags pa'i bdag med du zin kyang / sems skad cig pa nyid tha snyad du byed pa po nyid du rung ste / nang dang phyi (line-2) rol gyi 'du byed bdag med pa dag la rgyu dang rkyen so sor nges par tshogs pa'i dbang gis chos gzhan dag mngon par 'grub pa'i phyir dper na dril bu sgra 'byin ba dang / mar me snang bar byed pa dang / chu 'bab par byed pa de (line-3) bzhin du ste / de'i phyir kho bo cag ni tshogs pa las tha snyad du blta ba khas len gyi don dam par ni de gang la yang mi gnas te / ji skad du /

/ de ni mig dang gzugs la med /

/ de gnyis bar na 'ang mi gnas te /

/ gang du de (line-4) ni gnas 'gyur ba /

/ de yod ma yin de med min /

zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa lta bu'o / / kha çig mig gi 'od zer yul gyi phyogs su song nas 'jin par byed do / / snyam du sems pa de dgag pa'i phyir bshad pa /.

Thus:

Although there is no ātman, which is falsely imagined by the heretic, it is feasible to maintain the state of the agent for the momentary citta from the viewpoint of conventional expression (vyavahāra). The reason: the other dharmas are produced through the organ where the main cause and the associate conditions conglomerate in separate order (pratiniyama) in the internal and the external conditioned events (saṃskārā) which do not have any independent entity (nairātmya). For example, like a bell emits sound, a lamp lights up and water flows. For this reason, we maintain [the act of] seeing by reason of the conglomeration of [eye, form, etc.] from the viewpoint of conventional expression. However, in ultimate reality, they do not exist anywhere at all. It has been said:

It does not exist in the eye-[organ] or in form,
it does not exist between the two either,
where would it exist?
It is neither existent nor non-existent, etc.

[Our āgamas] are these statements [of Bhagavat]. Some imagined:[57] having gone to the point of the object-sphere, the light of the eye grasps. In order to refute this, we reply:

na caksuḥ raśmivad yuktaṃ akṣatvād itarākṣavat //55c-d//

/ mig ni 'od zer ldan mi rigs /

/ dbang po yin phyir dbang gzhan bzhin //55c-d//

(55c-d) It is untenable to say, "the eye-[organ] has light,"

since it is the state of that organ, just as the other organ.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,31,5-6) gal te de (line-7) ltar mig gi dbang po 'do zer dang ldan pa ma yin na / 'o na ji ltar byi la dang 'ug pa dag mun khrod na mig dag las sgron ma ltar 'bar ba 'byung bar snang zhe na / de'i phyir bshad pa /

If thus, the eye-organ is not endowed with light, then one might ask:[58] Now then, how can a cat and an owl shine a lamp-like glare from their eyes in a dark place?

For this, we reply:

naktaṃ carākṣy-adhiṣṭhānaṃ dṛśyaṃ dṛśyaṃ na hīkṣaṇaṃ

/56a-b/

/ mtshan mo rgyu ba'i mig 'bras snang //

/ dbang po snang ba ma yin no /56a-b/

(56a-b) It is visible by the eye-ball of [an animal]

which moves at night, and it is not visible by

the eye-[organ].

(96,31,5-8) / zhes bya ba ni mun khrod na-mtshan mo rgyu ba rnams kyi mig gi 'bras bu snang bar zad kyi dbang po ni

mi snang ste / de ni bstan du med pa yin pa'i phyir ro / / de'i phyir rnam par rtog pa de yang bzang (96,32,1-1) po ma yin no / / de bzhin du /

Thus:

It is only the eye-ball of the [animals] which move at night that shines, and the organ does not shine. The reason is: that [organ] is invisible. Therefore, this discrimination is also not right.

Likewise:

na sukhādy-ātmakaṃ [cakṣur] vastutvā(t) tadyathā pumān //56c-d//

/ mig ni bde sogs bdag nyid min /

/ dngos po yin phyir skyes bu bzhin //56c-d//

(56c-d) The eye does not have the nature of pleasure, etc., because it has the nature of entity. For example, puruṣa.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,32,1-4) kha cig mig ni thams cad du song ba yin te / blta bar bya ba thams cad la thogs (line-5) ma med pa'i phyir ro snyam du sems pa de dag la 'di brjod par bya ste /

Some imagine: the eye-[organ] reaches everywhere, because it is free [to see] everything which should be seen. Against these people, the following should be said:

nāpi sarvagataṃ cakṣuḥ sat(t)vāt tad-golakādivat /57a-b/

/ mig ni kun tu song min te /

/ gyo* phyir de 'bras la sogs bzhin /57a-b/

*TJ yod.

(57a-b) The eye-[organ] does not reach everywhere, because it has the nature of being, just as the ball of that (eye), etc.

(TJ is omitted here).

atha vā'sarvāṅgatvākṣi(Ms. no avagraha) pārārthyaṃ tadyathā ghaṭaḥ //57c-d//

/ yang na mig ni kun 'gro min /

/ gzhan don nyid phyir bum pa bzhin //57c-d//

(57c-d) Or rather, the eye-[organ] does not have the nature of moving everywhere, because it is devoted to another, just as a pot.

(TJ is omitted here).

rūpopalabdhi-hetutvād yathā rūpaṃ tatheti vā /58a-b/

/ gzugs dmigs 'gyur ba'i rgyu yin phyir /

/ dper na gzugs bzhin de bzhin no /58a-b/

(58a-b) Or [the eye-organ does not move everyplace], because it is a cause (hetu) of apprehending form similar to form.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,32,2-4) kha cig na re mig ni me'i rang bzhin te / gsal ba ches chen po dag gis zil gyis gnon pa'i phyir mar me bzhin no / zhes zer ba de yang bzang po ma yin te / gang gi phyir zhe na /

Some say:[59] As for the eye-[organ], there is own-being of fire, because it is suppressed by the great light, just as a lamp. This is not right, because:

na cakṣus teja-saṃyuktam indriyatvā(t) tvagadivat //58c-d//

/ mig ni me dang ldan ma yin /

/ dbang po yin phyir pags sogs bzhin //58c-d//

(58c-d) The eye-[organ] is not conjoined with fire, because it has the nature of organ, just as skin, etc.

(96,32,2-5) kha cig mig ni 'byung ba chen po bzhi'i rgyu las byung ba yin yang me shas che ba yin no snyam du sems dpa' de dag la yang /

Some imagine: the eye-[organ] has risen caused by the four Mahābhūtas, but the part of fire is dominant.

Against these [people] also:

tejo'dhika[ṃ] mahābhūta-prasādādy-ātmakaṃ na ca /59a-b/

/ 'byung chen dang* sogs bdag nyid na**/

/ me shes che ba ma yin no***/59a-b/

*TJ dad. **TJ ni. ***TJ te.

(59a-b) Also, [the eye], having the nature of subtle, etc., [caused by the four] elements, does not have the fire-dominant-[part].

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,32,2-7) / grangs can dag yid ma gtogs pa'i dbang po lnga po dag ni yul dang phrad nas 'dzin par 'dod de / 'di ltar mig la sogs pa'i 'jug pa ni gnas nas (line-8) phyir rol tu 'phos nas yul 'dzin par byed do zhes zer ba dgag pa'i phyir /

The Sāṃkhyas maintain:

Excepting mind-[organ], having conjoined with object-sphere, they grasp. Thus, the activity of the eye-[organ, etc.] is: having moved outside from [own-]basis, they grasp the object-sphere.

In order to refute, we say:

na prāpta-viṣayaṃ cakṣur indriyatvād yathā manaḥ /59c-d/
rūpavat kāraṇatvād vā hetumatvāt tathāpi vā//60a-b//

/ mig ni yul dang phrad ma yin /
/ dbang po yin phyir yid bzhin dang /59c-d/
/ rgyu phyir rgyu dang ldan pa'i phyir /
/ yang na gzugs la sogs pa bzhin//60a-b//

(59c-d,60a-b) The eye does not reach the object-sphere,
because of its nature of organ, just as mind.
Because it is a cause or it is proceeded from a cause,
just as form.

(96,32,3-1) chos mngon pa pa dag na re / mig dang rna ba dang yid ni yul ma phrad pa 'dzin pa yin te 'di ltar mig dang rna ba ni thag ring pos bskal pa'i gzugs dang sgra yang 'dzin la yid kyang 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa dang (line-2) thag ring ba dang nye ba'i don rnams la thogs pa med par 'dzin pa'i phyir ro / sna dang lce dang lus ni de lta ma yin te / gang gi phyir de dag ni yul phrad pa kho na 'dzin par byed do / zhes zer pa de dag gi 'dod pa bsal ba'i phyir /

The Ābhidhārmikas maintain:[60]

The eye, ear, and mind grasp the object-sphere which cannot be reached. That is to say, the eye and ear grasp the

distant form and sound. The mind also freely grasps the objects of past and future, near and far. Nose, tongue and body are not that way. For what reason? They only grasp the objects which can be reached (prāpta-viṣaya).

In order to refute their suppositions:

na prāpta-viṣaya-grāhi-ghrāṇadīṣṭaṃ yathekṣa[ṇaṃ] /60c-d/
bāhyārtha-grahaṇāt sākṣād atitānāgatāgrahāt//61a-b//

/ sna tshogs yul phrad 'dzin mi 'dod /
/ phyi don mngon sum 'dzin phyir dang /60c-d/
/ 'das dang ma 'ongs mi 'dzin phyir /
/ dper na mig gi dbang po bzhin//61a-b//

(60c-d,61a-b) It is not maintained, "the nose etc. grasps the object-sphere which is reached." For it perceives the external object directly. Also it does not perceive past and future, just as the eye-[organ].

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,32,3-5) / lus kyi dbang po la (line-6) sogs pas ma nges pa'i skyon bsal ba'i phyir /

In order to clear up the fallacy of the uncertain [reason] (anaikāntika) by the touch-organ, etc.:

sādhya-tulya-niṣedhāc ca nānekātvaṃs tvagādibhiḥ //61 c-d//

/ sgrub dang 'dra bar bkag pa'i phyir /
/ lus la sogs pa* ma nges min //61c-d//

*TJ pa'i.

(61c-d) It does not commit the fallacy of the uncertain

[reason] because of touch, etc. For it negates [i.e., non-grasping of unreachable object] just as the sādhya (=the eye).

de bzhin du. Likewise:

trayaṃ nāprāpta-viṣayaṃ manaḥ-śrotrākṣi-lakṣaṇaṃ /
indriyatvād yathā ghrāṇaṃ citta-hetutvato'pi vā //62//

/ mig rna* yid kyi mtshan nyid gsum /
/ yul dang ma phrad 'dzin ma yin /62a-b/
[/ dbang po yin pa'i phyir dang / sems skye ba'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir / dper na sna la sogs pa bzhin no /]
//62c-d//

*TJ rna. MHK sna.

(62) [Those] three properties, i.e., the mind, ear and eye do not [grasp] the unreachable object. The reasons are: they are 'indriya' and the cause of [the function] of mind, just as nose.

darśanena-iva boddhavyā yathā kathita vistarā(t) /
śra(va)ṇa-ghrāṇa-rasana-tvag-indrīya-nirākriyāḥ //63//

/ lta ba ji ltar rgyas bshad pas /
/ nyan dang snom dang myang ba dang /
/ lus kyi dbang po gsal ba dad /
/ nges par khong du chud par bya //63//

(63) Following the detailed exposition of darśana. the negation of those organs, i.e., hearing, smelling, taste and touch should be understood correctly.

(TJ is omitted here).

na yenānena boddhavyaṃ pratyuktaṃ śravaṇādy api /64a-b/

/ sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg /

/ dgag pa'i tshul yang de yin te /64a-b/

/ mkhas pas gzu bo'i blo dag gis /

/ ci rigs par ni shes par bya //64c-d//

(64) As for the discourse on hearing, etc., it should be understood properly, with an errorless naya and with straightforward intelligence.

na yuktā paramārthena vedanānubhavātmikā /

vijñāna-saṃprayuktatvāt tad-anye caitasā yathā //65//

/ tshor ba don dam nyid du na /

/ myong ba'i* bdag nyid yin mi rigs /

/ rnam shes mtshungs pār ldan pa'i phyir /

/ de las gzhan pa'i sems byung bzhin //65//

*TJ ba.

(65) "Vedanā has the nature of experiencing"[61] is untenable from the viewpoint of ultimate reality, because of its association with vijñāna just as thought which is other than that.

(96,32,4-5) / zhes bya ba ni pha rol po dag tshor ba'i mtshan nyid ni dbang po dang yul dang / rnam par shes pa gsum 'dus pa'i reg pa myong ba yin la / de yang myong ba'i (line-6) bya brag las rnam pa gsum du 'dod do / / tshor ba de don dam pa nyid du na myong ba'i bdag nyid yin par mi rigs te / rnam par shes pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i phyir de las gzhan pa'i sems las byung ba bzhin no / / zhes bya (line-7)

bya bar tshad ma nye bar sbyar ro / / de ni rig pa dang [62] ldan pa ma yin te / gang gi phyir bsam gtan bzhi la snyoms par zhugs pa'i gnas skabs na yang re zhig bde ba dang sdug bsngal dag spangs pa yin na / tshor ba thams (line-8) cad 'gags pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i gnas skabs na lta smos kyang ci dgos te / ji skad du ting nge 'dzin de ni tshor ba med pa dang / rnam par rig pa'i sa bon med pa yin no zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o / / tshor ba'i byad par dag (96,32,5-1) kyang dgag pa'i phyir /

Thus:

The opponents maintain: the essential property (lakṣaṇa) of vedanā is experiencing the contact of the assemblage of three, i.e., organ, the object-sphere and vijñāna. And there are three kinds of that (vedanā) according to the different experiencing.

From the viewpoint of ultimate reality, it is untenable [to maintain] that vedanā has the nature of experiencing, because of its association with vijñāna, just as the thing which belongs to thought (caitāsika)---thus pramāṇa is employed. That [vedanā] is not endowed with [enjoyment] (āsvādanasamprayukta).[62] Since even at the time of concentration in the four trances, for the time being, pleasure and pain are forsaken. How much more does it have to be mentioned for the time of nirvāṇa, where all feelings are annihilated. As it has been proclaimed: as for that trance, there is neither feeling nor the seed of representa-

tion (vijñapti). [Our discussion] tallies with this āgama.

[Next], in order to refute the aspects of vedanā:

sukhānugrāhikā neṣṭā sparśajatvāt tad-anyavat /

yathokta-hetor vijñeyā na duḥkhā pīḍanātmikā //66//

/ bde ba phan 'dogs mi 'dod de /

/ reg las byung phyir de gzhan bzhin /

/ sdug bsngal gnod pa'i bdag nyid min /

/ gtan tshigs bstan pas shes par bya //66//

(66) "Pleasure is [an essential property] of something beneficial,"------- is not maintained, since it is produced by touch, just as something other than that. Pain does not have the nature of affliction, because of the reason which is to be known as explained already.

[neṣṭā]'duḥkhāsukhā tadvat tṛṣphalatvād [yathetha]rā /67a-b/

/ sdug min bde min mi 'dod de/

/ 'bras bu sred phyir gzhan bzhin no /67a-b/

(67a-b) Neither painless nor pleasureless [vedanā] are maintained, for the fruit of [vedanā] is craving, just as the other [vedanā].

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,32,5-6) / sems dang (line-7) sems las byung ba'i tshul gyis sems yod pas tshor ba dag kyang yod pa kho na yin no zhe na / de'i phyir

One might maintain: Since thought is existent in the manner of thought and mental (caitasika), feelings are also, indeed,

existent. For this, [we refute]:

vivakṣitād vā vijñānā-svabhāva-pratiṣedhataḥ //67c-d//

/ rnam shes ngo bo nyid kyang ni /

/ dgag pa smra bar 'dod phyir ro //67c-d//

(67c-d) Since we wish to explain the refutation of own-being of vijñana.

(96,32,5-7) / zhes bya ba smras te / rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid dgag par (line-8)yang 'og nas smra bar 'dod pa'i phyir tshor ba rnam gsum ni don dam pa ma yin te / sems bkag pa na sems las byung ba dag dgag pa byas pa yang khong du chud par 'gyur te / pha rol gyi rgyal po pham na de'i dmags kyang pham (96,33,1-1) par mngon pa bzhin no /

Thus:

Since the refutation of own-being of vijñana will be treated later, the three modes of feeling (sukha, duḥkha, asukha-aduḥkha) do not exist in ultimate reality. If thought is refuted, then the refutation of mentals also [consequently] shall be understood. For example, if the enemy king is defeated, the defeat of his army also will be realized.

etena saṃjñā vyākhyātā saṃskārāś cobhayātmakāḥ /68a-b/

/ 'du shes 'du byed rnam gnyis dag /

/ des ni rnam par bshad gyur te /68a-b/

/ mkhas pas gzu po'i blo dag gis /

/ ci rigs par ni shes par bya //68c-d//

(68) Thus, [refutation] of the essentials of both, i.e., saṃjñā and saṃskārā has been commented

The wise should understand [that] properly,

with straightforward intelligence.

(<u>TJ</u> is omitted here).

na vastu prativijñapti svabhāvaṃ tat(tvato mataḥ /

(āla)mb[Ms.v]anātvāt saṃjñāvan nāśitvād vā pradīpavat

//69//

/ rnam shes don dam nyid du na /

/ dngos po rnam rig dngos nyid min /

/ dmigs dang bcas phyir 'du shes bzhin /

/ yang na 'jig phyir mar me bzhin //69//

(69) In ultimate reality, [<u>vijñāna</u>] is not the real entity which recognizes things.[63] For it has an objective support, just as <u>saṃjñā</u>. Or, it [is doomed] to destruction, just as a lamp.

(96,33,1-4) / zhes bya ba ni rnam par shes pa don dam nyid du na dngos po so sor rnam par rig pa'i dngos po nyid (line-5) ma yin te / dmigs pa dang bcas pa'i phyir dper na 'du shes bzhin nam / yang na 'jig pa'i phyir mar me bzhin no / / dngos po zhes bya ba ni de dngos su 'dug pa'i phyir dngos po'i yang na 'di la sems dang sems las byung (line-6) ba'i chos rnams gnas pa'i phyir dngos po ste / gzugs la sogs pa dag go / / de so sor rnam par rig pa ni rnam par rtog pa med pa'i sgo nas rang gi ngo bo yongs su shes pa ste / rnam par shes pa ni de'i ngo bo nyid ma yin no /

Thus:

In ultimate reality, <u>vijñāna</u> is not an entity (<u>vastu</u>) which

recognizes things. For it has an objective support, just as saṃjñā. Or, it is doomed to destruction, just as a lamp. "bhāva"---since it exists as an actual substance, it is an entity. Also, since it is the abode of thought and its constituents, it is bhāva, i.e., rūpa, etc.

"prativijñapti"---total comprehension of 'own-being' without any conceptualization (nirvikalpa-mukhena). And vijñāna does not have this nature.

(96,33,1-7) phung po bkag pa dang 'dra bar khams dang skye mched dag kyang bstan pa'i phyir /

In parallel to the refutation of skandha[s], in order to show [that of] dhatus and āyatanas:

skandho'stu dhātavo(Ms.°vato) jñeyājñeyānyāyatanāni
ca //70//

/ phung po lnga po rnam dpyad pa'i /
/ sgrub ba ji skad bstan pa des /
/ phung po rnams kyi khams shes bya /
/ skye mched rnams kyang shes par bya //70//

(70) According to the demonstration of proof (sādhana) [of niḥsvabhāvatā] shown in the examination of the pañcaskandha, the dhātus of the aggregates should be known; the āyatanas of the aggregates should be known also.*

(TJ is omitted here). * translation is from Tib.

(96,33,2-3) / 'dir smras pa / phung bo dang skye mched dang khams rnams ni (line-4) don dam par ngo bo nyid yod pa kho

na yin te / skye ba la sogs pa 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid ldan pa'i phyir ro / / 'di na gang yod pa ma yin pa de ni 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid dang ldan pa ma yin te / dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no (line-5) phung po dang skye mched dang khams rnams la ni 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid dang ldan pa yod de / dge slong dag gsum po 'di dag ni 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid yin te / 'di lta ste / skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig pa'o zhes gsungs pa'i (line-6) phyir ro / / de'i phyir 'dus byas phung po dang / skye mched dang khams rnams ni ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin no /

Here, [the opponent] objects:
In ultimate reality, skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus really have own-being[s]. For [they] are endowed with the triple marks of the conditioned [dharmas], i.e., arising, etc. Here, the thing which does not exist is not endowed with the mark of the conditioned [dharmas], like a flower in the sky. As for skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus, they are endowed with the mark of the conditioned [dharmas]. For it has been proclaimed by Bhagavat: O monks! These three are the mark[s] of the conditioned [dharmas], i.e., arising, abiding and perishing. For this reason, the conditioned skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus really have own-being[s].

naivotpādādayo yuktāḥ saṃskṛtatvena lakṣaṇaṃ /
saṃskṛtatvād hi(Ms.vi) lakṣyasya boddhyatvāc ca tad anyavat //71//

/ skye sogs 'dus byas nyid kyis ni /
/ mtshan nyid mtshan gzhi'i nyid mi rigs /
/ 'dus byas yin phyir rtogs bya'i phyir /
/ de las gzhan pa nyid bzhin no //71//

(71) "The arising, etc. are the essential property of the entity(=lakṣya-dhātus), for they [the arising, etc.] are the conditioned [dharmas]." is invalid. For they are conditioned and the object of understanding, just as other [lakṣya] than that (=arising).

(96,33,4-4) / zhes bya ba ni skye ba la sogs pa de dag ni 'dus byas nyid kyi mtshan nyid du gyur pas phung po la sogs pa mtshan gzhi'i mtshan nyid yin par mi rigs te / 'dus byas yin pa'i phyir dang (line-5) rtog par bya ba yin pa'i phyir skye ba la sogs pa mtshan nyid de las gzhan pa'i mtshan nyid bzhin no / / zhes bya bar bsams so / / de'i phyir

/ skar ma rab rib mar me dang /
/ sgyu ma zil pa chu bur dang /
/ rmi lam glog dang (line-6) sbrin lta bur /
/ 'dus byas de ltar blta bar bya / /

zhes gsungs pa de dag grub pa yin no / / gang dag dngos po rnams ni ngo bo yod pa kho na yin te / mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir ro / / mo gshan gyi bu la sogs pa yod pa ma yin (line-7) pa dag la ni mtshan nyid kyang med do zhes zer ba de dag kyang ma grub ste /

Thus:

Those arising, etc. are the marks of the state of being conditioned. Hence, to say laksya of laksana is invalid, because it is conditioned and it is to be understood, just as the other laksya than arising, etc.,---thus intended. For this reason, these declarations are established:[64]

As stars, a fault of vision, as a lamp,
A mock show, dew drops, or a bubble,
A dream, a lightning flash, or cloud,
So should one view what is conditioned.

As for the objective entities, there are indeed own-beings, because there are the mark[s]. For those non-entities like a son of a barren woman, there is no mark. This cannot be established.

nāpi lakṣaṇa-sadbhāvād bhāvānāṃ sātmatā matā /72a-b/

/ dngos rnams mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir /

/ ngo bo nyid yid mi 'dod /72a-b/

(72a-b) "[There are] the essences of the entities, for there are real properties [in them]" is also not maintained.

(96,33,4-7) / ces smras te / ngo bo nyid ces bya ba ni ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa nyid ces bya (line-8) ba'i tha tshig go /

Thus:

"An own-being"---it means to say the thing which is endowed with an own-being.

viruddho'pi hi hetuḥ syād asiddhārthāpi vā mataḥ //72c-d//

/ de phyir gtan tshigs don ma grub /

/ don 'gal nyid du'ang gyur-pa yin//72c-d//

(72c-d) Therefore, we maintain: [the meaning of <u>hetu</u>] is contradictory. Also, the meaning of <u>hetu</u> is not established.

(96,33,4-8) / zhes bya ba ni gang gi phyir dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du sngar bstan pa de'i phyir pha rol po dag gi gtan tshigs mtshan nyid dang ldan pa'i (96, 33,5-1) / phyir zhes bya ba de'i don dbu ma pa la ma grub ste / chos thams cad mtshan nyid med pa'i phyir ro / / gtan tshigs de'i don 'gal ba nyid du'ang gyur pa yin te sa la sogs pa ngo bo nyid med pa dag sgrub pa la (line-2) mtshan nyid yod par mthong ba'i phyir ro / / zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs kyi don 'gal ba nyid yin pa'i phyir ro /

Thus:

Previously, we have explained the absence of own-being of entities. Hence, the meaning of the <u>hetu</u> of the opponent, i.e., "because it is endowed with mark[s]," cannot be established for the Mādhyamika, because all the <u>dharmas</u> have no marks. Also, the meaning of <u>hetu</u> will become contradictory. For the meaning of the <u>hetu</u>, "because the existence of the mark can be seen" has a contradictory nature against the [established] thesis, " earth, etc. has no own-being."

(96,33,5-2) / ji ltar mtshan nyid med pa de ltar 'di bshad de /

[Next], we explain no-mark the way it is:

kāṭhinyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ mahyā na mahītvena yujyate /

kā[yavijñāna]-hetutvād agnitve (Ms. anyatve) lakṣaṇaṃ

kathaṃ //73//

/ sa yi* mtshan nyid sa nyid kyis /

/ sra ba nyid du mtshon mi rigs /

/ lus kyi nams shes rgyu yin phyir /

/ me nyid kyis ni mi rigs bzhin //73//

*TJ yi. MHK yis.

(73) "Solidity is the essential property of earth,[65]

for it is the nature of earth" is absurd.

For [the solidity] is the cause of the kāya-vijñāna.[66]

How could [anybody say] the property of [solidity is]

in the fireness?

(96,33,5-3) zhes bya ba ni gcig pa nyid 'gog ste / sa'i mtshan nyid ni sa nyid kyi sra ba nyid du mtshon par mi rigs te / lus kyi rnam par shes pa skye ba'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir dper (line-4) na me'i mtshan nyid me nyid kyis sra ba nyid du mtshon par mi rigs pa bzhin no / / sa nyid kyi zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar gyur pa'i mtshan nyid kyi ste / dper na ji ltar khyod kyis ril ba las slob mar ram / slob ma las mkhan por mthong (line-5) dam zhes ril ba thogs pa'i sgo nas slob ma yin par mtshon ba 'am / slob ma khrid pa'i sgo nas mkhan po yin par mtshon pa lta bu'o / / 'dir ni sa nyid kyis sa'i mtshan nyid de de ltar mtshon par mi rigs te / gal te gcig pa (line-6) nyid yin na sa nyid las

logs shig na gang gis mtshon par byed pa'i sra ba nyid ces bya ba ci yang med pa'i phyir ro /

Thus:

The oneness (ekatva) [of a part of pratijñā and hetu] is refuted. It is not valid to indicate the essential property (lakṣaṇa) of the earth by hardness, because it is the cause of arising of kāyavijñāna (bodily-knowledge). For example, it is as invalid as indicating the mark of fire as hardness by fireness(?) "by earthness (mahītvena)"---is the following [relationship] between the essential properties: for example, just as you notice a disciple by a water-vessel (kuṇḍika) or a preceptor from [his] disciple---simillar to indicating a disciple because he is holding a water-vessel or indicating a preceptor because he is instructing a disciple, in this case, the indication of earth by earthness is invalid. For if [lakṣaṇa and lakṣya] are identical, then apart from the earthness, so-called hardness, which is the indicator [of the earth], does not exist at all.

de bzhin du, Likewise,

/ glang gi mtshan nyid glang nyid kyis /
/ nog dang lkog shal sogs mi 'dod /
/ khyad par can gyi* blos brtag phyir /
/ dper na bong bu'i mtshan nyid bzhin //74//

*TJ gyis.

(74) "The essential properties of a cow are a lump, a dewlap, etc. for they are the characteristics of a cow".

is not maintained. For, [they are] cognized by a special understanding, just as the properties of a donkey.

(TJ is omitted here).

/ gcig na ji ltar mtshan nyid yin /
/ des ni de nyid mi mtshon phyir /
/ gzhan na ji ltar mtshan nyid yin /
/ gzhan gyi* gzhan nyid mi mtshon phyir //75//

*TJ gyi. MHK gyis.

(75) If [lakṣya and lakṣaṇa] are identical, then how could it be the property of [that entity]? For a different property does not indicate the other entity,

[just as a hump does not indicate a horse].

(96,34,2-3) / dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba / bam po lnga pa / 'dir smras / phung po dang khams dang skye mched dag ni don dam par (line-4) mtshan nyid yod pa kho na yin te / de'i yul tha snyad khyad par can gyi bya ba yod pa'i phyir ro / / 'di na gang mtshan nyid med pa la ni de'i yul la tha snyad khyad par can gyi bya ba mi skye ste / dper na mog sham gyi bu la 'gro ba med pa (line-5) bzhin no / lhas byin la ni de'i yul la 'gro po zhes bya ba sogs pa'i tha snyad khyad par can gyi bya ba yod pas de'i phyir dngos po rnams la mtshan nyid yod pa kho na 'o

The Mádhyamakahṛdaya-vṛtti-Tarkajvālā, section five.

Here, the opponent objects:

As for skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, there are certainly the essential properties. For there is a function of a particular conventional expression (vyavahāra) for that object-sphere. Here, for the thing which has no essential property, there would not arise a function of a particular conventional expression. For example, as for a child of a barren woman, 'going' does not arise. [However], as for Devadatta, there is a function of a particular conventional expression, i.e., 'goer' etc. in that object-sphere. Hence, there are certainly the essential properties in the objective entities.

(96,34,2-5) zhe na / 'dir bshad pa / gal te ma brtags na grags pas (line-6) 'jig rten gyi dbang du 'gro ba la sogs pa'i tha snyad yod par 'dod na ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin no / / 'on te rnal 'byor pa mnyam par bzhag pa shes rab kyi dngos po'i ngo bo nyid ji lta ba bzhin du rnam par dpyod pa dag la don dam par (line-7) 'gro ba la sogs par yod par 'dod na ni gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid de / 'di ltar don dam par de'i yul la gtan tshigs khyad par can gyi tha snyad yod par mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro / / ji ltar zhe na / gal te 'gro ba don dam par (line-8) yod par gyur na de song ba 'am ma song ba 'am bsgom pa'i lam la yod par 'gyur grang ste / de la re zhig bye grag tu smra ba dang / bye brag pa dag ma song ba la 'gro ba yod par 'dod pa de dag dgag pa'i phyir bshad pa /

If so, then we reply.

If you maintain that there is a conventional expression [like] being-passed (gamana), etc. according to a well-known fact of the world, without examination, then you [are committing the fallacy of] proving the things which are already being proven.[67] On the other hand, if you maintain that there is being-passed, etc. in ultimate reality, for the yogins who are in concentration (samāhita) and who have seen through the own-being of the entities as they really are, then the meaning of hetu cannot be established. For it is not proved that a particular hetu, a conventional expression, exists in that object-sphere in ultimate reality. For what reason? For if there is 'being-passed' in ultimate reality, then it is in the process of 'gone', 'ungone' and 'going'. Among them, the Vaibhāṣika and the Vaiśeṣika maintain that there is 'going' in 'ungone.'

In order to refute, we say:

agate paramārthena na gatiḥ sampratīyate /
adhvatvād (Ms. arthatvād) gamy-abhāvād vā tad-anyāsmin yathāgatai(ḥ) //76//
/ ma song ba la don dam du /
/ 'gro ba yod par mi 'dod de /
/ lam yin phyir dang 'gro med phyir /
/ dper na ma 'ongs lam bzhin no //76//

(76) " There is going in the ungone " cannot be accepted from the [viewpoint of] ultimate reality, for it is

a process or for there is no going, just as not yet gone to (agatam).

(96,34,3-1) / zhes bya ba ni 'gro ba'i bya ba mngon par ma grub bo / / zhes bya ba'i tshig gi lhag ma'o /

Thus:

There are some remaining (=unexpressed) words, i.e., the act of going cannot be (re)produced (abhinivṛtta).

(The remainder of TJ is omitted here).

(96,34,3-3) 'dir smras pa / ma song ba la ni 'gro ba med de der 'gro ba'i bya ba ma zhugs pa'i phyir ro / / song ba la yang 'gro ba med de / 'gro ba'i bya ba zhig pa'i phyir ro / bgom pa la ni rkang ba gnyis 'jog pa dang / 'degs pa'i (line-4) mtshan nyid kyi bya ba 'jug pa'i phyir de la ni 'gro ba yod pa kho na yin no zhe na /

Thus:

Here, the opponent objects: There is no going in the ungone. For the act of going does not commence there. There is no going in going either. For the act of going has finished [there]. [However], there is certainly going in the actual movement, because in the actual movement, there is commencement of the action, which has the characteristic of lifting and putting down of both feet [alternately].

'dir bshad pa, Here, we rejoined,

gatāgata-vinirmukta-gamyamānānirūpaṇāt /

na gamyamāne gamanaṃ jāyate paramārthataḥ //77//

/ bgom la don dam nyid du na /

/ 'gro ba yod pa ma yin te /

/ song dang ma song ma gtogs par* /

/ bgom pa rtog tu med phyir ro //77//

*TJ has no par.

(77) In ultimate reality, going does not take place in the actual movement, because apart from gone and ungone, the actual movement is not in sight.

(96,34,3-4) / zhes bya ba 'di (line-5) la bgom pa zhes bya ba de ni song ba 'am ma song ba 'am / gang cung zad ni ma song ba zhig yin grang na / / gnyi ga'i don yan bstan zin to / / 'on te gnyi ga'i bdag nyid kyi bgom pa zhig yod par 'dod na / de la yang gang nas rkang pa (line-6) btegs pa de ni song ba yin la / gang du rkang pa 'jog pa de ni ma song ba yin pas de gnyis las ma gtogs pa'i gsum pa gang bgom pa zhes bya bar gyur pa de ni ci yang med pas de'i phyir bsgom pa la yang 'gro ba yod pa mi 'thad (line-7) do / / ci ste bgom pa zhes bya ba ni brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ste / de ni song ba nyid dam ma song ba nyid du tha snyad gdags par mi nus pa nyid yin no zhe na /

Thus:

"Actual movement"---it is either gone or ungone or a-bit-ungone. If it is so, then the meaning of both (gone and ungone) is already shown. On the other hand, if we suppose the existence of some actual movement which has the own-being of both (gone and ungone), then, in this case also, [the

act of] lifting a foot from a given place is already gone and [the following act of] putting down of a foot is ungone. Hence, the third thing, other than these two and to be termed the actual movement, does not exist at all. For this reason, it is not proved that there is going in the actual movement. One might say: The actual movement cannot be expressed, that is, it cannot be expressed in terms of either gone-ness or ungone-ness.

gatāgatatvāvācye'*pi gamyamāne gatir na ca /
adhvatvāt tadyathātīte yathā vānāgate'*dhvāni //78//
*Ms. no avagraha.

/ bgom pa song dang ma song bar/
/ brjod pa* min la'ng 'gro med de /
/ lam yin phyir na 'das pa bzhin /
/ yang na ma 'ongs lam bzhin no //78//
*TJ par.

(78) There is no going, also in the actual movement which is inexpressible [in terms of] gone-ness and ungone-ness, because it is a process, just as being passed. Or, just as in a process in future.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,34,4-1) / 'dir smras pa / 'gro ba ni yod pa kho na yin te / des de dang ldan pa'i tha snyad yod pa'i phyir ro / / 'di na gang (line-2) yod pa ma yin pa de la ni des de dang ldan pa'i tha snyad med de / ri bong gi rva can zhes bya ba'i tha snyad med pa zhin no / / 'gro ba yod pa la ni des de

dang ldan pa'i tha snyad yod de / dper na tsai tra 'gro'o zhes bya ba lta bu'o / / de'i phyir 'gro ba (line-3) yod pa kho na yin no

Here, an opponent objects:

Going is certainly existent. For there is a conventional expression [i.e., goer] which possesses that (going) by that. Here, as for the absence [of goer], there is no conventional expression which possesses that [going], just as the absence of the conventional expression, i.e., hare's horn. As for the thing which has going, the conventional expression which has that (going) exists. For example,--- "Caitra goes." For this reason, there is certainly going. (96,34,4-3) zhe na / 'dir bshad pa tsai tra 'gro'o zhes bya ba'i tha snyad gang yin pa de yang dag par na 'gro ba po 'am / 'gro ba po ma yin pa zhig la brtag grang na / de la re zhig.

If so, then here we rejoin:

That conventional expression "Caitra goes" is understood whether there is a goer or there is not a goer in ultimate reality. If it is so, then also:

gatyasiddher na gantā'sti na (Ms.nā) gati(r gaccha)-
tiṣyate /79a-b/

/ 'gro ma grub phyir 'gro po med /
/ de phyir de ni 'gro mi 'dod /79a-b/

(79a-b) Since going is not established, goer does not exist, Therefore, " he goes" is not maintained.

(96,34,4-4) / ces bya ba ni gang gi tshe song ba dang ma song ba dang / bgom pa'i lam dag la 'gro ba rnam pa thams cad du ma grub pa'i phyir / 'gro ba yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe 'gro ba po yang med bzhin du / ji ltar 'gro ba yod pa zhig (line-5) gang du 'gro na tsai tra 'gro ba po zhes bya ba'i tha snyad du 'gyur gal te de 'gro ba po'i ngo bo nyid yin par gyur na ni de nam yang 'gro ba'i bya ba dang bral bar mi 'gyur ro / / de'i phyir 'gro ba po de ni 'gro bar mi 'dod do / / kha cig 'gro ba po ma yin par (line-6) bya ba'i shugs kyis 'gro bar 'dod pa de dag la yang /

Thus:

When there is no going, since going is not established in the process of gone, ungone and the actual movement in all aspects, then goer is non-existent also. Then, how could there be going? Where would [he] go in order to have that conventional expression, i.e., Caitra the goer. If he is the own-being of a goer, then he would not depart from the act of going. For this reason, we do not maintain, "that goer goes." Some maintain: although he is a non-goer, he goes by the power of the act [of going]. Against those also:

agantur na gatir yuktā gaty ayogād yathā purā //79c-d//

/ 'gro po min par 'gro mi rigs /

/ 'gro dang bral phyir sngon bzhin no //79c-d//

(79c-d) Going of non-goer is invalid, for it is disjoined from going, just as the foregoing.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,34,5-3) bya brag pa dag gis smras pa / gang 'gro ba'i bya ba ma skyes pas mi (line-4) 'gro bar ni rigs so / / 'gro ba'i bya ba skyes pa ni 'gro bar 'gyur te / gang gi phyir rdzas las gzhan pa'i 'gro ba yod pas de dang ldan pa'i phyir 'gro ba po'i ngo bo nyid ma yin yang 'gro ba kho nar 'gyūr te rang gi bdag nyid (line-5) las gzhan pa'i 'gro ba'i dngos po dang 'brel pa'i yul las lhas byin 'gro ba dang ldan no zhes bya ba'i blo 'byung ste / blo dang sgra rjes su 'jug pa'i phyir dper na lhas byin dbyug pa dang ldan no zhes bya ba'i blo 'byung ba lta bu'o (line-6) zhes smra bar nus so /

The Vaiśeṣika objects: " the thing in which the act of going is unborn, does not go" is valid. [Because, when] the act of going is born, it goes, for there is going which is other than dravya. Hence, although the own-being of going is inexistent, there is certainly going, because that [category of going] is there. In the gocara, which is apart from that entity itself, there is the real [action] of going. Thence, the following understanding arises. Devadatta has the act of going. For the expression and understanding tally (anvaya). For example, we can say, "Devadatta has a stick."

zhe na 'dir bshad pa. If so, then we refute:

svato'*rthāntara-sambandhe gantetīyaṃ matir matā/
daṇdivan nānvayābhāvād buddhi-śabdānuvṛttitaḥ //80//

*Ms. no avagraha.

/ rang las gzhan pa'i don 'brel la* /
/ 'gro po snyam pa'i blo 'di 'dod /
/ blo dang sgra rjes 'jug pa'i phyir /
/ dbyug can bzhin min rjes 'gro med //80//

*TJ pa.

(80) [The Vaiśeṣikas say:] We maintain [the reality of] that perception of a goer in the connection with an object other than himself.

For the understanding and the expression tally. For example, a person who holds a stick. [We say:] It is not so, because there is no logical connection (anvaya) between them. [for, in ultimate reality, the person and a stick do not have the own-beings; hence, there is no connection].

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,35,1-5) / rang gi sde pa kha cig na re .....(line-6) 'gro ba zhes-bya ba 'gro ba po las don tha dad par gyur ba ni med de / skye ba'i phyogs nyid du skye ba po zhig pa'i phyir me la sogs pa'i rgyun (line-7) bzhin pas 'gro ba ni 'khrul pa yin no zhes zer ba de dag la yang kho bo cag ni don dam par 'gro ba zhes bya ba med pa dang / kun rdzob tu ni de 'dod pa kho na yin par bstan pa'i phyir /

[Some] of our own school maintain:[68] the 'going' is not a separate entity from the 'goer.' For the thing which has risen perishes at that very spot, just as the continuation of a wheel of fire (alātacakra). Hence, 'going' is

illusory (bhrānta). Against them, we say: the 'going' does not exist in ultimate reality, but exists in conventional reality. In order to show this:

nirantaradig-uptādi saṃskāra-prasarāśrayā(ḥ)/
jvālādivad gatibhrāntiḥ sāṃ(vṛ)ti sā na tat(t)vataḥ
//81//

/ rgyun chags yul gzhan 'byung ba yi /
/ 'du byed rgyun la brten nas ni /
/ me la sogs bzhin 'khrul ba'i 'gro /
/ de yang kun rdzob de nyid min //81//

(81) The bases of the going-forwards of conditioned things , having the spread of the continuous points, are just as [a wheel] of fire,etc. That rolling motion [of a fire-wheel] exists only conventionally, but not in ultimate reality.

(TJ is omitted here).

adravyatvāt kalāpasya nirīhatvād athāpi vā /
na gantrya(ḥ) kalpanā nyāyyā(ḥ) kāpilaiḥ paramārthataḥ
//82//

/ ser skya pa yis rnam brtags pa'i /
/ 'gro po don dam nyid mi rigs /
/ tshogs pa rdzas su med phyir dang /
/ yang na gyo ba med phyir ro //82//

(82) Goers, imagined by the followers of Kapila, are improper from the viewpoint of ultimate reality, because the conglomerated thing has no real entity and also it is

devoid of the nature of inward striving.

(96,35,2-2) zhes bya ba smras so / / gal te ser skya pa dag na re / gang dag la tshogs pa rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa de (line-3) dag la ni skyon der 'gyur gyi / kho bo cag ni tshogs pa can rdzas su yod pa kho nar 'dod de byed pa tshogs pa'i yang lag rnams ma bzung na bya ba tshogs pa can yang gzung du med pa'i phyir tshogs pa'i yang lag gi bdag nyid (line-4) bzhin no / / zhes zer ba de dag gi 'di ltar gsal bar bya ste /

Thus:

If the followers of Kapila (=Sāṃkhya) say: Here, the fallacy shall arise to those who maintain that the conglomerated entity does not exist substantially. However, [it does not apply to us], because we maintain that the conglomerated entity certainly exists substantially. For, when the cause, which is the ancillaries of the conglomeration is not grasped, then the effect, which is the possessor of the conglomeration, is not grasped. For this reason [the conglomerated thing] is just as the ātman of the ancillary---thus, they say.

We clarify this point as follows:

dravyasa(t) samudāyas cet samudāyyāgraho'*grahāt /

tad-ātmavad ayuktaṃ tat teṣām adravya-sat(t)vataḥ //83//

*Ms.°ya grahe gra.

/ gal te tshogs pa rdzas yod de /

/ tshogs byed ma gzung gzung* med phyir /

*TJ bzung bzung.

/ de yi bdag bzhin de mi rigs /

/ de dag rdzas su med phyir ro //83//

(83) If [the Sāṃkhyas] say: the conglomerated entity is real, for it is not grasped, when [the funtion of] the conglomerated is not grasped. [Hence, the conglomerated entity is real] just as the own-nature. [We say:] this is invalid, because of their unreal existence.

(TJ is omitted here).

śeṣa-kriyā niṣedho'pi* dig-eṣā** pratipāditā /84a-b/

*Ms.°epi. **Ms.°śeṣā.

/ bya ba lhag ma dgag pa yang /

/ phyogs des rab tu bstan pa yin /84a-b/

(84a-b) This way of explanation is also the refutations of the remaining actions [i.e., speaking, eating, etc.].

(96,35,2-5) / ji ltar (line-7) zhe na / 'di na lhas byin smra'o zhes bya ba de yang smras pa smra 'am / 'on te ma smras pa smra grang na / re zhig smras pa la ni smra ba med de / tshig gi bya ba 'das pa'i phyir ro / / ma smras pa la yang smra ba med de tshig gi bya ba ma shugs (line-8) pa'i phyir ro / / smra bzhin pa yang smra ba med de / smras pa dang ma smras pa ma gtogs par smra bzhin pa med pa'i phyir ro / / de bzhin du ji ltar smra ba po smra 'am smra ba po ma yin pa smra grang na de la smra ba po gang smra bar 'gyur ba (96,35,3-1) / ni med de / rnam pa thams cad du smra ba med pa'i phyir ro / / smra ba po ma yin pa la yang smra ba med smra ba dang mi ldan pa'i phyir

ro / / de gnyis las gzhan pa'i smra ba po ni mi 'thad de / sngon dang phyi ma dag la (line-2) de'i ngo bo nyid med pa bzhin pas de'i phyir su zhig smra bar 'gyur / de bzhin du smra ba po dang smra ba gcig gam thad da pa gcig yin grang na / gnyi ga yang skyon du 'gyur ro / / de bzhin du za ba po za bar byed pa dang / byed pa po las byed pa dang / gcod pa po gcod pa dang blta ba po blta ba la sogs pa dag kyang 'gro ba dang 'gro ba po bkag pa bzhin du dpyad pa dang dgag pa 'dra bar bya'o /

One might ask how. In the case of "Devadatta speaks", this [case] also either he speaks what he has spoken or he speaks what he has not spoken. If it is the case of "he speaks what he has spoken," then he has nothing to speak about, since the act of speaking already being passed. [If it is the case] of, "he speaks what he has not spoken," then, here also there is no speech, since the act of speaking has not commenced yet. [In the case of] the actual speaking also, there is no speech, because apart from what being spoken and not being spoken, there is no actual speaking. Likewise, there is either a speaker who speaks, or a non-speaker who speaks. Among them, no speaker ever speaks, because speaking does not exist in all aspects. Also as for a non-speaker, there is no speech, because he is not endowed with speaking. There cannot be [the third] speaker other than these two, because there is no own-being either prior to or posterior to it. Hence, nobody speaks.

Likewise, whether [one holds] the identity or the diversity between a speaker and speaking, both will be false. Likewise, the examination and the refutation of "a eater eats","a performer performs","a cutter cuts", and"a viewer sees ",etc., should be done as in the case of going and the goer.

(96,35,3-3) / de'i phyir lung las / rab 'byor chos thams cad ni 'ong (line-4) ba dang 'gro ba med pa ste / de dag ni gnas de las mi 'da'o zhes gsungs pa dang / de bzhin du 'di la 'ong med 'gro ba 'ga' yang med / / chos rnams thams cad nam mkha' ji bzhin no / zhes gsungs pa dang de bzhin (line-5) du chos thams cad ni blun pa dang / sems med ba dang / bya ba med pa dang rtsva dang shing dang rtsig pa lta bu'o / / zhes gsungs pa la sogs pa de dag grub pa yin no /

Therefore, [the following] is declared in a scripture: Subhūti! As for all the dharmas, there is neither going nor coming, and neither do they abide. Likewise, it is declared: there is neither coming nor going at all, just as space. It is also declared: all the dharmas are silent, no-thought, actionless like grass, tree and wall.

(96,35,3-5) / 'dir smras pa / nang gi dngos po rnams ni don dam par (line-6) ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin te / de dag la bcings pa dang thar pa yod pa'i phyir ro / / yod pa ma yin pa la ni de dag med de mo gshan gyi bu la* bcings pa dang thar pa dag med pa bzhin no / / nang gi dngos po rnams

*P. las.

la ni (line-7) bcings pa dang thar pa dag yod de / gang gi phyir zhe na / bcom ldan 'das kyis /

/ dam chos rnam par mi shes pa'i /

/ byis pa la ni 'khor ba ring /

/ zhes gsungs pa dang / de bzhin du 'khor ba'i btson ra nas yang dag par (line-8) zlog(?)* pa'i phyir 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad pa bstan to / / zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro

*P. bzla ba.

Here, an opponent objects:[69]

As for the subjective entities (ādhyātmika-bhāvāḥ), there is certainly the own-being in ultimate reality, since there are bondage and emancipation in them. As for the inexistent thing, none of these exist, just like inexistence of bondage and emancipation for a child of a barren woman. There are bondage and emancipation for the subjective entities. For what reason? Bhagavat proclaimed [in the Dhammapada]:

For the foolish people, who do not know the true dharma, saṃsāra is long.

Likewise;;the Eightfold Path has been preached in order to turn away from the prison of saṃsāra.

zhe na / 'dir bshad pa / If so, we reply:

saṃsāra-mokṣa-sadbhāvād iṣṭā cet sā svabhāvatā /84c-d/

yathā vikalpitaṃ rūpaṃ yadaiṣāṃ nāvadhāryate /

tadā nirūpya rūpāṇāṃ bandha-mokṣau kutaḥ kathaṃ //85//

/ gal te dngos nyid yod 'dod de /

/ 'khor dang thar pa yod phyir na /84c-d/

/ gang tshe ji ltar rnam brtags pas* /

/ de dag rang bzhin rnam dbyad na /

/nges bzung** med pa de'i tshe /

/ ji ltar bcings shing gang nas thar //85//

*TJ pa. MHK pas. **TJ gzung. MHK bzung.

(84c-d,85) If [someone says] that own-beingness is maintained, for a bondage and an emancipation are real, then [we say]: when that imagined nature is not attested, then where and how are bondage and emancipation to be seen?

(96,35,4-1) / gang gi tshe mtshan nyid byed pa dag gis ji ltar rnam par brtags pa'i nang gi dngos bo de dag gi rang bzhin rnam par bzhag pa (line-2) ji skad bstan pa'i rim pas rnam par dbyad pa na / nges par gzung du med pa de'i tshe na gang zhig de ltar bcings shing gang nas thar par 'gyur te / de'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do / / ci bcings pa dang thar pa dag (line-3) mi 'thad pa kho na yin nam

When the establishment of the own-being of these subjective entities, which are imagined by the Vaiśeṣika and the Sautrāntika (=the lakṣaṇa-kārin), are not verified in the way they claim, then what will be bound and whence might mokṣa [be attained]? For this reason, [your] meaning of hetu is unestablished. Are bondage and emancipation not acceptable at all?

žhe na de'i phyir. If you ask, then:

yujyate ni[ḥ]svabhāveṣu māyā-svapnopameṣu(tu) /
svahetu-pratyaya-vaśād viśiṣṭesv ātma-lābhīṣu //86//
/ ngo bo nyid yod ma yin pa /
/ sgyu ma rmi lam lta bu dang /
/ rang gi rgyu dang rkyen dbang las /
/ bdag nyid khyad par 'thob la 'thad //86//

(86) It is valid [to those who maintain]: the conditioned things do not have own-being, just as māyā and a dream. [However], they do acquire a special own-nature, by the force of own-cause and conditions.

(96,35,4-3) / ces bya ba smras te / gang dag la 'du byed rnams (line-4) ngo bo nyid yod pa de dag ni sngar dpyad pa'i gtan tshigs dag gis phyir bcings pa dang thar pa dag mi 'thad do / / 'du byed rnams ngo bo nyid yod pa ma yin pa sgyu ma dang smig rgyu lta bu rang gi rgyu dang rkyen gyis dbang las skad cig ma (line-5) snga ma dang mtshan nyid mi 'dra ba'i rang gi bdag nyid kyi khyad par thob pa dag la ni bcings pa dang thar pa dag 'thad do /

Thus:

To those who [maintain],"conditioned things have own-being, bondage and emancipation [from it]"is invalid by several reasons which have been previously examined.

[However], bondage and emancipation are valid to those who [maintain the following]:

[1] conditioned things do not have own-being, but do acquire a special own-nature (svātman).

[2] [The own-nature] has a different essential property (lakṣaṇa) from the foregoing moment by the force of [the combination of] own cause and conditions, just as māyā and a mirage.

(96,35,4-5) / ji ltar zhe na / 'di na 'du byed kyi tshogs thog ma med pa'i dus nas* zhugs pa bdag dang bdag gir 'dzin pa'i (line-6) 'dzin khris brin pa 'dod chags la sogs pa nyon mongs pa'i lcags sgrog gis bcings pa las yang dag pa'i shes pa bskyed pas bcing ba mtha' dag bkrol shing 'khor ba'i btson ra nas yang dag par 'das pa'i thar pa (line-7) zhes bya ba tha snyad du gtogs pa'i shes rab kyi[s] tha snyad gdags pa 'thad do / / don dam par ni ma yin te / de ltar yang ji skad du / de bzhin gshegs pas 'khor ba ldog par mdzad kyang der 'ga' yang 'khor ba med la / de bzhin (line-8) gshegs pas mya ngan las 'das pa ston par mdzad kyang der 'gal yang mya ngan las 'das pa med do / / zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o /

*P. na.

For what reason? It is valid to postulate [the state of affairs] named emancipation by prajñā which belongs to conventional expression. That is: [the state of] going beyond (samatikrānta) from the prison of saṃsāra, by having untied all the bondages through correct knowledge (samyag-jñāna). 70
For what reason? For it is valid to postulate [the state of affairs] named mokṣa by prajñā which belongs to conventional expression. That is: the conglomeration of the

conditioned things began from time immemorial; [we are] seized by a graha (a large marine animal) or 'I' and 'mine'; chained by the iron chains of greed, etc. Emancipation is the way out (samatikrānta) from the prison of bondage, after having untied all the bondage by [the power] of correct knowledge (samyag-jñāna). However, they do not exist in ultimate reality. This is also declared in the āgama:[71]

Although saṃsāra is being postulated, [in ultimate reality], saṃsāra does not exist at all. Although nirvāṇa is being demonstrated by Tathāgata, nobody attains nirvāṇa there at all.

(96,35,4-8) / rang gi sde pa kha cig na re / rgyu dang rkyen gcig nas gcig du brgyud pa'i rgyun 'brel pa'i ming (96,35,5-1) / dang gzugs 'dod chags la sogs pa dang lhan cig skyed pa thar pa'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs dang ldan pa ni bcings pa zhes bya la / bcings pa la dam pa'i chos mnyan pa dang tshul bzhin yid la byed pa las (line-2) byung ba'i yang dag pa'i shes pa'i sgron ma mi shes pa'i mun pa dang bral ba skyes pas 'dod chags la sogs pa'i 'ching ba las grol ba ni thar pa zhes bya ba'o / zhes zer ba de dag gi phyir bshad pa /

Some of our own school[72] [claim] regarding name and form:

[1] Arising constantly one after another.

[2] Arising simultaneously with greed, etc.

[3] The counterstate of mokṣa is called bondage.

On the other hand, freedom (mukti) from bondage of greed, etc.,against bondage, expelling darkness by generating the light of samyag-jñāna which is born from

listening and correct attention (yoniśo-manasikāra) of the true dharma is called mokṣa. In order to refute them:

nāma-rūpasya saṃ[Ms.°n]sāro na yuktaḥ paramārthataḥ /
saṃskṛtatvāt pṛthivyādir yathā bāhyasya neṣyate //87//
/ ming-dang gzugs ni don dam du /
/ 'khor bar rigs pa ma yin te /
/ 'dus byas yin phyir phyi rol gyi /
/ sa la sogs pa mi 'dod bzhin //87//

(87) "Saṃsāra of name and form" is invalid from the viewpoint of ultimate reality. For it is the state of the conditioned, just as [saṃsāra] of the external earth, etc. is not maintained.

(96,35,5-3) / zhes bya ba la ming ni phung po gzugs can ma yin pa bzhi po dag go / / gzugs ni lus dang dbang po zhes bya ba'i (line-4) tshogs so / / de ni don dam par na 'khor ba 'byung zhing 'gro ba dang kun tu 'gro bar mi rigs te / rgyu dang rkyen dag gis mngon par 'dus byas pa'i phyir / / dper na phyi rol gyi sa la sogs pa dag 'dus byas yin pa'i phyir 'khor (line-5) bar mi 'dod pa bzhin no / / de thar pa yang mi 'thad de /

Thus:

"name"---the four skandhas which are immaterial skandhas. "Form"---the conglomeration of so-called body and organ. If it is from the viewpoint of ultimate reality, it is invalid to [maintain their] saṃsāra, i.e., arising, going

and conglomerating. For it is produced from cause and condition[s]. For example, just as the external earth, etc. cannot be accepted as [the agents of] samsāra, because they are produced. It is also invalid [to speak of their] mokṣa.

ji ltar zhe na. For what reason?

na mucyate nāma-rūpaṃ kathaṃcit paramārthataḥ /
utpatti-matvān naśād vā yathā bāhya-jalādikaṃ //88//

/ ming gzugs don dam nyid du na /
/ ji ltar yang ni thar mi 'gyur /
/ skye dang ldan phyir 'jig pa'i phyir /
/ phyi rol chu la sogs pa bzhin //88//

(88) In ultimate reality, name and form cannot be emancipated in any way, because they have arisen, similarly [its] destruction, just as the external water, etc.

(96,35,5-5) / zhes bya ba ni 'di (line-6) la de'i rgyun thar par brtag gam skad cig ma thar par brtag grang na / de la re zhig rgyun ni rjes su yod pa ma yin pa nyid kyis chu'i rlabs 'byung ba dang 'gag pa bzhin la skad cig ma yang bcings pa ni bchings pa'i dus nyid du (line-7) zhig pa'i phyir dang / dus phyi mar 'byung ba yang bcings bzhin kho nar 'byung ba'i phyir thar par ga la 'gyur ste / de ltar re zhig ming dang gzugs la bcings pa dang thar pa dag mi 'thad do /

Thus:

Here, which are we to understand—the continuation of what is emancipated or momentary [state of what] is emancipated? If it is in the case of continuation, [it is impossible], because it has no real entity, just as the rising and perishing of waves. If it is in the case of a momentary [state], then it is also [impossible], because bondage disappears at the very moment of bondage, and what arises later will be bound, where might emancipation be? In this way, it is also invalid [to maintain] bondage and emancipation of nāma and rūpa.

(96,35,5-7) / gnas ma bu'i sde pa dag ni phung po (line-8) dang skye mched dang khams rnams las gzhan pa'i gang zag 'khor ba dang / thar pa 'dod pas de dgag pa'i phyir bshad pa /

The Vatsīputrīyas maintain:[73]

Pudgala, which is different from skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus, transmigrates and is emancipated. For the refutation of this:

na pudgalaḥ saṃsārati mucyate naiva tat[t]vataḥ /
prajñapyatvād yathā veśma vācyatvād vāpi gandhavat //89//

/ gang zag yang dag nyid du ni /
/ 'khor dang thar par mi 'gyur te /
/ gdags bya yin phyir khang pa bzhin /
/ brjod bya yin phyir ri dang 'dra //89//

(89) In reality, pudgala does not transmigrate nor be

emancipated, because it is postulated, just as a house; because it is expressible, just as perfume.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,36,1-3) yang na gang zag de ni yod pa nyid ma yin te / gzugs su rung ba dang myong ba dang mtshan mar 'dzin pa dang mngon par 'du byed pa dang / rnam par shes par byed pa dag las gshan pa'i mtshan nyid dmigs (line-4) su med pa'i phyir / nam mkha'i me tog bshin pas / de'i phyir bshad pa /

Moreover, pudgala is inexistent [in ultimate reality], since the essential property other than molesting (rūpaṇa), experiencing (anubhūti), esteem (citri-kāra), together-making (abhi-saṃskāra), perceiving (vijñānana), just as the flower in the sky. For this reason we state:

niṣpudgalā vā saṃskārā hetumatvād yathā ghaṭaḥ /
utpattimatvān nāśitvā(d) jñeyatvād vāpi loṣṭavat //90//

/ yang na gang zag gang zag min /
/ rgyu dang ldan phyir bum pa bzhin /
/ skye dang ldan phyir 'jig pa'i phyir /
/ shes bya yin phyir bong ba bzhin //90//

(90) Or, the formative forces have no-personality, since they have a cause, just as a jar; by reason of having arisen; because of its destruction; or it is knowable, just as a clod of clay.

(96,36,1-5) zhes bya ba ni 'di la gang zag de phung po la sogs pa las gzhan zhig yin nam / gzhan ma yin pa zhig yin

grang na / gal te gzhan yin grang na ni mtshan nyid med par 'gyur ro / / gzhan ma yin na ni phung po la sogs pa (line-6) zhig pa na gang zag kyang 'jig pa'i skyon du 'gyur ro / / ci ste gang zag de gcig pa nyid dang tha dang ba nyid du brjod par bya ba nyid kyang ma yin la / rdzas su yang yod par 'dod do zhe na / de lta yang mi rigs te /

Here, do you maintain that pudgala is other than the skandhas, etc.or otherwise? If you maintain that it is other than the [skandhas], then the essential property [of pudgala] becomes nil. [However,] if they are identical, then the following difficulty will arise: when the skandhas,etc. are destroyed, then that pudgala also will be destroyed. If one maintains however :[74]that although pudgala is inexpressible [in terms of] either identical or diversity, there is a real entity [in pudgala] ,it is still not valid:

dravya-sattā[cāvā]cyatvā(d) gandhavat pudgalo'mataḥ /
śyāma-gau(tamā)vācyo bandhyā-putreṇa saṃśayāt//91//

/ gang zag brjod du med phyir bas /
/ rdzas su yod par mi 'grub ste /
/ dri dang dkar sngor brjod med pa'i /
/ mo gsham bus ni ma nges 'gyur //91//

(91) "[Although it cannot be pointed out exactly, nevertheless], pudgala is real, although it is undescribable" is untenable, since [the hetu] is uncertain, for it can either[indescribable but real] like [the best] perfume

or [indescribable and unreal] like [the colour of] a
a barren woman's child, whether it is white or blue.

evaṃ nirātmakāḥ skandhā nirjīvās sat(t)vā(Ms. a)
'varttitāḥ /92a-b/

/ de ltar phung po bdag med cing /
/ srog med sems can yod min pa /
/ mkhas pas gzu bo'i blo dag gis /
/ ci rigs par ni shes par bya //92//

(92) Thus, the skandhas are devoid of self-nature and lives and sentient beings are inexistent [in the skandhas]. The wise should understand [that] properly, with straightforward intelligence.

(96,36,2-2) [illegible] / zhes bya (line-3) bar bsams so / / de la bdag ces bya ba ni grangs can dang byē brag pa dag gi gzhung las rgyun du 'gro ba 'am / 'byung po thams cad kyis brtag par bya ba yin pa'i phyir bdag ces bya'o / / srog ces bya ba ni gcer bu pa dag (line-4) gis gzhung las 'tsho ba'i don gyis srog ce'o / / sems can zhes bya ba ni rgol ba thams cad kyi gzung las yod pa'i dngos po ni sems can no zhes 'am / 'gro ba rnams su sbyor ba ni sems can no zhe'o / / gang zag ces bya ba ni (line-5) gnas ma bu'i sde pa dag gi gzhung las yang 'gro ba len pa'i phyir gang zag ce'o / According to the basic texts of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, ātmaka is herein considered because of the examination of [its own nature, i.e.,] as either "perpetual mover" or "all beings (sarvabhūta)." "Jīva" ---here refers to life, because it means 'living' according to the basic

text of the Nirgrantha. " Sattva" refers to either "existing real entity" or " entring several destinies," according to the basic text(s) of all opponents.

(96,36,2-5) bdag bkag pa bzhin du srog dang gang zag dgag pa yang 'dra bar mthong nas

Having also seen the refutation of the [own-being] of jīva and pudgala in the similar manner of refuting ātman:

> śarīrendriya-saṃghā+o nirātmaka [ca]* tattvato mataḥ /
> hetumatvād yathā stambhaḥ pracayād vāpi nāku-vat //93//
> *Ms. ca hypermeter.
> / lus dang dbang po'i tshogs rnams la /
> / de nyid du na bdag med 'dod /
> / rgyu dang ldan phyir ka ba bzhin /
> / yang na bsags phyir grog mkhar bzhin //93//

(93) In [ultimate] reality, the congregation of body and organ has no own-self---thus maintained, for it has a cause, just as a pillar; or it is accumulated, just as an ant-hill.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,36,2-7) / mu stegs can dag na re bdag ni yod pa kho na yin te / dran pa dang ngo shes pa dang / shes pa skye ba la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs dag gis lus dang dbang po'i tshigs dag ni bdag dang bcas pa yin no / (line-8) bum pa dang snam bu la sogs bdag med pa dag la ni dran pa dang ngo shes pa skye ba ma mthong ba de'i phyir dran pa la sogs pa dag ni bdag gi chos yin pa'i phyir / des na bdag yod pa kho nar

rjes su dpag go zhes zer ro / / 'dir (96,36,3-1) bshad pa /
The outsiders (Tīrthika) say:[75] self is certainly existent. The congregations of body and organ are endowed with ātman, by reason of generation of remembrance (smṛti), recollection (pratyabhijñā), and knowledge (jñāna) etc. As for the thing which has no ātman [like] a jar and cloth, etc., generation of remembrance and recollection cannot be seen. Hence, remembrance, etc. are the attributes (dharma) of ātman. Therefore, we infer the existence of ātman. Here, we reply:

smaraṇa-pratyabhijñāna-jñānotpādādi-hetubhiḥ /
ātmasattā-pratijñāne hetūnāṃ syād asiddhatā //94//
/ dran pa dang ni ngo shes dang /
/ shes skye la sogs gtan tshigs kyi /
/ bdag yod nyid du dam bca'*ba /
/ gtan tshigs rnams ni ma grub nyid //94//
*TJ dam bca' MHK dam 'cha'.

(94) Existence of ātman shall not be established by the hypothesis having the [following] hetus, [i.e.,] "by reason of having remembrance, recollection and producing knowledge, etc."

(TJ is omitted here).

sendriyaḥ sātmako deha ityevaṃ cet prasādhyate /
asādhāraṇataivaṃ syād-d-hetūnāṃ anvayādṛte //95//
/ gal te dbang bcas lus la ni /
/ bdag yod nyid du sgrub byed na /
/ gtan tshigs thun mongs nyid mi 'gyur /
/ rjes su 'gro ba med phyir ro //95//

(95) If it is argued that, "a body with an organ [must] have an own-nature," then the hetu is a false hetu subsisting only in the paksa (asādhāraṇatā), because there is no concomitance in agreement (anvayādṛta).

(96,36,3-4) / zhes bya ba ni dbang po dang bcas pa'i lus la dran pa la sogs pa (line-5) dmigs pa'i phyir bdag yod pa nyid du sgrub pa ni ci dang 'dra zhes bya ba'i chos mthun pa'i dpe med pa'i phyir gtan tshigs thun mong ma yin pa nyid du 'gyur ro / / dran pa la sogs pa bdag med pa dag la yang dran pa dang (line-6) ngo shes pa dang / shes pa skye ba dag mthong ba'i phyir dran pa la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs dag gi don 'gal ba nyid kyang yin no /

Thus:

"A body with an organ [must] have an ātman, because it has remembrance, etc."---this reasoning (sādhana) does not have any similar case (sapakṣa). Hence, the hetu will be an exclusive case (asādhāraṇatā).[76] For, although ātman is nowhere to be seen, the occurrance of remembrance and recognition can be seen. Therefore the meaning of the hetu, i.e., remembrance, etc. is contradictory [to the fact].

(96,36,3-6) / gal te 'di snyam du bdag ces bya ba'i sgra ni kha cig la nye bar gdags su rung ba'i phyir don (line-7) ji lta ba bzhin nyid yin te / dper na bram ze'i khye'u seng ge zhes bya ba yang bram ze'i khye'u de la gyer bag dang gtum bag dang / mthu rtsal la sogs pa dag snang bas de la seng

ge zhes bya ba'i tha snyad nye bar gdags su (line-8) yod pa las na / logs shig na seng ge zhes bya ba ral pa spungs pa la sogs pa'i khyad par dang ldan pa'i* ri dvags** kyi rgyal po dngos yod par shes pa de bzhin dus lus dbang po dang blo'i tshogs skad cig ma la dran pa dang (96,36,4-1) / ngo shes pa dang / shes pa skye ba la sogs pa nye bar gdags pa snang ba las na bdag ces bya ba dngos gang la de dag yod pa'i bdag de yod pa kho na yin no snyam du pha rol po dag dran pa la sogs pa'i nye (line-2) bar gdags pa yod pa'i sgo nas / lus dang dbang po dang blo'i tshogs de las gzhan pa'i bdag yod do / / snyam du sems pa'i dogs pa bsud nas 'dir slob dpon gyis bshad pa /

*P. po **P. dgas

If one ponders:[77] the word called 'self' is a real existing entity, since it can be conceived in a certain person. For example, if we call a brahmin-youth a lion, then luminous body, fierceness, might, etc., are reflected in that brahmin youth. Hence, the expression 'lion' is really conceived in him. However, apart from that, it is known that the real entity called a lion is the king of the beasts, endowed with the particular[s] of a thick (=piled up) mane, etc. Likewise, when the designation (upacārata) of remembrance, recollection and knowledge appear instantly in the congregation of body, organ and intellect, there is certainly a real entity called ātman where there are these [remembrance, etc.]. Thus, having anticipated (=meeting

fear or doubt of mind) the opponents' thinking---ātman which is other than the congregation of body, organ and intellect, since there is the designation(?) of remembrance, etc.,---the ācārya (Nāgārjuna) refutes, here:

ātmaśabdo yathārtho'yam* kvacit tad upacārataḥ /
tadyathā sinha-śabdaś ce[n]naivam ātmā prasidhyati /96/
dṛṣṭāntāsambhavo yasmāt siddhasādhanatā'pi vā //97a-b//

*Ms. °oyam

/ gal te bdag sgras don bzhin te /
/ 'ga' la nye bar gdags pa'i phyir /
/ seng ge'i sgra dang 'dra zhe na /
/ bdag ni grub pa nyid mi 'gyur /96/
(96,36,4-5) de'i phyir.....dpe med do / grub pa la sgrub pa nyid kyang yin te //97a-b//

(96,97a-b) If [an opponent says]: the word ātman has a real meaning, for it is used metaphorically for something [real]. For example; the word 'lion' [which] is used for describing a clever and brave son of a brahman]. Then we say: ātman cannot be proved that way, for there is no dṛṣṭānta and also it proves that which is already being proved. (siddhasādhanatā).

(96,36,4-5) 'di ltar kho bo cag kyang tha snyad du rnam par shes pa la bdag gi sgra dngos su 'dogs te / 'di ltar rnam par shes pa ni yang srid pa len pa'i phyir (line-6) bdag yin no shes lus dang dbang po'i tshogs dag la nye bar 'dogs pa'i phyir te /

For; we also postulate the word 'I' in the consciousness (vijñāna) from the standpoint of conventional [reality]. That is: We postulate 'I' which takes the next existence (punar-bhava), in the conglomeration of body and organ. (TJ is omitted here).

(96,36,4-6) ji skad du /

/ dper na yan lag tshogs pa la /
/ shing rta zhes ni dran pa ltar /
/ de bzhin phung po rnams brten nas /
/ kun rdzob tu ni sems can brjod /

ces gsungs pa'i phyir ro /

For example, we ponder; "this is a carriage," in a congregation of ancillaries.

Likewise, conventionally we call "this is a sentient being" [which is] dependent on skandhas---thus it has been said.

atha vijñāna-viṣayo yathārtho'nyatra *sādhyate /97c-d/
nitya-sarvagatvādi-virodhā(t) syād viruddhatā //98a-b//

*Ms. (pra) hypermeter.

/ ci ste rnam shes yul la ni /
/ don bzhin gzhan la sgrub byed na /97c-d/
/ rtag dang kun 'gro sogs bral phyir /
/ 'gal ba nyid du 'gyur ba yin //98a-b//

(97c-d,98a-b) Here, the real existence of other [Supreme-self] is proved, [analogous to] the object-sphere of vijñāna. Then, an incompatibility shall arise due to the obstruction of [His attribution] of permanent, omnipresent, etc.

(96,36,4-7) / zhes bya ba ni ci ste pha rol po dag (line-8) sangs rgyas pa la rnam par shes pa la don ji lta ba bzhin gyi bdag dngos yin par tha snyad gdags par grub bo de kho bo cag bdag dam pa gzhan la don ji lta ba bzhin gyi bdag dngos yin par tha snyad gdags su rung bar sgrub bo zhe na /

The opponents might say to the Buddhist: If you prove the establishment of vijñāna as a self-entity (ātma-vastu) which really exists, then you are proving our [position]---the validity of other Supreme-self.

(96,36,5-1) de ltar na bdag dam pa de rnam par shes pa kho na bzhin du rtag pa dang kun tu 'gro ba la sogs pa dang bral bas de'i phyir rnam par shes pa bzhin du rjes su dpog pas mi rtag pa dang / kun tu 'gro ba ma yin pa nyid kyis bdag dam pa (line-2) chos can de'i rang gi ngo bo bsal ba'i phyir 'gal ba nyid du 'gyur ro /

In that case, that Supreme-self is, just as vijñāna, devoid of permanence, omnipresence, etc. For this reason, [you are] negating the own-being of that subject (dharmin), for [His attributes (dharma)] will be impermanent, non-omnipresent, by making analogy with vijñāna. Hence, contradiction shall arise.

bandha-mokṣāv ato neṣṭhau kasyacit paramārthataḥ /98c-d/

/ de phyir gang la'ang don dam du /

/ bcings dang thar pa yod mi 'dod /98c-d/

(98c-d) Therefore, nowhere bondage and emancipation are maintained from the viewpoint of ultimate reality.

(96,36,5-2) / ces bya ba ni ming dang gzugs sam / gang zag gam / bdag gang la yang brtag mi (line-3) bzod pa'i phyir ro /

Thus:

Since, [the existence of] name, form, *pudgala* and *ātman* are not fit for critical examination in any place.

(96,36,5-3) / song dang ma song bgom* pa yi** /
/ de bzhin sems la lhag ma bshad /99a-b/
*TJ bgom MHK bsgoms **TJ yi MHK yis.

(99a-b) Similar to gone, ungone and actual movement,
the rest of the [examination concerned] mind
[should be] explained.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,37,1-1) / de'i phyir sems la yang don dam par ni bcings pa dang thar ba dag mi 'thad do / / de'i phyir lung las rigs kyi bu de (line-2) bzhin gshegs pa ni 'khor ba sel bar mi mdzad la / mya ngan las 'das pa sgrub par yang mi mdzad de / de ci'i phyir zhe na / 'di ltar mnyam pa nyid pa 'khor bar 'gyur ba yang med / mya ngan las 'da' bar 'gyur ba yang (line-3) med / kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur ba yang med / rnam par bya bar 'gyur ba yang med pa'i phyir ro / / zhes gsungs pa la sogs pa de dag grub pa yin no /

For this reason, in ultimate reality, bondage and emancipation in mind also cannot be maintained. Therefore, it has been
78
proclaimed in the āgama: Son of good family, Tathāgata does not either refrain from *saṃsāra* or attain nirvāṇa. For what

reason? Since there is neither samsāra nor nirvāṇa; neither defilement nor purification in the sameness (samata).

(96,37,1-3) / gal te de ltar kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang (line-4) ba dag yod pa ma yin na / 'o na ci'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis /

/ chags pas chos rnams mi shes shing /
/ chags pas chos rnams mi mthong ste /
/ mi gang 'dod chags sten byed pa /
/ de tshe mun pas mun nags 'gyur /

(line-5) zhes bya ba la sogs pas kun nas nyon mongs pa'i nyes dmigs bstan pa mdzad cing / gang dag 'phags pa'i shes rab kyis ngoms pa de dag ni ngoms pa'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa ci'i phyir rnam par byang ba'i yon (line-6) tan bsdigs par mdzad

If, thus, there is neither defilement nor purification, then why does Bhagavat declare?:

By attachment, [a man] does not know dharmas,
by attachment, [a man] does not see dharmas,
anybody slaves himself to greed, then it becomes
darker and darker, and so forth.

Thus, having shown the reproach of defilement, Bhagavat declared: Those who are contented with prajñā of the ārya are [truly] contented, and so forth. What was the reason for pointing out the virtue of purification [here].

(96,37,1-6) ce na bshad pa / chags pa sgyu ma lta bu'i 'du byed kyi tshogs 'dod chags la sogs pa'i 'jug pa shas che ba

dri za'i grong khyer gyi bud med bzang mo la chags pa lta bu dang / de'i nyes dmigs (line-7) mthong ba la brten nas kun rdzob pa'i 'dod chags la sogs pa de dag ni yod pa kho na yin no don dam par ni /

We rejoin: the attachment is the congregation of conditioned events like māyā [and] involvement with greed, etc. just as the attachment to a 'good-lady' of an excellent fairy-castle. And those greeds, etc. are certainly existent in conventional [truth], on the basis of seeing reproach of that [attachment]. [However], in ultimate reality:

utpannaṃ hi yadā ceto-vināśābhimukhaṃ tadā /99c-d/
rañjanaṃ kasya keneṣṭhaṃ raktaṃ naṣṭaṃ na ceṣyate //
100a-b//

/ gang tshe sems ni 'gag pa la /
/ mngon du phyogs shing skyes pa'i tshe /99c-d/
/ gang la gang gis chags par 'dod /
/ chags pa 'gags* la'ng mi 'dod do //100a-b//

*TJ 'ga' MHK 'gags.

(99c-d,100a-b) When the direct-experience of annihilation of the mind has risen, then whose attachment [is it]? By what is it desired? And the annihilation of attachment also cannot be maintained.

(TJ is omitted here).

ucyate jāyamānaṃ cet tat kiṃ janmonmukhaṃ yadi /100c-d/

/ gal te skye bzhin chags zhe na /
/ de ci gal te skye mngon* phyogs /

*TJ sngon.

(100c-d) If it is said [by the opponent]: What is about to come into being is that [attachment]. [We say:] if it is so, then what is [that which] is about to come into being?

(96,37,2-3) zhes bya ba ni gal te sems skye bzhin pa chags par 'gyur ro zhe na / skye bzhin pa de ci skyes pa 'am / ma skyes pa zhig yin / gal te skye ba la mngon du phyogs pa yin te / de ni skyes pa ma yin te / yongs su ma grub pa'i phyir (line-4) ma skyes pa yang ma yin te / bya ba 'jug pa'i phyir ro zhe na / gal te de lta na /

Thus:

If one says—"the generating mind becomes 'affected' (rakta)", then is that actual generation generated or ungenerated? If it is generating now, then, that is not being generated, since is is not completed. It is also not not-being-generated, because of entering into the act. If it is so, then:

nirāśraya-kriyā'yogāt* tad ajātasya neṣyate /101a-b/

*Ms. yāyogāt.

/ ma skyes pa la de mi 'dod /

/ gzhi* med bya ba mi ldan phyir /101a-b/

*TJ gzhi MHK zhi.

(101a-b) The unproduced that [rakta] is not maintained, for it is the baseless (=the agentless) [and] the actionless.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,37,2-4) zhes bya bar 'gyur ro / / 'di ltar bya ba ni

byed pa po la brten pa yin te / dper na lhas byin (line-5) za bar byed do / / zhes bya ba de lta ba yin na / skye bzhin pa ni rang gi ngo bo yongs su ma grub pas ma skyes pa yin pas de ci ltar skye ba'i bya ba dang ldan par 'gyur / 'gal te skyes bzhin pa ni brjod par bya ba ma yin pa'o / / zhe na (line-6) de ltar na de skyes pa nyid dang ma skyes pa nyid du brjod par mi nus pas /

Thus:

An action is dependent on an agent, for example, Devadatta eats. Therefore, as for the actual generation, own-being is not completed. Hence, it is ungenerated. Then, how is it connected with the act of generation? If you say the actual generation is inexpressible, then it is not able to express [definitely whether it is] the state of 'being generated' or 'not being generated.'

Hence:

(96,37,2-6) / skye bzhin skyes dang ma skyes par /
/ brjod pa min la'ng chags pa med /101c-d/
avācyām apy avācyatvāc cittaṃ raktaṃ na rāgavat /102a-b/
/ brjod med sems kyang chags min te /
/ brjod du med phyir 'dod chags bzhin /102a-b/

(101c-d,102a-b) In the thing which is inexpressible [in terms of] either actual generation, being generated or ungenerated, 'affected' does not exist. The inexpressible mind is also not 'affected,' because of [its] inexpressible nature, just as [in the case] of greed.

(TJ is omitted here).

saktyākāreṇa cej jātaṃ cittaṃ raktam iti-iṣyate /102c-d/
rakta-sphaṭika-dhīvat syāt tad-buddhi-raktatā* kathaṃ //103a-b//

*Ms. rakrta

/ gal te sems ni chags pa yi* /
/ rnam par skyes pa chags 'dod de /102c-d/
/ shel** la tshon chags blo bzhin na /
/ de'i blo ji ltar chags nyid yin //103a-b//

*TJ yi MHK yis. **TJ shel MHK shes.

(102c-d,103a-b) If "the affected (rakta) is so called [when] mind is produced as an aspect of attachment, just as thought (dhī)[is produced] by the coloured crystal," then in what way should the affected nature of that be?

(TJ is omitted here).

tad evaṃ rajanābhavāt saṃvṛtī rāga-kalpanā /103c-d/

/ de ltar chags pa med pa'i phyir /
/ 'dod chags rtags pa kun rdzob yin /103c-d/
/ 'dod chags bzhin du chos rnams kun /
/ ci rigs par ni shes par bya //104a-b//

(103c-d,104a-b) Thus, thought construction about greed is conventional [existence], because the agent of greed (rajana) does not exist [in ultimate reality]. All the dharmas, such as greed, etc. should be known in due order.

bhāvo dravyāśrayo yuktaḥ sa ca tasmān na bhidyate

/104c-d/

/ dngos po rdzas la rten*rigs na** /

/ ye yang de las dbyer yod min /104c-d/

*TJ brten MHK rten. **TJ nas MHK na.

(104c-d) [When] it is valid [to speak of] an entity which has a real locus, then that [entity] is inseparable from that [real locus].

(96,37.3-6) / zhes bya ba ni 'di na chags par (line-7) byed pa'i dngos po ni 'dod chags so / / dngos po de yang rdzas la brten te dper na snam bu'i tshon dang / 'bras chan gyis tshos pa zhes bya ba lta bur rigs grang na / dngos po de yang rdzas de las tha dad par dbye zhing bstan (line-8) par mi nus te / dper na snam bu las logs shig na tshon yod pa ma yin pa dang/ 'bras chan las logs* shig na tshos pa yod pa ma yin pa lta bu'o / / de'i phyir 'dod chags 'dis sems 'di chags so zhes bya ba'i (96,37,4-1) tha snyad 'di bsgrub par dka' ba'i phyir 'dod chags kyi rtog pa ni kun rdzob pa yin no /

*P. sogs

Thus:

Here, the entity which instigates attachment is greed. [However], that entity also depends on a substantial entity (dravya). For example, it is valid to say, the "colour of a woolen cloth" or "well-cooked boiled rice with milk." However, it is impossible to indicate that entity (=colour or well-cooked) separating from that [underlying] sub-

stantial entity. For example, apart from boiled rice with milk, [the state of] "well-cooked" does not exist. Or, apart from a woolen cloth, that colour does not exist. For this reason, we maintain the impossibility of the [popular] conventional expression (vyavahāra), "this mind is being attached by this greed" [from the standpoint of ultimate reality]. Therefore, we maintain that the thought construction of greed is [possible] from the standpoint of conventional [reality].

rāgasyeva tena* raktiś cetasā'pi prasajyate /105a-b/

*Ms. na te.

/ de phyir 'dod chags ji bzhin du /

/ sems la'ng chags pa 'thad mi 'gyur /105a-b/

(105a-b) Therefore, similar to greed, [the existence of] 'affected' by mind also leads to absurdity.

(96,37,4-1) zhes bya ba ni 'dod chags dang chags pa gnyis dbyer (line-2) med pas rang gi bdag nyid la byed ba 'gal ba'i phyir ro / / zhes bya bar bsams so / / de gnyis dbyer med pa ni tshad ma 'dis / sgrub par byed de

Thus:

Due to the inseparation of two, i.e., greed and what is affected by greed, it is contradictory to say, "[greed] is acting 'against' itself" (svātmani kriyāvirodhāt) — thus considered. Inseparability of these two can be proved by the following pramāṇa:

na rāgasyānyatā yuktā raktasyāgrahaṇe'grahāt /105c-d/

/ 'dod chags chags las gzhan mi rigs /

/ chags pa ma bzhung gzung med phyir /105c-d/

(105c-d) It is invalid to [maintain] the separation between greed and [what is affected with greed (rakta)]. For [greed] is not conceived when what is affected by greed is not conceived.

(TJ is omitted here).

raktātmavat pṛthaktva'pi nānyavat tena raktatā /106a-b/

/ chags pa nyid bzhin tha dad naang /

/ des na mi chags gzhan bzhin no /106a-b/*

*TJ misses 106a-b.

(106a-b) [When rāga and rakta] are separated, it is just as if something else which is not affected by them. For example, 'affected' itself.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,37,4-7) / gzhan yang gal te sems las logs shig na 'dod chag zhes bya ba dmigs su yod cing des chags pa nyid du 'gyur ro zhe na / de'i phyir

Furthermore, if someone says: Apart from mind, so-called 'greed' is perceived. And through that (rāga), [mind] is affected by greed. Then [we say the following] against him:

na vastu prativijñapte[ḥ] rāgād bhedo'sti cetasaḥ /106c-d/

ālambanādi tulātvā(t) na cānyaṃ bheda kāraṇaṃ //107a-b//

/dngos po rnam par rig pa'i sems /

/ 'dod chags las gzhan yod min te /106c-d/

/ dmigs pa la sogs mtshungs phyir dang /

/ tha dad rgyu gzhan med phyir ro //107a-b//

(106c-d,107a-b) The mind which recognizes things does not exist apart from greed, for it resembles objective support, etc. And there is not another cause besides that [ālambana].

(TJ is omitted here).

tasmāt samudayasyeṣṭa ekena samudayinā /107c-d/

svotpatty*apekṣo nirdeśo yathā kusumite tarau //108a-b//

*Ms. svotpraty.

/ de phyir 'dus pa cig* rang nyid /

/ skyes la bltos nas 'dus pa can /107c-d/

/ tha snad bstan pa nyid 'dod** de /

/ me tog rgyas pas shing bzhin no //108a-b//

*TJ gcig MHK cig **TJ 'dod is lacking MHK tha dad

(107c-d,108a-b) Thence, depending on the rise of own-[beings] through one of the aggregates, the presence of [greed] in the aggregates is maintained. For example, when [the flowers] on a tree [are blossoming, we say 'the tree (=aggregates)] is blossoming' (=part).

(96,37,5-3) / zhes bya ba ni kho bo cag gi lugs ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i tshul gyis 'dod chags la sogs pa 'dus pa'i yan lag gcig rang gi bdag nyid tho pa la thos nas (line-4) sems dang sems las byung ba 'dus pa can dag la 'dod chags la sogs pa zhes bya bar tha snyad du bstan

pa nyid du 'dod de /

Thus: Our view (mata) is: We maintain that so-called greed, etc., in conglomerated entities such as 'thought' (citta) and 'belonging to thought' (caitasika) are [existent as devices] of teaching and popular expression. [The reason is:] we understand that greed, etc. obtain the status of own-self as an ancillary of conglomeration according to the method (nīti) of tathya-saṃvṛti-satya.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,38,1-1) / dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba / bam po drug pa / 'dir smras pa / 'dod chags ni yod pa kho na yin te / de spang ba'i bstan (line-2) pa'i phyir ro / / 'di ltar bcom ldan 'das kyis dga' ba'i 'dod chags lhan cig skyes pa'i sred pa zad pa dang / 'dod chags dang bral ba dang / 'gog pa gang yin pa de ni mya ngan las 'das pa'o / / zhes gsungs (line-3) pa'i phyir ro zhe na / bshad pa ji skad bstan pa'i tshul gyi[s] 'dod chags yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir /

The Madhyamakahṛdaya-vṛtti-Tarkajvālā, section six.

Here an opponent objects:

Greed is certainly existent, since its forsaking (prahāṇa) is taught. For it has been declared by Bhagavat:[79]

Extinction of craving (tṛṣṇā) which is born simultaneously with the attachment to greed for gratification, separation from greed and that stopping---is nirvāṇa.

We reply:

According to the guiding principle (nīti) of [Prajñāpāramitā which is mentioned already], there is no such thing as greed

[in ultimate reality]. Thence, [we say]:

tat prahāṇān na nirvāṇaṃ yujyate tattva*'yogataḥ /

108c-d/

*Ms. tara

/de spangs phyir ni mya ngan 'das /

/ mi rigs de nyid mi 'thad phyir /108c-d/

/ mya ngan 'das pa don dam du /

/ dngos dang dngos med mtshan nyid min //109a-b//

(108c-d,109a-b) To say, "through forsaking, nirvāṇa is realized" is invalid in ultimate reality. [For], from the standpoint of ultimate reality, nirvāṇa is devoid of [any] mark [whether it is] real or unreal.

(TJ is omitted here).

bhāvo hi yadi nirvāṇaṃ bhāvatvāt saṃskṛtaṃ hi tat

/109c-d/

/ gal te mya ngan 'das dngos na /

/ dngos po yin phyir de 'dus byas //109c-d//

(109c-d) If nirvāṇa is existent, then that (nirvāṇa) is a conditioned entity, because of [its] existing nature.

(96,38,1-8) / zhes bya ba la dngos po zhes bya ba 'byung ba'i phyir dngos po ste / rgyu dang rkyen rnams kyi 'dus byas pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go / / de'i phyir mya ngan las 'das pa dngos po rjes su dpog (96,38,2-1) / pas 'dus byas nyid kyis 'dus ma byas nyid bsal ba'i phyir chos can gyi ngo bo

nyid nyams so / / gzhan yang mya ngan las 'das pa ni 'dus byas kyi gnyen po yin par 'dod na / gal te 'dus byas yin na /

Thus:

"bhāva"---existence, since it comes into being. It means [the conglomeration] of causes and conditions. For this reason, if nirvāṇa is inferred as existence, then 'the unconditioned-ness' of [nirvāṇa] is repudiated. Thus, dharma (=asaṃskṛtatva) of dharmin(=nirvāṇa) is destroyed [in this reasoning].

Moreover, if nirvāṇa is the antidote (pratipakṣa) of being conditioned, [then nirvāṇa must be conditioned]. If it is conditioned, then:

saṃskṛtatvād vipakṣo'pi na saṃskṛta-virodhavat /110a-b/

/ gnyen po ma yin 'dus byas phyir /

/ dper na 'dus byas 'gags* pa bzhin /110a-b/

*TJ 'gag

(110a-b) [Nirvāṇa] is not the antidote (vipakṣa), because [the antidote] is conditioned, just as a contradiction is conditioned.

(96,38,2-2) / zhes bya ba ltar 'gyur rol Thus, it will follow.

abhāvo yady abhāvatvā(t) nāśitāvat parāśrayāt /110c-d/

nesthaś ca pratipakṣo' sau nāśitāvat parāśrayāt //111a-b//

/ gal te dngos med gzhan rten 'gyur /*

/ dngos po med phyir zhig pa bzhin /110c-d/

/ de ni gnyen por mi 'dod de /

/ gzhan la brten** phyir zhig bzhin no //111a-b//

*MHK has an extra line, i.e., gal te dngos me chig pa bzhin

**TJ rten MHK brten

(110c-d,111a-b) If [nirvāṇa] is non-existence, then it depends on other things, because of its non-existent nature---just as the annihilated thing. And that [nirvāṇa] cannot be taken as the antidote (pratipaksa), for it depends on others, just as the annihilated thing.

(96,38,2-3) / zhes bya ba la dngos po med pa dang / rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa dag ni rnam grangs te / gal te mya ngan 'das pa dngos po med pa nyid yin na bde ba nyid la sogs par mi (line-4) 'thad pa'i phyir / nam mkha'i me tog bzhin pas ngo bo nyid nyams so /

(TJ is omitted here).

Thus:

Abhāva and adravyasat are synonymous. If nirvāṇa is devoid of own-being, then happiness, etc. cannot be attained, just as a flower in the sky. Hence, [there should be] own-being [for nirvāṇa]---thus considered.

(96,38,2-7) / 'o na lung las dge slong dag / mya ngan las 'das pa de ni ma skyes pa dang / ma byung ba dang / 'dus ma byas nyid du yod do zhes gsungs pas 'dus ma byas pa'i bdag nyid kyi mya ngan las (line-8) 'das pa ma yin nam zhe na / bshad pa

One might think: Then, [how would you explain] the following āgama:

Monks! That nirvāṇa is existent as having the nature of non-arising and the unconditioned existence.

Hence, is there not be nirvāṇa which has the own-being of unconditioned?

Then we reply:

asaṃskṛto'py ayukto'sau pūrva[ko]* niṣedhataḥ /111c-d/

*Ms. pūrve

/ de ni 'dus ma byas mi rigs /

/ dgag* pa gong du bstan pa'i phyir /111c-d/

*TJ dgag MHK gdag

(111c-d) It is also invalid to say that it is unconditioned, since this denial is previously [explained].

(96,38,2-8) zhes bya ba ni gal te rdzas su yod pa yin na dngos po yin pa'i phyir / de 'dus byas yin pa'i phyir de 'dus (96,38,3-1) byas nyid du 'gyur gyi / 'dus ma byas ma yin te / skyon gong du bstan pa'i phyir ro / / gal te mya ngan las 'das pa rdzas su yod pa dang tha snyad gdags su rung ba nyid dang ma skyes pa dang rtag tu gnas pa nyid du brtag grang na

Thus:

If it is real entity (dravya-sat), then there is own-being. Hence, although it is conditioned, it cannot be unconditioned. Here, [a difficulty arises] which has been refuted previously. If nirvāṇa is a substantial entity which can be designated, unproduced and the perpetual existence, then:

citte[r] viśeṣaḥ kaścāsya muktāt sāṃkhyā-prakalpitāt /112a-b/

/ grangs can dag gis rab brtags* pa;i /

/ grol ba'i sems las khyad ci yod /112a-b/

*TJ brtag MHK brtags

(112a-b) [Then], is there any [kaś ca] distinction between this [substantial, unproduced and the perpetual nirvāṇa] and the liberation in the consciousness (citta-vimukta) [of Puruṣa] which is conceived by the Sāṃkhya?

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,38,3-4) / mya ngan las 'das pa ni zad pa nyid yin par yang mi rigs te / ji ltar zhe na /

As for nirvāṇa, it is invalid to [speak of] the nature of extinction itself (kṣayatva). For what reason?

svarasa-kṣayiṇaḥ kleśā vikalpāraṇi-saṃbhavāḥ /112c-d/
teṣāṃ asaṃcit[t]eḥ keṣāṃ kṣayān mokṣo 'stu te kṣayaḥ
//113a-b//

/ nyon mongs rnam rtog gtsub shing las /
/ byung ba rang gi nyang zad pa /112c-d/
/ de la bsags pa yod min pas /
/ gang zag khyod mthar ni* zad 'gyur //113a-b//
*TJ, MHK mi zad 'gyur, but Ms. kṣayaḥ

(112c-d,113a-b) The defilements are generated by the fire-starter of discrimination and die out naturally. Since there is nothing accumulated, by what extinction does your mokṣa should become extinct?

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,38,4-1) / bsags pa med na gang gis bcings shing gang las thar par 'gyur te / de'i phyir

If there is no accumulation, then by what is it bound [and] from what is it emancipated? For this:

ajātānāṃ tathā '*sat(t)vāt kalpanāyāṃ samobhayaḥ /

113c-d/

*MS. no avagraha

/ skye ba med la rtog pa yang /

/ de bzhin med phyir tshul gnyis* mtshungs /113c-d/

*TJ gnyis, MHK nyid.

(113c-d) Where there is no birth, the discrimination is also inexistent. [Therefore], both [methods, i.e., bandhana and mokṣa] are identical.

(96,38,4-1) / zhes bya ba smras so / Thus, it is said.

vada kasya kṣayāt mokṣaḥ kṣayiṇo'kṣayiṇo'pi vā /114a-b/

/ zad pa can nam zad med na /

/ gang gi zad pas thar pa smros /114a-b/

(114a-b) Whether the extinction exists or not, by what extinction is mokṣa spoken?

(96,38,4-2) zhes bya ba ni re zhig rang gi ngang gis zad pa can mar me bzhin du zad pa la ni thar pa mi 'thad do / / zad pa can ma yin pa la yang zad pa med pa'i phyir nam mka' (line-3) lta bu la thar pa med do / / ci thar pa med pa kho na yin nam zhe na / kun rdzob tu yod de / don dam par ni yod ma yin te / gang gi phyir zhe na /

Thus:

Emancipation is unacceptable for the extinction which extinguishes by its own-nature just as a lamp. [Also], there is no emancipation in the thing which has no extinction [in itself] just as space. One might ask: Does emancipation not exist

at all? [We say]: it exists in conventional reality, but it does not exist in ultimate reality. For what reason?

svabhāva-śūnyatā-bodhān nirvṛttes tan mater api /114c-d/
akṣayākṣayi-dharmatvaṃ prāpnoti'prāpti yogataḥ//115a-b//
/ rang bzhin stong nyid rtogs* pa'i phyir /
/ de yi blo yang zlog** gyur pas /114c-d/
/ zad med mi zad chos nyid 'thob /
/ thob pa med pa'i tshul gyis so //115a-b//

* TJ rtog MHK rtogs, **TJ ldog MHK zlog.

(114c-d,115a-b) Having realized the emptiness of the essential (svabhāva-śūnyatā), that knowledge (mati) itself becomes extinct. [Thus], non-extinct and inexhaustible 'Dharma-hood' is attained by way of non-attainment.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,38,4-6) ji skad du bcom ldan 'das gyis nga ni thob pa med pa kho nar byang chub kyi snying po las langs so / de bzhin du tshe dang ldan pa sha ra dra' ti'i bu thob pa yang yod / mngon par rtog pa yang yod de / (line-7) de ni 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyi gnyis su brjod par zad kyi don dam par ni yod pa ma yin no / / zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa lta bu'o / / de'i phyir kho bo cag ni pha rol po dag 'dod pa la mi brten pas /[80]

It is declared by Bhagavat: by way of non-attainment, I have risen from the terrace of enlightenment (bodhi-maṇḍa). Likewise, "Śāradvatīputra, as for the existence of attainment, realization (abhisamaya), these two are only expressed from

[the standpoint of] worldly conventional expression, and do not exist in ultimate reality, and so forth."

For this reason, we do not go along with the position of the opponents. Hence:

nātmakāmāśrayante(Ms.to) sā yathā-bhūta-parīkṣakāḥ /115c-d/
kudṛṣṭāmaya-durgandha-saktodgārā-giras tataḥ //116a-b//
*Ms.°dṛṣṭa-cāmaya, but ca is hypermeter.

/ yang dag ji bzhin yongs rtogs pa /
/ bdag la phan pa 'dod pa dag /115c-d/
/ lta ngan nad dri ngan bgos pa'i /
/ sgregs pa'i tshig la brten mi byed //116a-b//

(115c-d,116a-b) Therefore, [those] who investigate [dharmas] as they really are for his benefit do not rely on the stinking words of wrong view vomited by the self-conceit.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,38,5-5) 'dir smras pa 'dod chags ni yang dag par yod pa kho na yin te / phyin ci log yod pa'i phyir ro / 'di ltar (line-6) mi rtag pa dang sdug bsngal ba dang / stong pa dang bdag med pa dang / mi sdug pa dag la rtag pa dang bde ba dang / dngos po dang / bdag la sdug par phyin ci log pa dag ni yod do / / de dag la brten nas (line-7) 'dod chags la sogs pa dag 'byung bar 'gyur te / ji skad du ma rig pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi rtsa ba yin la / ma rig pa'i rtsa ba ni tshul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa yin / tshul bzhin ma yin (line-8) pa yid la byed pa'i rtsa ba ni 'du shes phyin ci log tu gyur pa yin no zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro zhe na /

Here, someone objects:

Greed certainly exists from the standpoint of [ultimate] reality (tattvatas). For there are the perverted conceptions (viparyāsa). They are: taking impermanent as permanent, suffering as pleasure, emptiness as real entity, no-self as self and repulsive as beautiful.

Having based on these [perverted conceptions], greed, etc. are generated. For it is proclaimed by Bhagavat:

Ignorance is the root of the defilements, etc. The root of ignorance is the superficial mental orientation (anyoniśo-manasikāra). The root of the superficial mental orientation is the perverted conception.

bshad pa / We refute:

na viparyāsa-sadbhāvāt sadbhāvas tasya yujyate /116c-d/
rāga-tulya-vicāratvāt tat klṛptir api sāṃvṛtī //117a-b//

/ phyin ci log dag yod pa'i phyir /
/ 'dod chags yod par* mi rigs te /116c-d/
/ 'dod chags bzhin du brtags ba'i phyir /
/ rtog pa de yang kun rdzob pa //117a-b//

*TJ pa MHK par.

(116c-d,117a-b) It is invalid to say that due to the real existence of the perversion, [there is] a real existence of that [greed]. For it is similar to greed, [the perversions] are analyzed. That discrimination [of perversions] is also conventional.

(96,39,1-1) / zhes bya ba ni phyin ci log kyang 'dod chags bzhin du chags bzhin du brtag par bya ste / phyin ci log

de phyin ci log tu gyur pa 'am / phyin ci log tu ma gyur pa 'am / phyir ci log (line-2) tu 'gyur bzhin pa 'am / phyin ci log las phyin ci log tu gyur pa tha dad dam / 'on te tha mi dad ce na / phyin ci log rnam pa thams cad yang dag par na 'dod chags kho na (line-3) bzhin du mi 'thad pas / de'i phyir phyin ci log pa yang kun rdzob pa yin no /

Thus:

Similar to greed, the perversions also should be viewed. That is: Is that perverted conception being already perverted? Or, is it not being perverted? Or, is it in the process of being perverted? Is 'being perverted' different from perversion? Or not? [Thus, it should be examined]. However, just as greed, it is invalid [to maintain its existence] in every aspect in ultimate reality (tattvatas). Therefore, the perverted conception also is existent as conventional reality.

gzhan yang / Moreover:

prāg eva citta-cai[t]tānāṃ svabhāva-pratiṣedhataḥ /117c-d/
rāgo-rakta*-svabhāvena na vayan tena rajyate //118a-b//

/ sems dang sems las byung ba yi /
/ ngo bo nyid phyir sngar bkag phyir /
/ gang gi de ni chags 'gyur ba'i /
/ 'dod chags chags pa'i dngos nyid med //118a-b//

(117c-d,118a-b) Since the own-being of mind and what belongs to mind is refuted previously, greed and the affected [i.e.,]

*Ms. rāga, but Tib. chags pa.

what is affected by that [mind], do not[exist]

as own-beings.

etena [dveṣa-mo]hādi-pratyuktaṃ pratibhāvayet /118c-d/

/ des ni sngang dang rmongs la sogs /

/ so sor bshad pa byas par 'gyur /118c-d/

(118c-d) By that [method (nīti)], the refutation of hate, delusion, etc. should be clarified.

(96,39,1-5) zhes bya ba ni 'dod chags (line-6) dang chags bkag pa'i tshul des zhe* sdang ba dang gti mug dang rmongs pa la sogs pa dag kyang 'dra bar bkag par shes par bya'o /

*P. zhes.

Thus:

It should be known that by that method of refutation of greed and the affected, hate [the hated (dviṣṭa)], delusion and the deluded (mūḍha), etc. are also to be refuted in the same manner.

(TJ is omitted here).

tataś ca bandhanāsiddher acalā niḥsvabhāvatā /119a-b/

/ de ltar bcings thar ma grub phyir /

/ ngo bo nyid med gyo ba med /119a-b/

(119a-b) In conclusion: since bondage [and emancipation] are inexistent, [the entities] are the state of no-own-being and immovable [from the viewpoint of the ultimate reality].

(96,39,1-8) ces bya ba ni pha rol po gis star dngos po rnams ni don (96,39,2-1) dam par ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin te /

bcings pa dang thar pa yod pa'i phyir ro zhes gang smras pa de'i gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid dang / don 'gal ba nyid yin pa'i phyir te / bcings pa dang thar pa dag kun rdzob pa yin pa'i phyir ro /

Thus:

The opponent [stated] previously that entities have their own-being[s], indeed, since there are bondage and emancipation. The meaning of hetu in this statement is unjustifiable, since it is the incompatible (viruddha) [hetu]. The reason is: bondage and emancipation exist in conventional [reality].

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,39,2-5) bshad pa W_e say

nesṭhā mahyātmano'nanyā pṛthivī paramārthataḥ /119c-d/
hetu-satvād yathā vāyur vastutvād va'pi bodhavat//120a-b//

*Ms. no avagraha.

/ sa ni don dam nyid du na /
/ sa las gzhan min nyid mi 'dod /119c-d/
/ rgyu dang ldan phyir rlung bzhin dang /
/ dngos po yin phyir shes pa bzhin //120a-b//

(119c-d,120a-b) "The earth is not other than the nature of the earth"---is not maintained from the standpoint of ultimate reality. For it has a cause as wind; it also has the nature of existence as understanding.

(96,39,2-6) / zhes bya ba ni sra ba nyid ma gtogs par sa zhes bya ba ci yang med la / sa ma gtogs par yang gang gis

(line-7) gzhan ma yin pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i gzhan nyid med do zhes bya bar tshad ma rnam par bzhag ste / dngos po rnams stong pa nyid du ro gcig pa'i phyir ro / / shes pa bzhin zhes bya ba ni skyes bu bzhin no zhes bya ba'i (line-8) tha tshig go /

Thus:

Excepting solidity, what is called 'earth' does not exist whatsoever. The reasoning is asserted as follows: Except the earth, by what does it become 'non-other-ness?' For [all] the entities are the one and the same nature (eka-rasa) with emptiness, "like understanding"---means it is being produced.

nānyat pṛthivyā salilaṃ gṛhyate paramārthataḥ /120c-d/
utpatti-matvād dravyā (Ms. urvyā)tmā yathorvyā na pṛthak tathā //121a-b//

/ sa las don dam nyid du na /
/ chu ni gzhan par mi gzung ste /120c-d/
/ skye dang ldan phyir* rdzas las ni /
/ sa gzhan min pa ji bzhin no //121a-b//

*P. pa'i.

(120c-d,121a-b) "Water is [something] other than the earth"---is not conceived from the standpoint of ultimate reality. For [both] are generated [and] the essential nature of the substance [of earth] is similar to water and there is no difference.

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,39,3-2) / sa dang chu la sogs pa ni gzhan nyid yin te sgra dang blo tha dad pa yang yod la / las dang mtshan nyid kyang tha dad pas de'i (line-3) phyir sa la sogs pa dag ni gzhan nyid yin no snyam na bshad pa /

Someone might think that: as for water, etc. [certainly] there is a difference [between them]. [For], there are different word[s] and understanding. And also, the function and the essential nature of [these elements] differ. For this reason, there are differences between the earth, etc.

We refute:

nāpi ta[d] dhvani-dhī bhedāt kśityādīnāṃ matā *'nya(tā)/
121c-d/
kārya-lakṣaṇa-bhedād vā sādhya-dharmya-a-samānvayāt //
122a-b//

*Ms. no avagraha.

/ sa la sogs pa* sgra blo dang /
/ las dang mtshan nyid tha dad pas /121c-d/
/ de dag gzhan nyid mi 'dod de /
/ bsgrub bya'i chos dang mi ldan phyir //122a-b//

*TJ pas MHK pa.

(121c-d,122a-b) "There are differences between the earth, etc., due to the difference[s] of words, understanding, function and properties."—— is also not maintained. For, this is [the fallacy of] the absence of the connection in the sādhya-dharma.

(96,39,3-3) / zhes (line-4) bya ba la 'dir bsgrub par bya ba ni gzhan nyid de de nyid chos yin pas bsgrub par bya ba'i chos so /

(TJ is omitted here).

Thus: here, the probandum (sādhya) is the difference (anyatā). Since it is being dharma which is the dharma of the probandum (sādhya).

rūpasyātmāny abheda'pi vyapadeśāc ca saṃśayaḥ /122c-d/

/ gzugs kyi bdag nyid mi* gzhan yang /

/ tha snyad yod phyir ma nges 'gyur /122c-d/

*TJ min, MHK mi.

(122c-d) The own-nature of form is not different, because it is [only] designation. Hence, [this thesis] is doubtful.

(TJ is omitted here).

parakumbhasya* cāsiddher asiddhārtho bhaved asau /123a-b/

/ yongs su brtag** pa ma grub phyir /

/ de don ma grub nyid du 'gyur /123a-b/

**TJ brtags, MHK brtag. *Skt. parakumbha and Tib. yongs su brtag do not tally.

And since jar of other [i.e., an imagined object?] is not being proven, thesis should be false.

(96,39,4-2) zhes bya ba ni sgra dang blo tha dad pa'i phyir / / zhes yongs su brtags pa de'i don ma grub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs de'i don ma grub pa nyid du 'gyur pas pha rol pos yongs su brtags pa'i don ni don dam pa pa ma (line-3) yin no /

Thus:

"Because different words and knowledge exist [between earth, etc.]" This imagined meaning is not established. Hence, the meaning of that reason cannot be established. Therefore, the meaning, which is imagined by the opponent, does not exist in ultimate reality.

śabdādi-bheda-bhinne'pi tasmāt te vyabhicāriṇaḥ /123c-d/

/ sgra sogs bye thag tha dad kyang /

/ de phyir de dag 'khrul par 'gyur /123c-d/

(123c-d) This separation according to different [word and knowledge] of sound, etc. are, therefore, improper.

(96,39,4-3) / zhes bya ba ni khyad par gzhan nyid ston pa'i gtan tshig dag go /

Thus:

"The difference and the other-ness do not exist"---is the <u>hetu</u>.

viśeṣaṇa-abhidhānāni* nivāryante virodhinā /124a-b/

*Ms. abhidhāne'pi

/ khyad par brjod par gyur kyang ni /

/ 'gal bas nges par zlog* par 'gyur /124a-b/

*<u>TJ</u> bzlog, <u>MHK</u> zlog.

(124a-b) [Thus,] statements about the difference are rejected, because of that contradiction.

(96,39,4-4) / gcer pu pa dag ni dngos po thams cad gnyi ga'i bdag nyid yin par 'dod de / sa las chul sogs pa dag gzhan (line-5) nyid de mtshan nyid dang las tha dang pa'i phyir ro / / gzhan nyid kyang ma yin te / sra ba nyid la sogs pa yod pas 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir ro zhe na / 'di skad ces brjod par bya ste

81

The Nirgranthas maintain:

All the dharmas have binary nature. For water, etc. are different from the earth, because they have different essential properties and function[s]. [At the same time], there are also [some]similarities. For example, [water, etc.] are the conglomerated entity by having solidity, etc. [For, solidity is the essential property of the earth]. The following should be said against them.

ubhayatvaṃ virodhān na yathā'gner uṣṇa-śīta te /124c-d/

/ gnyi ga nyid kyang mi rung ste /

/ 'gal phyir me la grang dro bzhin /124c-d/

(124c-d) It is invalid [to maintain] the binary nature, – for it is contradictory, just as cold and heat of fire.

(TJ is omitted here).

gzhan yang Moreover,

anya-an-anyatva-pakṣokta-niṣedhād vā tad apy asa(t) /125a-b/

/ gzhan dang gzhan min phyogs dgag pa /

/ bstan phyir de yang bzang po min /125a-b/

(125a-b) That [theory of the binary nature] is not good [reasoning], since the thesis of other and not-otherness is refuted.

(96,39,4-8) zhes bya ba ni 'di la gzhan nyid dang gzhan ma yin pa nyid kyis phyogs dgag pa bstan zin pa'i phyir / de gnyis las ma gtogs pa gang gnyi ga'i bdag nyid 'gyur ba gzhan gang yod (96,39,5-1) / de de'i phyir gnyi ga'i bdag nyid de yang bzang po ma yin no / /

Thus:

In this [chapter], the thesis, which holds the difference and the similarity [simultaneously], has been refuted already. Hence, excepting these two, what is the binary nature? Therefore, this [theory] of binary nature also is not a good [theory].

(96,39,5-1) / ci ste gnyi gar smra bdag 'di skad ces / me yang gnyi ga'i bdag nyid yin te btso ba la sogs pa dag la ni tsha ba yin la bden (line-2) pa'i gsang sdags la sogs pas byin gyis brlabs pa dag la ni grang ba yin pas / de'i phyir me yang gnyi ga'i bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir khyad kyi dpe med do zhe na / de dag gi phyir bshad pa /

However, if the Ubhaya-vādins insist: there is binary nature in fire also, because the miraculous power (adhiṣṭhāna), [produced] by true mantra, cools off the heat in cooking pans, etc.

We refute those again:

dvayātmakatve'pi sarvasya prasiddho'ṃśo [ni*]darśanam

/125c-d/

dṛṣṭānta'nyūnatā tasmān na paraṃ pratijāyate//126a-b//

*hypermeter

/ gnyi ga'i bdag nyid nyid yin yang /

/ kun la grags pa'i cha dper bstan /125c-d/

/ des* na gzhan la dpe med pa /

/ rab tu skye bar mi 'gyur ro //126a-b//

*TJ de, MHK des.

(125c-d,126a-b)[Having utilized the rare example], the Nirgrānthas maintain the binary nature [of fire]. However, [having utilized] the most common [example], we have refuted it. Therefore, our lack of dṛṣṭānta does not arise [in favour of] the opponent.

(96,39,5-3) / zhes bya ba ni me la gnyi ga'i bdag nyid 'ga' zhig yod du brin kyang de la gang 'jig rten kun (line-4) la grags pa'i cha de dpe nyid du bstan pas de'i phyir gnyi gar smra ba dag la kho bo cag gis dpe med par mi 'gyur ro / gnyi ga'i de yang don dam pa nyid ma yin no / gang gi phyir zhe na /

Thus:

Granted that fire has the binary nature, yet, it is not a whole truth accepted by all [anytime and anyplace]. Therefore, our dṛṣṭānta will not be annulled for [the benefit] of the Ubhaya-vādins.

The binary [nature] also does not exist in ultimate reality. For what reason?:

āpekṣikī ca sāsiddhir manorama-vikalpitā /126c-d/

dvayor anyatarasyāpi prāg-asiddher na sidhyati //127a-b//

/ de ni bltos nas 'grub pa ste /

/ gnyis las gang yang rung ba zhig /126c-d/

/ sngar ma grub na mi 'grub phyir /

/ yid kyis* rnam par brtags par zad //127a-b//

*TJ kyis, MHK kyi.

(126c-d,127a-b) [You maintain] that [binary nature] is established having [the nature of] interdependency. [However], apart from [these] two, [what would be there?] And when the former is not established, [the latter] is not established also. [Hence, this nature], is imagined [only] for the pleasure of mind (manō-rama).

(TJ is omitted here).

(96,40,1-1) / bdag yod pa yang yin la bdag med pa yang yin pa dang / rtag pa yang yin la mi rtag pa yang yin pa dang (line-2) dngos po yang yin la dnogs po med pa yang yin no / / zhes bya ba la sogs pa /

When there is self, there is no-self also. When there is permanence, there is impermanence also. When there is real-entity, there is non-real-entity also, etc.

sarveṣūbhaya-vādeṣu pratiṣedhe'py ayaṃ nayaḥ /127c-d/

/ gnyi gar smra ba* thams cad la /

/ dgag pa'i tshul yang de nyid do//127c-d//

*TJ smras pa, MHK smra ba.

(127c-d) This method also [applies] in the refutation of all the twin talks.

(96,40,1-2) / zhes bya bar sbyar ro / Thus, it is related.

evaṃ yathokta[ḥ] vidhinā niṣiddhā s(ā) svabhāvatā /128a-b/

/ de* ltar 'di skad bsgrub bstan pas /

/ ngo bo nyid yod nyid ma grub /128a-b/

*TJ 'di, MHK de.

(128a-b) Thus, through the formula which has been explained, that own-beingness is not established.

(TJ is omitted here).

iṭy ete saṃskṛtā dharmā(ḥ) sāratvena vicāritā//128c-d//

/ de ltar 'dus byas chos de dag /

/ bsdu bas rnam par brtags pa yin//128c-d/

(128c-d) Thus, [the niḥsvabhāvatā of] the conditioned dharmas has been discussed in an abridged form.

asaṃskṛtā nirodhau dvav ākāśaṃ tathatā tathā /129a-b/

/ 'dus ma byas ni 'gog gnyis dang /

/ nam mkha' dang ni de bzhin nyid /129a-b/

(129a-b) The unconditioned [dharmas] are as follows:[82] the two stoppings, the space and suchness (tathatā).

(TJ is omitted here).

pratisaṃkhyā-nirodho hi na bhāvaḥ paramārthataḥ /129c-d/

nityā-vikṛtarūpatvād v*āndhyā-tanayaḥ-mūrt[t]ivat//130a-b//

*Ms. ba

/ so sor brtags te 'gog pa ni /

/ don dam du na dngos po min /129c-d/

/ rtag dang rang bzhin mi 'gyur phyir /

/ mo gsham bu yi* gzugs bzhin no //130a-b//

*TJ bu'i, MHK bu yi.

(129c-d,130a-b) In ultimate reality, the cessation which results from the intellectual comprehension is surely not a real entity.[83] For it is a form which is eternally 'deformed,' just as the figure of a child of a barren woman.

(96,40,2-4) / de nyid kyi gtan tshigs kyi khyad par gzhan bstan pa'i phyir /

In order to show another particular reason of this:

ajātatvād ahetutvād akāryatvād athāpi vā /130c-d/
saṃskṛta-asaṃgrahād vāpi nirodha-asambhavād api //131a-b//
/ ma skyes phyir dang rgyu med phyir /
/ de bzhin las kyang med phyir dang /130c-d/
/ 'dus byas ma bsdus phyir dang ni /
/ 'gag pa med pa'i phyir yang ngo //131a-b//

(130c-d,131a-b) Here [the unconditioned dharmas do not have their own-beings]. The reasons are: they are birthless, without a cause and work-less. There is neither the assemblage of conditions nor dissolution of [them].

(TJ is omitted here).

yacca kāryaṃ mataṃ yasya na hi tat tasya karaṇa /131c-d/
ajātatvādi-hetubhyo hasti-mastaka-śṛṅga-vat //132a-b//
/ gang gis* 'bras bu gang 'dod pa /
/ de ni de'i rgyu ma yin te /131c-d/
/ ma skyes la sogs gtan tshigs kyis /
/ glang chen glad kyi rva bzhin no //132a-b//

*TJ gi, MHK gis.

(131c-d,132a-b) For a causeless entity, by whom is that effect [produced]? It is like the horns on the head of an elephant, by reasons of not having been born, etc.

(TJ is omitted here).

ajāta-kāraṇaṃ neṣṭhaṃ kāryam ity-avasīyate /132c-d/
kāryatvāt tadyathā kṣaudraṃ na kha-puṣpādi-kāraṇaṃ
//133a-b//

/ ma skyes rgyu dang ldan pa yi /
/ 'bras bur* mi 'dod shes par bya /132c-d/
/ 'bras bu yin phyir sbrang rtsi ni /
/ mkha' min sogs rgyu ldan min bzhin //133a-b//

*TJ bu, MHK bur.

(132c-d,133a-b) "For an unborn cause, an effect is undesirable"---thus ascertained. For example, for a cause like the flower in the sky, there will be no effect like the honey-bees [in the flowers].

(TJ is omitted here).

etena [vyoma-tathatā-dikkālātmādi buddhimān]./133c-d/
[pratiṣiddhaṃ vijāniyād yāvat] kiṃcid asaṃskṛtaṃ //134a-b//

/ des ni nam mkha' de bzhin nyid /
/ phyogs dang dus dang bdag la sogs /133c-d/
/ 'dus ma byas pa ji snyed pa /
/ bkag par mkhas pas shes par bya //134a-b//

(133c-d,134a-b) Thus, the intelligent person should know the refutation of any kind of the unconditioned [dharmas]

i.e., space, suchness, direction, time and ātman, etc.

dravya-pradhāna-jīvādi-jñeyaṃ yat tīrthyakalpitaṃ
/134c-d/

yathāyogaṃ niṣeddhavyaṃ yukty-āgama-viśāradaiḥ//135a-b//

/ rdzas dang gtso bo srog la sogs /

/ mu stegs brtags pa'i shes bya dag /134c-d/

/ rig dang lung la mkhas rnams kyis /

/ ci rigs par ni dgag par bya //135a-b//

(134c-d,135a-b) Those things to be known i.e., dravya, pradhāna, jīva etc., are the false imagination of the outsiders. They should be negated by those who are proficient in reason (yukti) and scripture (āgama).

iti sva-parā-siddhānta-kalpitātmā nirātmatāṃ /135c-d/

vidvān vibhāvya bhāvānāṃ tattva-jñānāmṛtaṃ pivet //136a-b//

/ rang dang gzhan gyi* grub pa'i phyir /

/ dngos po rnams la bdag btags pa /135c-d/

/ mkhas pas bdag med rtogs bya zhing /

/ de nyid shes pa'i bdud rtsi btung //136a-b//

*TJ gyis, MHK gyi.

(135c-d,136a-b) Thus, ātman is imagined by the siddhāntas of the other and own[schools]. [However], having realized the self-less-ness of the entities, may the wise drink the ambrosia of knowledge of ultimate reality (tattva-jñāna).[84]

NOTES

Chapter III

1. dbang du byas nas (vakṣīkaraṇa). Here, the author opens with a statement of its purpose and of the use of its subject matter. Avalokitavrata comments on the term dbang gis as follows: (96,256,5,8) dbang gis zhes bya ba'i sgra'i sbyor ba ni dper na gzegs zan dag gi gzhung las/ de nas(257,1,1) de'i don du chos rnam par bya'o zhes bya ba dang/ dpyod pa can dag gi gzhung las de nas de'i 'og tu chos rnams zhes bya bar 'dod do.... Thus, the term dbang gis has the same function of the following Sūtras: athāto dharmam vyākhyāsyāmaḥ (Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra I-1) or athāto dharmajijñāsā (Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra,I-1). Cf. Ichigo," Chūganha to Katsuron" (see p.26 of this study).

2. One of more famous expressions of eye in the Pali canon is: pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhum udapādi, ñāṇam udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. (SN. II, 105, v. 179, v. 258, v. 442ff. Mahāvagga 11). "In the previously unheard-of dharma, the eye arose, knowledge arose, insight arose, cognition arose and light arose." We also find the term cakkhumat(one with the eye in many places. The Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā (=P) ed. N. Dutt, 1934 has the following: Moreover, a Bodhisattva, a great being should train in perfect wisdom if he wants to produce the five eyes, i.e., the fleshly eye, the heavenly eye, the wisdom eye, the Dharma-eye, the Buddha-eye. (Conze, The Large Sūtra, etc., p. 17). For the commentary on this passage and a study of it, see Venkata Ramanan: Nāgārjuna's philosophy, etc., pp.119-126. As Ramanan writes, "The five kinds of eyes that Prajñā-pāramita-sūtras speak of are really the different levels of comprehension, the different degrees of removal of this dirt from the mirror of mind, enabling it to reflect the true nature of itself as well as of all things. The eyes yield views; but the views differ not only in range, but in depth and in the quality of illumination." (Ibid.) Although Bhavaviveka does not mention the five eyes here, his intention is exactly the same.

3. See Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (P) Dutt's edition, p. 178, translated by Conze in The Large Sūtra, p.114 "Furthermore, a Bodhisattva, who courses in the perfection of wisdom, gives a gift which is threefold pure; with his attention centered on the knowledge of all modes, he dedicates to full enlightenment that gift which he gives,

after he has made that wholesome root common to all beings. P. p.264 (Conze p. 194). Tied by three ties he gives a gift. Which three? The notion of self, the notion of others, the notion of a gift, etc."
Here, a note should be made concerning the relationship between ägama and yukti in Bhāvaviveka. It has been believed that, "And also within the Mādhyamika school, yukti-centered Bhāvaviveka takes the view that all the āgama(s) are not necessarily [our] pramāṇa, but they become pramāṇa only after examination by yukti in accordance with nīti. Therefore, in order to make āgama(s) faultless, we must establish prāmāṇyam of āgama(s) by inference complete with pratijñā, hetu, and dṛṣṭānta." (Mochizuki Bukkyō Daijiten or Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Vol. 9, p. 403c, (Tokyo, 1963)).
We suggested a slight amendment for this passage, because "Here, our contention is not the predominant role of yukti in Bhāvaviveka's system, but yukti as a verifier of the authority of āgama, which this statement suggests. We consider the unique feature about the verse is that its author, Bhāvaviveka, while keeping āgamas as the initial and final authority, makes yukti an indispensable means to correct understanding of the deep meaning of āgama," (Iida, "Āgama and Yukti in Bhāvaviveka," p. 84).

As Toyoki Mitsukawa has shown that the major āgamas of Bhāvaviveka are the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, especially the Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (The Questions of Suvikrāntavikrāmin). According to Mitsukawa's Chart III, there are the following significant contrasts between the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti and the Prajñāpradīpa (Tibetan translation) of Bhāvaviveka.

1). While Bhāvaviveka quotes the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras thirty times, Candrakīrti quotes eleven times.
2). While Bhāvaviveka quotes the Suvikrānta-vikrami-paripṛcchā twenty times, Candrakīrti quotes none.
3). While Canddrakirti quotes the Samādhirāja-sūtra eighteen times, Bhāvaviveka quotes only once.

See Mitsukawa, "Shōben to Gesshō no shisoteki haikei," (A doctrinal background of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti), Ryūkoku Daigaku Ronshū, No. 376, pp. 51-87.
Mitsukawa, "Prasannapadā ni mirareru gattō zanmaigyō," (On the citation of the Samādhirāja-sūtra in the Prasanna-padā), IBK, XV, No. 2, (1967), pp. 24-249.

4. The combination should be noted between these three gates to freedom, i.e., sunyatā, animittatā and apranihi-tatā and trimaṇḍala-pariśuddhi. Is this Bhāvaviveka's own innovation?

5. Satkāyadṛṣṭi, Conze translates; the 'false view of individuality,' 'the belief in I and mine.' He also notes; the etymological derivation of this very archaic term

presents great and almost insuperable difficulties. (Buddhist Thought in India, . p.38, p. 276). Robinson translates, real-body-view which is one of the five views, i.e., (1) satkāyadṛṣṭi, (2) extremist-view (antagrāha-dṛṣṭi, (3) false-view (mithyādṛṣṭi), (4) approval-of-views-view, (5) approval-of-asceticism-views (śīla-vrataparāmarśadṛṣṭi) (Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 274, n. 26. Wayman writes, "The expression satkāyadṛṣṭi is translated after the T. 'jig tshogs la lta ba: 'jig=S. *sad-'dis-integrating,' BHS sad-;tshogs=S. kāya 'aggregate, collection'; lta ba=S. drsti 'view.' It appears to mean the complete occupation with transitory things. This is not the explanation given in Edgerton, Dict." (The analysis of the śrāvaka-bhūmi, etc., p. 85). Having taken recourse to these three different interpretations, we suggest, "the false view of enduring entity in an aggregated and composite entity." Mithyādṛṣṭi, wrong view that things just happen without cause or condition, according to the Ta-chih-tu-lun. See Venkata Ramanan, ibid., p. 109. Antagrahadṛṣṭi, a false view that takes two extreme sides, i.e., eternalism (śāśvata-vāda) and annihilationist views (uccheda-vāda).

6. P. p. 220, Conze, p. 157; his fewness of wishes consists in that he does not wish even for enlightenment, (alpecchatā yad bo° mahasattvo bodhim-api necchati, P. p. 220, l. 2).

7. Cf. Conze, Aṣṭasāhasrikā, etc., p. 116. The Lord: So it is, Sariputra. Even if a Bodhisattva, after he has raised his mind to full enlightenment, would, for countless aeons, five gifts, guard his morality, perfect his patience, exert his vigour, and enter the trances, how ever great may be his setting forth and the thought which he raises to full enlightenment,---if he is not upheld by perfect wisdom and lacks in skill in means, he is bound to fall to the level of Disciple or Pratyekabuddha.

8. Cf. Ramanan, op. cit., p. 294. The thirty-seven factors constitute the Way that leads to Nirvāṇa; faring on this Way one reaches the city of Nirvāṇa. The city has three gates, viz., śūnyatā, anittatā and apranihitatā, (206a),

9. See p.48 of this study.

10. For a detailed list and study of these marks and distinctions, see Burnouf, Lotus de la bonne Loi, Tome 2, "Section II, Des Quatre-vingts signes secondaires," (Paris, 1852), pp. 583-615. Lamotte, La Traite de la Grande, Vertu de Sagesse, Tome 1, (Louvain, 1944), p.272ff. De Jong, "L'episode d'Asita dans le Lalitavistara," Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller zum 65, Geburtstag, (Leipzig, 1954), pp. 323-325.

Wayman, "Contributions regarding the thirty-two characteristics of the great person," Liebenthal Festschrift, (Santiniketan May, 1957), pp. 243-260.

11. Another species of citron tree, sweet lime, (Monier-Williams Dict., 807a).

12. This explanation of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa resembles the celebrated doctrine founded by Dignāga. However, we should note that Dignāga's doctrine presupposes the Vijñaptimātra theory. On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka's line of thinking is that of the Sautrāntika as we have seen in some details in the second chapter of this study.

13. Cf. Bhagavān āha: (na-)anyā Subhūte loka (saṃvṛtir anyaḥ paramārthaḥ. yena lokasaṃvṛtes tathatā saiva (paramā)-rthasya tathatā.....)
The Lord: Worldly convention is not one thing, and ultimate truth another. What is the Suchness of worldly convention, that is the Suchness of ultimate reality..... Conze: The Gilgit manuscript of the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā P P etc., (Roma, 1962), p. 166. p. 361.

14 Dvidhā---colour and shape. Viṃśatidhā---four basic colours, eight shapes and eight colours. See Poussin's translation of the Abhidharmakośa, i, p.16

15. See Ko hsi ch'ü tsang wên tzŭ tien, (Peking, 1957), p. 888b.

16. *Nirlakṣaṇa-paramārtha-pṛṣthalabdha-viśuddha-jñāna-gocara-tathyasaṃvṛti. This long compounded expression amounts to mean the following: as we shall see presently, Bhāvaviveka grades ultimate reality into two kinds, i.e., supramundane-ultimate-reality and mundane-ultimate-reality. The former has no attributes (nirlakṣaṇa) and is inexpressible. However, the words and the deeds of the ārya, who had some experience of paramārtha, differ from those of the worldlings. This is the meaning of 'pṛstha-labdha.' In other words, the words and the deeds of ārya based on ultimate reality should be pure and true knowledge of the world (tathya-saṃvṛti-jñāna).

17. Our familiar picture of Bhāvaviveka is only a man of 'priyānumāna' which has been drawn by several scholars, starting from Candrakīrti to Kajiyama. However, the following statement on śamatha (calming of mind) shows a different side of Bhāvaviveka---a master of meditation.

18, 19 and 20. These verses are quoted by Tsong-kha-pa in his Lam-rim-chen-mo, śamatha section, which corresponds to Tōkyō Tripiṭaka Reprint (Vol. 152, p. 112, col. 5, lines 1-2), (Vol. 152, p. 116, col. 3, line 3), and (Vol. 152, p. 115, col. 5, line 8) in sequence.

21. Vastu---saṃketaviṣayaḥ / yathā ghaṭagaganādi / vastutvaṃ ca prameyatvaṃ svarūpa-saṃbandhaviśeṣo / vastu dvidhaṃ bāhyaṃ abāhyaṃ ca / (Nyāyakośa, p. 728). "Vastu is a designated object-sphere, like a pot, sky, etc. Vastutva is something which is an object of cognition and an object-sphere which is related to the essential quality. Vastu is twofold, [i.e,] external and internal."

Thus, solidity, wetness, heat, motion, etc., are the essential properties of the earth, water, fire, wind, etc., which are the object-spheres of cognition.

22. Cf. Śrāvakabhūmi, "How does he thoroughly search reason? There are four reasons: dependency reason (apekṣā-yukti), effect-and-cause reason (kārya-kāraṇa-yukti), demonstration-and-proof reason (upapatti-sādhana-yukti), and true-nature reason (dharmatā-yukti). Among these, by dependency reason, he thoroughly searches convention (saṃvṛti) from the standpoint of convention, as well as the absolute (paramārtha) from the standpoint of the absolute, and underlying cause (nidāna) from the standpoint of underlying cause." (Wayman, Śrāvakabhūmi, p. 112).

23. It should be noted here that the prerequisite to the examination of paramārtha-satya is calming (śamatha) which is the result of concentration (samāhita). At the same time, instead of dwelling that śamatha, he should proceed to higher vision (vipaśyanā). Although Bhāvaviveka does not use these technical terms, his intention lies on this point.

In this sense, Bhāvaviveka is also a 'perenial' philosopher, as Conze terms it, because there are degrees or reality and a hierarchy of insights about the reality dependent on spiritual maturity. See Conze's Buddhist Thought of India, p. 17.

24. This verse is quoted by Candrakīrti also in his Prasannapadā (39) as follows:

anityāśca te saṃskārā utpadavyayadharminaḥ /

utpadya hi nirudhyante teṣāṃ vyupaśamaḥ sukhaḥ //

Prasannapadā, p. 13, (=B40).

25. Cf. / prajñāpāramitānītir iyaṃ sarvajñatāptaye /

/ na tūtpādanirodhādipratiṣedhaparo nayaḥ /MHK-V-7/

7. This guiding principle of the Prajñāpāramitā

leads to attainment of all-knowledge,

But the method which aims at

Negation of arising, ceasing, etc., does not.

(See Iida, "Āgama and Yukti," p. 82).

This verse, the Yogācārin's criticism of the Mādhyamika, shows that despite the fact that both schools adhere to Prajñāpāramitā-nīti they interpret it differently.

26\. 1). The argument can formulated as follows:

Hypothesis:	Earth,etc.(is) not own-being-possessing.
(pakṣa)	(dharmin) (dharma)
	from the standpoint of ultimate reality.
Reason:	(Because) earth,etc. (is)
(hetu)	(a) manufacture-possessing
	(b) cause-possessing
Examples:	sa-pakṣa (a) like knowledge
	vi-pakṣa (b) (unlike)

2). Compare this formulation with the standard formulation such as given by Karl Potter:

Hypothesis:	That mountain (is) fire-possessing.
Reason:	(Because) that mountain (is) smoke-possessing.
	(a) (as in) kitchen.
	(b) (unlike) lake.

3). We immediately notice two things.

1). the standard formulation does not have the qualification from the standpoint of ultimate reality.

2). Bhāvaviveka's argument does not have vipakṣa.

Kajiyama summarizes the characteristics of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism as given in the above with the following four items;

(1). A peculiar qualification "from the transcendental point of view (paramārthataḥ)" is added in every conclusion (pakṣa).

(2). He negates the prasaṅga-vākya, which is the unique method of the Prāsaṅgikas.

(3). Reason of his syllogism lacks "non-existence of reason in the counter example" or "negative concomitance" (vipakṣa nāstitā), one of the three conditions of reason.

(4). The conclusion of every syllogism is a negative proposition and yet the negation is qualified as an absolute negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) and is not a relative negation (*paryudāsapratiṣedha*). (Kajiyama, "the Svātantrika Mādhyamika," p. 305). *The Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara Research Publication*, 1957, Nalanda.

27. The *Mādhyantavibnaga-bhāṣya* also has three interpretations of *paramārtha*. See verse III-11ab. Nagao, "The *Mādhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, p. 41.

28. The translation, *total negation* and *negation for affirmation* is due to R. C. Pandeya: *The Problem of meaning in Indian Philosophy*, 1963, New Delhi, p. 208.
Kajiyama is perhaps the first scholar who noticed the capital importance of this distinction in Bhāvaviveka's system as he says, "Just as an affirmative proposition is construed in two ways, a negative proposition is also interpreted in two ways, this time by understanding the negation as of a term (*paryudāsa*-) and as of a proposition (prasajya-pratiṣedha). A proposition 'x is not y' means 'x is a non-y or z' when the negation is understood as paryudāsapratiṣedha; but if it is construed as prasajya-pratiṣedha, the same proposition means only 'It is false that x is y' without allowing a positive interpretation. Among Buddhists, this theory of two kinds of negation was applied to philosophy first by Mādhyamikas such as Bhāvaviveka. Buddhist logicians followed them in adopting it for the explanation of their particular doctrines." (Kajiyama, *Tarkabhāṣya*, p. 3).
See also Kajiyama, "Chūgan tetsugaku no ronrikeitai," (The logical forms of the Mādhyamika philosophy). *Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, Vol. 36, No. 3.
J. F. Staal, "Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought," *BSOAS*. XXV, 1, (1962), pp. 58-59.

29. Pakṣaḥ---vipratipatty-eka-koṭiḥ (One side in an opposition), (*Nyāyakośa*, p. 451).

30. *The Abhidharmakosa*, Chapter IX. Poussin, p. 247.
Bhagavat dit à un Brâhmane: "Si je dis que tout existe, il s'agit des douze sources de la connaissance (āyatana). By the term *all*, the Buddha indicates the five *skandhas*, the twelve sense-fields, the eighteen elements,---nothing more or nothing less.

31. According to Dignāga, there are the five inadmissible theses, i.e., 1) pratyakṣa, 2) anumāna, 3) āgama, 4) loka-prasiddhi and 5) svavacana-viruddha (or nirākṛta). Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. II, p. 170, n. 2.
Here, āgama and svavacana-viruddha are taken together and anumāna-viruddha is omitted.

32. Although we have been unable to identify the exact reference of this passage from the Prajñāpāramitā literature, the term, 'sarva-dharmā-svabhāvena-śūnya' is located in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (483).
See Conze, Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, Bibliotheca Indica, No. 284, (Calcutta, 1958), p. 202.

33. These subdivisions of paramārtha-satya have capital importance in the system of Bhāvaviveka. For, here, he defines the term 'paramārthatas' which is used consistently. This paramārtha is the realm of conceptual activities. (See Kajiyama, "Svātantrika-Mādhyamika," p. 314.

34. a). Bhāvaviveka mentions the Abhivyakti-vādin in the Prajñāpradīpa also. (Tōkyō Reprint, Vol. 95, 221, 2, 1-5). According to Avalokitavrata, the sub-commentator of the Prajñāpradīpa, this is the position of the Sāṃkhya school. They argue:
pratijñā: A body is ātman-possessing.
hetu: Because, it is a manifestation [of prakṛti].
dṛṣṭānta: Like a pot. (Tōkyō Reprint, 97,186,3,1-8).
Here, Bhāvaviveka points out the impossibility of this argument, because there is the necessary concomitance (avinābhāva) between the manifestation and no-self-ness in the case of a pot. Thence, the Abhivyakti-vādin is contradicting himself in his inference.
Cf. Ichigō, "Chūganha to sutronha," p. 250.

b). As Hajime Nakamura rightly mentions, the abhivyakti-vādin is contrasted with the janma-vādin by Puṇyarāja, (11th-12th century, A.D.?) a commentator of the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. (Nakamura, Hajime, Indo shisō no shomondai, (The problems of Indian thought). (Tōkyō, 1967), p. 408.
Subramania Iyer also summarizes Vṛṣabhadeva's Paddhati, a sub-commentary to the Vākyapadīya, as follows: I-28: "According to Vṛṣabha, two views are here expressed in regard to words: (1) that they are eternal and, therefore, already existent and manifested at the time of use, (2) that they are produced at the time of use and disappear again.
The first view is associated with the Sāṃkhyas, especially Vārṣagaṇya. The second view seems to be that of the Naiyāyikas....." Iyer, K.A. Subramania, The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the vṛtti, (Chapter I), (Poona, 1965), p. 41, n. 1.

35. This is the one of the characteristics of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, as Kajiyama says: Reason of his syllogism lacks "non-existence of the reason in the counter example" of negative concomitance" (vipakṣa nāstitā), one of the three conditions of reason. (op. cit., p. 305).
Bhāvaviveka stresses this point also in his Chang-chung-lun, (Taishō 30, 268c, 28-29).

36. Cf. "A formal argument stating the three characteristics, which are respectively called anvaya (positive pervasion), vaitreka (negative pervasion) and pakṣadharmatā (the fact that h is a property of s) is metaphorically (upacārāt) called inference [for others or syllogism]." Kajiyama, Tarkabhāṣya, #14, p. 86.

37. According to the Tarkajvālā here, this view is held by a layman (laukika) and the Ābhidharmika (chos mngon pa), etc. For example, in the Abhidharmakośakārikā;

bhūtāni pṛthivīdhātur aptejovāyudhātavaḥ
dhṛtyādikarmasaṃsiddhāḥ kharasnehoṣṇateraṇāḥ //I-12//
(Gokhale, "Abhidharmakośakārikā," p. 76).

(I-12). The gross-elements are [four, i.e.,] the earth-element, water, fire and wind-elements. [They] are established by actions such as retaining, etc. [and their own-beings are] solidity, wetness, heat and agitation. Cf. Poussin, "Kośa," pp. 21-23.

38. Here, Bhāvaviveka points out the alteration (anyathā-bhāva) among the essential properties of elements. For example, when yogins move easily under the water as if they were walking on the ground, then the essential property of the water is alternated to the earth, etc.

39. Cf. Mādhyamika-kārikā, XV-2.

svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham /
akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca //

2). How, indeed, can own-being be something which is produced? Certainly, own-being [by definition] is not-produced and not dependent on anything else.

40. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, a cognition (jñāna) is explained as follows:
"From the contact of soul, sense-organ, mind and object, there arises, at all events, a cognition" (ātmêndriyârtha-saṃnikarṣāt tāvaj jnānaṃ utpadyate). P. 161 of The Vaiśeṣika Darśana, with the Commentaries of Śaṅkara Miśra

and Jayanārāyana Tarka Panchānana, ed. by Pandita Jayanārāyana Tarka Panchānana, Bib. Ind., New Series, 4 etc., (Calcutta, 1861), cited and translated by Masaaki Hattori, "Studies of the Vaiśeṣikadarśana (I)- On the Vaiśesikasūtra III, i. 13, IBK, Vol. XIV, No. 2, (1966), p. 98.

As Hattori points out elsewhere, Uddyotakara divides the contact (saṃnikarṣa) into six categories, i.e., 1) saṃyoga, 2) saṃyukta-samavāya, 3) saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya, 4) samavāya, 5) samaveta-samavāya, 6) viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva, (Cf. Nyāyavārttika, Vāranasī ed. p. 31, cited by Hattori).

See Hattori, "Vaiśeṣika no chikakusetsu ni taisuru Dignāga no hihan (Dignāga's criticism of the theory on pratyakṣa by Vaiśeṣika), Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia, No.2, p. 30, note 25.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, there are three kinds of saṃyoga: 1) anyatara-karma-ja (=the case of beating a drum with a hand), 2) ubhaya-karma-ja (=the case of clapping the hands), 3) samyoga-ja(=the case of the conjunction of young shoots, etc., which are inactive, with the substances ether, etc. when they are sprouting. (Cf. Ui, Vaiśeṣika, p. 150).

Here, we take saṃyoga between palāśa tree and candana tree as ubhaya-karma-ja.

41. Both TJ and MHK omit the translation of this Sanskrit verse.

42. Doṣābhāsa=dūṣanābhāsa. "abhūtasādhanadoṣodbhāvanāni dūṣanābhāsāni," (Nyāyamukha)." Confutation is pointing out the defect[of an inference] (dūṣaṇāni nyūnatādyuktiḥ)", see Kajiyama op.cit. p.118 and note 316.

43. avayavin= having constituents or a composite whole.

44. Dṛṣṭāntadoṣa.

45. Although we have not been able to pinpoint the exact passage, the terms, advayatā (non-duality), advaidhīkāra (not divided) have the traces of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra or the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.

46. Abhidharmakośa-kārikā, "rūpam dvidhā viṃśatidhā," (I-10a).

Here, rūpa (form or visible) is either divided into twofold, i.e., colour (varṇa) and shape (saṃsthāna) or twenty kinds, i.e., blue, yellow, red and white (4). Long, short, square, round, convex, concave*, equal, and unequal (8). Cloud, smoke, dust, mist, shadow, light, illumination, and darkness (8).

*These two terms have been previously translated as haut

(unnata) and bas (avanata) by Poussin based on Hsüan-tsang's translation kao (high) and ti (low). However, since this does not make any sense to us, we have adapted the terms, convex and concave which were suggested by Stefen Anacker according to his research. Hajime Sakurabe also translates them totsu (凸) and ō (凹) in his Japanese translation of the Kośa. See Daijō Butten, p. 336.

47. Here, the first three of the four formless attainments (ārūpya-samāpatti) are mentioned. (Cf. Poussin, Kośa, p. 143, p. 175). The last naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyāyatana (neither perception nor non-perception) does not belong to 'the worldly yogins' here. For the first three are the preparatory stages to the last.

48. The eight emancipations (aṣṭau vimokṣāḥ) are:
   1) To see all things as impure (aśubha) and thereby reduce the internal lust,
   2) not to perceive the internal form from the external appearance,
   3) not to give rise of illusion on what is lovely,
   4) the station of endless space (ākāśānantyāyatana),
   5) the station of infinite consciousness (vijñānānantya-āyatana),
   6) the station of nothing whatever (ākiñcanyāyatana),
   7) the station of neither perception nor non-perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñānāyatana),
   8) the cessation of perception and feeling (saṃjñāvedita-nirodha).

   Cf. Abhidharmakośa, VIII, vv. 32, 33, Poussin, Kośa Chapitre VIII, pp. 203-208.

49. Abhibhv-āyatana aṣṭau (Kośa, VIII-35). See Poussin, op. cit., pp. 211-213.

50. Daśa kṛtsnāny, (Kośa, VIII-36). See Poussin, op. cit., pp. 213-214.

51. Cf. Abhimokkhalakkhaṇe vā indaṭṭhaṃ karotīti indriyaṃ (Aṭṭhāsalinī 3. 213, cited by Genjun H. Sasaki, Bukkyō shinrigaku no kenkyū, (A Study of Buddhist Psychology), (Tokyo, 1960), p. 15.

52. See note 46.

53. As we noted in Chapter II-3 of this study, Bhāvaviveka deals with the Sāṃkhya system in the sixth chapter of the Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā (MHK). (pūrva-pakṣa, vv. 1-6a and uttara-pakṣa, vv. 6b-6a).

In verse two of this pūrva-paksa, as Honda* also has shown, Bhāvaviveka seems to quote the following verses from the Sāmkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakrsna (4th century A.D.). That is:

/ rtsa ba'i rang bzhin mi 'gyur ba /

/ chen po la sogs rnam pa bdun /

/ rang bzhin 'gyur ba bdun nyid do /

/ 'gyur ba rnam bcu drug kyang //3//

(Tokyo Reprint, 96, 103, 5, line 3).

This is almost identical to:

mūla-prakṛtir avikṛtir mahad-ādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ sapta

ṣodaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ //SK-3//

* Cf. Megumu Honda, "Sāṃkhya Philosophy, etc." (See II-2-(1) of this study).

S. S. Suryanarayana Śāstri translates:

III. Primal Nature (prakṛti) is not an evolute; the seven, beginning with the Great One [i.e., mahat, the intellect] are both evolvents and evolutes; the sixteen [i.e., the five organs of sense, the five of action, the mind, and the five gross elements] are only evolutes; the spirit is neither evolvent nor evolute, (A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, ed. by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, (Princeton, 1957), p. 427).

/ gtso bo yod de sna tshogs kyi /

/ rjes su 'gro phyir yongs gyur phyir /

/ bya dang byed pa'i ngo bo'i phyir /

/ nus phyir sna tshogs ngo bo'i phyir //26//

(Op. cit., p. 107, 2, line 7).

This is also almost identical to:

bhedānām parimāṇāt samanvayāc chaktitaḥ pravṛtteś ca /

kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgād avibhāgād vaisya-rūpyasya //15//

kāraṇam asty avyaktam (16a).

XV. Because of the finite nature of specific objects,

because of homogeneity, because of evolution is due to the efficiency of the cause, because of the separation between cause and its product, and because of the merging of the whole world (of effects),---there is the unmanifest as the cause. (Op. cit., p. 430).

Thus, we can assume that Īśvarakṛṣṇa flourished before Bhāvaviveka.

54. There are three internal organs (i.e., intellect, ego, and mind) and ten external organs (i.e., the five of knowledge and the five of action). Cf. SK. No. 33.

55. The term ahaṃkāra is translated as I-making, I-principle and the ego-mind, etc.

56. According to Honda, "The theory or illustration of so-called pratibimba [reflection] appears in MHK vi. 3b-4a, 24. This theory is taught already by old Sāṃkhya teachers Āsuri and Vindhyavāsin, but not in SK, and later mentioned by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the Tattvasamgraha." (Op. cit., p.(37)).

57 and 58. As Nozawa notes, these views are held by the Mīmamsaka according to Avalokitavrata in his sub-commentary to the Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter II, verse 2ff.

59. Nozawa suggests that this view is, perhaps, held by the Naiyāyikas because a similar statement can be found in the Satyasiddhi Śastra (Taishō, No. 1646), fascile 4

60. Cf. cakṣuḥśrotramano'prāptaviṣayam trayam anyathā, (AKK I-43cd, Gokhale edition, p. 78). See Poussin, Kośa, Ch. premier, pp. 87-88.

61. Cf. vedanānubhavaḥ, AKK I-14c.

62. Tibetan text reads: de ni rig pa dang mi ldan pa ma yin te/ However, judging by its context, we emend it to: de ni rig pa dang ldan pa ma yin te /

63. Cf. vijñānaṃ prativijñaptir..... (AKK I-16a.)

64. Here, Bhāvaviveka undoubtedly quotes from the concluding verse of the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra.

tārakā timiraṃ dīpo māyā-avaśyāya bubudaṃ /

supinaṃ vidyud abhraṃ ca evaṃ draṣṭavyaṃ saṃskṛtam//

The Sanskrit verse is edited and translated by Edward Conze: Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, Serie Orientale Roma, XIII, (1957), p. 62 and p. 92.

65. See AKK I-12d.

66. Kāya-vijñāna, the fifth of the six or eight consciousness, can be translated as the tactile-consciousness, because its function is discernment of all physical contacts.

67. This is the fallacy of asserting the obvious (siddha-sādhanatā).

68. As Nozawa notes, this is the Sautrāntika school.

69. The Vaiśeṣika and the Sautrāntika(?)(=the lakṣaṇa-kārin).

70. Most of the Indian mokṣa systems have knowledge of reality (tattvajñāna) as the primary path to emancipation, because morality and devotion are secondary. (Cf. Franklyn Edgerton, The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy, (London, 1965), p. 31).

The Buddhist Logicians also state this point of departure as follows:
"All successful human action is preceded by right knowledge (samyag-jñana). Therefore this (knowledge will be here) investigated. (Samyagjñānapūrvakā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir iti tad vyutpādyate)." (Nyāya Bindu, verse 1, see Theodore Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, (1962 Dover edition), Vol. II, p. 1).

71. cf. Conze, " The Large Sutra ".p.191

72. The Sautrāntika school.

73-74. The Vatsīputrīyas maintained the existence of pudgala (person) based on the Burden Sūtra. See Conze, Buddhist Thought of India, pp. 124-125. Conze comments: The Vatsīputrīyas could claim with some justice that here the person was clearly distinguished from the five skandhas. For, if person and skandhas were identical, then the burden would carry itself, which is absurd." Conze also says: "It is interesting to note also that the Vatsīputrīyas claimed that their pudgala is neither different nor identical with the skandhas; see, p. 128-30. AK, iii 41." Op. cit., p. 282, note II 2, 2-29.

75. "Self certainly exists, because memory and remembrance are the attributes of ātman"---this is a common criticism of Buddhist anātman theory. See Nakamura, Indoshisō no shomondai, pp. 104-110.

76. This is an uncertain conclusion due to an exclusive and uncertain hetu. That is:

Pakṣa: This living body has ātman.
Hetu: Because it has remembrance and recollection.
s.p.: Like another living body.
v.p.: Unlike a pot.
However, a) as for s.p. (living body), we are not certain that this remembrance is pervaded by ātman.
b) as for v.p. (a pot), we are also not certain if remembrance is not found exactly by reason of having no ātman.

See NB, III, v. 99, (Buddhist Logic, vol. II, p. 208). Kajiyama, Tarkabhāṣā, p. 114.

77. This is an argument set forth by the Vaiśeṣikas who presuppose the six objects of experience (padārthas) have the nature of existing (astitva), expressibility (abhidheyatva) and intelligibleness (jñeyatva). Kajiyama, "Indoronrigaku," pp. 833-834.

The identical argument appears in the Prajñāpradīpa, chapter eighteen. See Ichigo, "Chūganha to katsuron."

78. This Bodhisattva idea of apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa (Nirvāṇa of no-fixed abode) is expressed in many occasions in the Mahāyāna-sūtras. For example,
The Lord: It is not thus, Maitreya, that I teach liberation from Samsara or its non-appropriation, or that I teach the appropriation or non-appropriation of Nirvana. But when Bodhisattvas, great beings who course in perfect wisdom, obtain the sovereignty of thought through a cognition which has the indiscriminate realm for its object, - then, on account of their exhibiting (themselves in) Samsara through skill in means in countless world systems in the world with its ten directions, I teach the non-renunciation of Samsara on the part of the Bodhisattvas, the great beings who have reached (the Mahāyānistic) Nirvana; and on account of their being established in the baseless realm of emptiness I teach their non-renunciation of Nirvana. (Conze, "The Questions of Maitreya," p. 649).

79. Cf. (The Sautrāntika objects). It has been declared that absolute indifference, the extinction of desires which are associated with enjoying life, that this kind of blank, is Nirvāṇa. (nanu ca yo'sya nandīrāga-sahagatāyās tṛṣṇāyāḥ kṣayo virāgo nirodho nirvāṇam ity uktam) Prasannapadā, p. 525. Stcherbatsky, Nirvāṇa, pp.190-191.

80. I have not been able to identify this āgama.

81. Regarding this section, see Nozawa's article, "Hannyo-tōronshaku no nitaironsha," (The Ubhaya-vādins in the *Prajñāpradīpa-vṛtti*). *IBK*, Vol. 3, no. 2, (1955), pp. 94-101.

82. Having treated the conditioned *dharmas*, Bhāvaviveka now turns to the unconditioned *dharmas*. It should be noted that *tathā* is included in the unconditioned *dharmas* which is the Mādhyamika's position.

83. "The Vaibhāṣika cannot endure the refutation of the *pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-asaṃskṛta*." See the *Karatalaratna*, Taishō, 30, 274a, 1-17ff. Poussin, *Le Joyau dans la main*, pp. 108-;09.

84. This is the end of refutation of the own-beings of both the conditioned *dharmas* and the unconditioned *dharmas*. Therefore, we stop our translation here. However, the third chapter has roughly 345 *anuṣṭubh* verses.

Chapter V

Exposition

In the preceding chapters, some major tenets of Bhāvaviveka"s system have been introduced, Especially, we have seen that he separates the world into the conventional reality (_saṃvṛti-satya_) and ultimate reality (_paramārtha-satya_). He further divides _saṃvṛti-satya_ into real (_tathya_) and false (_mithyā_). The first is like water and the second is like the water of a mirage. Here, causal efficacy (_kriyā-kāra-sāmarthya_) is the criterion to separate the conventional reality.

However, he does not stop there. He also tries to separate ultimate reality into two kinds; supra-mundane ultimate reality and mundane ultimate reality. These seemingly pedantic divisions have capital importance in Bhāvaviveka's system.

His points are:

1. ultimate reality is uncognizable by reasoning.
2. mundane ultimate reality is cognizable by reasoning.

This is the kind of ultimate reality intended when he makes the qualification of standpoint of ultimate reality. That is to say, ultimate reality itself cannot be expressed. However, " the _paramārtha_ exists in the knowledge of the _paramārtha_ which is conformable to discrimination (_kalpanā-anulomika-paramārtha-jñāna_, see p.102 of this study).

Thus, for Bhāvaviveka, mundane reality is limited but legitimate up to a certain point. However, for Candrakīrti (see p.31 of this study), the truth is only one, i.e., the distinction between paramārtha and saṃvṛti-satya is delusion. In regard to the differences between them, Kajiyama gives the following chart:[1]

Candrakīrti		Bhāvaviveka	
paramārtha	....	aparyāyaparamārtha	paramārtha
		paryāyaparamārtha	paramārtha
saṃvṛti	lokasaṃvṛti	tathyasaṃvṛti	saṃvṛti
	alokasaṃvṛti	mityāsaṃvṛti	saṃvṛti

The basic question raised here between the two schools is the relation between ultimate and conventional reality, which is one of the constant questions reised by Buddhist thinkers. Moreover, one man's ultimate reality is, sometimes, another man's conventional reality. Therefore, we propose to trace the different views on this question.[2]

Chapter V. 1

Satya-dvaya in the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.

In the foregoing, we have seen that Bhāvaviveka qualifies all his *pakṣas* by saying either *paramārthatas*, *tattvatas*, or *saṃvṛtitas*. The scriptual authority for these criteria is the following *āgama* where the discrimination of *satya-dvaya* is emphasized:

(96,64,4-7) kun rdzob dang don dam pa gnyis shes rab kyis rab tu 'byed pa dang ldan pa'i mkhas pas so

The person who can realize buddhahood is " the learned one who is endowed with discrimination (*vibhāga*) [produced] by the insight into the two, i.e., conventional and ultimate [truth]."

In the following, we propose our critical examination of his criterion, i.e., the *satya-dvaya* system under thse headings:

1. Introduction.
2. *Satya-dvaya* in Buddhist literature.
3. The Yogācāra's criticisms of the *satya-dvaya* theory of the Mādhyamika.
4. An evaluation.

1. Introduction.

We often realize the diametrically opposed positions towards the same phenomenon in the naïve belief of a man in the street and the knowledge of the expert. We also know

that this difference arises from the gap between face-value acceptance and the careful analysis of the same datum. That is to say, here are the two levels of reality---one conventional and the other ultimate. For example, according to the social convention we say, "the sun rises in the east." However we also know the sun never moves insofar as this solar system is concerned. This sort of "Copernican swing" is one of an endless list, in every branch of human knowledge and experience. This is precisely the point Bhāvaviveka makes the following statement in the Chang-chung-lun(Taishō,30,268c,8-12) which we translate:

> We also accept the conventional reality which [everybody] in the world unanimously accepts as real. For in worldly experience, origination through causes and conditions is accepted as real. Therefore, [reality] of the conditioned elements, i.e., the eye-[organ], etc.,is brought under [the category of] saṃvṛti-sat---everybody including shepherds and cowherds know this. Since we make our assertion from the standpoint of ultimate reality, we never contradict the actual experience of the world.

Bhāvaviveka also qualifies clearly that the view from the standpoint of ultimate reality is only possible in a highly concentrated mind when he says:

> After [a yogin] has generated the concentration of his intelligence, he should investigate, with his insight..... whether or not these entities are acceptable from the ultimate point of view. (Cf. p.94& 96of this study).

We can assume the possibility of this state of affairs when a quite ordinary entity such as 'time' suddenly loses its commonsense meaning, in the unconventional moments of our life. This separation of two levels of

reality is expressed traditionally by the contrasting terms, i.e., saṃvṛti-sat vs. paramārtha-sat. This is by no means a unique feature of Buddhism, for the Jains also express these levels by using terms like vyavahāra-naya and niścaya-naya (conventional standpoint and ultimate standpoint). We find the following statement in the Bhagavatī-sūtra (18,6,631), one of the earliest scriptures of the Jains: [3]

From the vyavahāra-naya (practical or empirical standpoint) the flowing molasses is endowed with sweet taste and from that of niścaya-naya (noumenal standpoint), it has five colours, two smells, five tastes and eight touches.

Thus, there lies the following clear-cut boundary:

Conventional level	Ultimate level
saṃvṛti-sat	paramārtha-sat
vyavahāra-naya	niścaya-naya

However, the boundary between dual truths in the world varies according to the diverse world-views of the different schools of thought. We often find that their controversies pivot around this question---the differentiation (vibhāga) between conventional reality and ultimate reality.

Here, we shall critically follow the shifts and swings of this boundary among major Buddhist philosophical systems, in order to give a proper perspective for the satya-dvaya of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system.

2. Satya-dvaya in various texts.

a). The Milindapañha

One of the most celebrated dialogues in the Pāli canon is the series of questions and answers between an Indo-Greek king, Menandros and a Buddhist monk-scholar, Nāgasena. To the question put forth by King Menandros concerning the reality of " Nāgasena", he replies:

.....that 'Nāgasena' exists as a denotation, appelation, designation, as a current usage, merely as a name. But according to the highest meaning the person is not got at here. (Horner,"Milinda's questions" p.37).

Nāgasena ti sankhā samañña paññatti vohāro nāmamattaṃ pavattati, paramatthato pan'ettha puggalo nûpalabbhati (Trenckner, "MIlindapanha" p.28).

There is a deliberate usage of two terms,i.e.,sammuti and paramattha when it says:

Mahārāja! 'It is I,' 'It is mine'---is a conventional expression, [but] not ultimate meaning,(sammuti mahārāja esa, ahan-ti mamati, na paramattho eso. ibid,p.225)

Thus, the notion of an entity exists only as a conventional expression, but not in ultimate meaning. However, the status of the underlying elements of this designated notion,i.e., the five skandhas,etc.is not precisely stated. This discussion---whether they are conventional or ultimate reality --is one of the themes of the Vaibhāṣikas, as we shall see in the following section.

b). Mahāvibhāṣā.

The Ābhidhārmikas invoke the theory of satya-dvaya to explain the Four Holy Truths. These are the accounts in the Ta-p'i-p'o-sha-lun which we translate (T.27, 339c9ff.):

Document 1

1). There is a theory which takes the first two (of the Four Holy Truths) as saṃvṛti-satya, for those mundane things of the world like man, woman, going, staying, pot and clothing belong to duḥkha and samudaya-satya. The last two are paramārtha-satya, since these supramundane true virtues belong to nirodha and mārga-satya.
2). There is another theory which adds nirodha to the first two as stated above. because the mundane designation exists when Buddha declares,"The Holy Truth of cessation is like a city, a palace or the other shore. The mārga-satya is paramārtha-satya exclusively, because there is no trace of the mundane designation there.
3). There is still another theory which includes all the ārya-satyas in the category of saṃvṛti-satya, because there is also a mundane designation when Buddha preaches about mārga-satya by means of śrāmaṇa or brahmans [who course in this mārga]. The principle of the no-self and emptiness of all the dharmas belongs solely to paramārtha-satya. For, those mundane things transcend their designations in emptiness and no-self.
4). Here we (the Vaibhāṣikas) criticize: It ought to be said as follows: they are [both] saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya in all the Four Truths. The reason is: there is saṃvṛti-satya in duḥkha and samudaya---this meaning has been explained previously. [However], there is paramārtha-satya in duḥkha-satya---that suffering results from the principles of impermanence, emptiness and no-self. There is paramārtha-satya---since there is the principle of pratītya-samutpāda. There is saṃvṛti-satya in nirodha-satya like a park, woods or the other shore. There is paramārtha-satya in nirodha-satya---the exquisite detachment and cessation.. There is saṃvṛti-satya in mārga-satya---since Buddha declared that mārgā-satya is like a boat and a raft; climbing a 'rocky mountain' through the stairs and enjoying the view. It is [enjoyable] like flowers and water. There is paramārtha-satya in mārga-satya---since mārga is the principle of the way out. Thus, we maintain there are both saṃvṛti-and paramārtha-satya in the Four Holy Truths. Therefore, both saṃvṛti

and paramārtha-satya include [the saṃskṛta-dharmas, i.e.,] the eighteen dhātus, the twelve āyatanas, the five skandhas. [The asaṃskṛta-dharmas, i.e.,] space and apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha also included in saṃvṛti and paramārtha-satya. Here, someone might ask: Is the mundane nature of mundane [things] existent from the standpoint of ultimate reality? Or not? Whichever you maintain, there is difficulty in both cases. The reason is: if there is the mundane nature of mundane [things] from the standpoint of ultimate reality, then there ought to be one satya, that is, paramārtha-satya. If there is no mundane nature of mundane [things] from the standpoint of ultimate reality, then there ought to be only one satya, that is paramārtha-satya. You should answer as follows: the mundane nature of the mundane [things] is existent by reason of paramārtha-satya. If there is no mundane nature of mundane [things] by reason of ultimate reality, Buddha should have declared, "this [saṃvṛti-satya] is not real" when he taught satya-dvaya. [However], upon preaching satya-dvaya, Buddha said "this is real." Therefore, the mundane nature of the mundane [things] is existent from the standpoint of ultimate reality.

Question: If this is so, there should be only one satya, that is paramārtha-satya.

Answer: There is only one satya, that is paramārtha-satya.

Question: If this is so, why should satya-dvaya be maintained?

Answer: According to the different associations [of audiences], two kinds of [satya] are maintained. It is not caused by the different substantial entities. If it depends on the substantial entity, there is one satya, that is, paramārtha-satya. [Thence], according to the different associations [of audiences], two kinds of [truths] are maintained.

To sum up: the foregoing Vaibhāṣika satya-dvaya theory is not predominantly the levels of reality but the levels of Buddha's instruction according to the degrees of understanding of audiences. We find another important aspect of satya-dvaya in the Mahāvibhāṣā (T. 27,463b,20-27), which we translate:

Document 2

[Those agents] like the person who is born and dies exist as

samvrti-sat. [On the other hand], the law of birth and death exists as paramārtha-sat. The person who enters and departs from samādhi exists as saṃvṛti-sat. [However], the samādhi which is being entered and departed exists as paramārtha-sat. The agent of [action] and the receiver of [the consequences of that action] exist as saṃvṛti-sat. [Nevertheless], karma, ripening and fruit [of action] exist as paramārtha-sat. That is: the definite nature of success and failure exists as paramārtha-sat. The designated agent of success and failure exists as saṃvṛti-sat. [On the other hand], the law of birth and death exists as paramārtha-sat. The person who enters and departs from samādhi exists as samvrti-sat. [However], the samādhi which is being entered and departed exists as paramārtha-sat. The agent of [action] and the receiver of [the consequences of that action] exist as saṃvṛti-sat. [Nevertheless], karma, ripening and fruit [of action] exist as paramārtha-sat. That is: the definite nature of success and failure exist as paramārtha-sat. The designated agent of success and failure exists as saṃvṛti-sat. That is to say: If successful nature is embodied in him, he is called a successor. If the nature of failure is embodied in him, he is called a [born] loser. For example, a tree, etc. are designated [entities] [while] the four elements(?) like rūpa, etc. are substantial entities. Likewise, a person (pudgala) is a designated [entity], while the five skandhas, i.e., rūpa, etc. are substantial entities.

Here, the point is: while the designated notion is saṃvṛti-sat, the underlying (upādāna) elements are paramārtha-sat. Here is a shift from the position of Nāgasena, because the underlying elements are paramārtha-sat here, while their status is not precisely stated in the Milindapañha.

c). The Abhidharmakośa.

Next, we translate the satya-dvaya theory in the Abhidharmakośa (T. 29, 116b,11-27) where the foregoing account of the Mahāvibhāṣā is expounded:

Document 3

It is also said in another sūtra [entitled Ekottarāgama], "As for satya, there are two kinds, i.e., [saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya. What are the marks of these satyas? The kārikā says (Gokhale,"Abhidharmakośa").

yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyā'pohe dhiyā ca tat

ghaṭā'mbuvat saṃvṛtisat paramārthasad anyathā //VI-4//

[When that thing] is either broken [physically] or

negated through intellectual [analysis],

the notion (buddhi) of that thing does not [evolve],

just as a jar and water---it is saṃvṛti-sat.

Otherwise, it is paramārtha-sat.

Discussion: If that thing is broken [physically], then the notion of that thing is annuled---this should be known as saṃvṛti-sat. And also, if the notion of that thing is annuled, as soon as that thing is negated through intellectual [analysis]---this is also saṃvṛti-sat. For example, when water is analyzed into rūpa etc. the notion of water is annuled. This applies to fire, etc. That is: when that thing is neither [physically] broken nor negated [yet through intellectual analysis],that thing is superimposed by means of worldly conventional expression. It is called 'saṃvṛti,' because it is a superimposed entity. According to the criterion of the world, we say, "there are a jar, etc." That is: When that thing is neither [physically] broken nor negated [through intellectual analysis], that thing is superimposed by means of worldly conventional expression. It is called 'saṃvṛti,' because it is a superimposed entity. According to the criterion of the world, we say, "there are a jar, etc." [Since] it is [still] a substantial entity and not a hollow entity (brdzun, mṛṣā), it is called saṃvṛti-sat. If an entity differs from the above, then it is called paramārtha-sat. That is to say, [even] though that thing is broken, the notion of that thing is not annuled. Also, when the other thing is negated through intellectual [analysis], yet that notion still exists---that thing should be known as paramārtha-sat. For example, rūpa, etc. [because] that thing is smashed into atoms or taste, etc. are negated by subtle intellectual [analysis], still the notion [of rūpa] persists. This applies to vedanā, etc. They are called paramārtha-sat, because they 'really really'exist. [Since] it is a [true] substantial entity and not a hollow entity, it is called paramārtha-sat.

To sum up: This is the position of the Sautrāntika,

in that it maintains the reality of a conglomerated entity,

i.e., 'a jar and water, etc.' in the locus of samvṛti-sat. They only admit the basic elements of these conglomerated entities as 'real entities' in the locus of paramārtha-sat. The identical argument based on the same kārikā is in the A-p'i-ta-mo shung-cheng-li-lun (fascicle No. 58, T. 29, 666a, 6-27) and the A-p'i-ta-mo tsang-hsien-tsung-lun (fascicle, No. 29, T. 29, 914c, 2-23) which are the works of Saṃghabhadra, a rival of Vasubandhu.

Bhāvaviveka's view of the two realities in general is similar to the above. However, there is an important difference: Bhāvaviveka is a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. That is to say, as a good Mādhyamika, he goes further by saying, "rūpa, etc. are also saṃvṛti-sat and not paramārtha-sat" as we have seen in the foregoing chapters of this study. According to Bhāvaviveka, this view is "the criterion of the Prajñāpāramitā" (prajñāpāramitā-naya) which he takes as 'the proper criterion of Buddhism.' Here is the shift from 'prajñā to prajñāpāramitā'---analysis to perfection of analysis.

The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra writers declare through the dialogue of Bhagavat and Subhūti, "all exists in conventional reality, but nothing exists in ultimate reality." This is the ultimate analysis. From here, we proceed to the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras including the Ta-chih-tu-lun, the commentary to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā.

d). Prajñāpāramitā-literature.

First, we propose to understand the meaning of 'prajñā-pāramitā' as 'perfection of analysis' or 'ultimate analysis' as far as the discrimination of satya-dvaya is concerned. The term 'prajñā' is translated as 'wisdom,' 'knowledge,' 'insight,' etc. However, there is another important meaning, i.e., 'analysis' which is synonymous with 'pravicaya' according to the Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā of Yaśomitra. It says: Prajñā is discriminating comprehension (pravicaya) of dharmas.[4]

Candrakīrti, in his Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa, also makes this point analogous with a person who, in search of the essence of the core of a plantain, never finds any core by peeling off the skins of a plantain.

Document 4

(99,5,2-2) / zhes rab (line-3) ni chos rab tu rnam par 'byed pa'o / / rnam par 'byed pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo mang bo ril bo gcig lta bur gyur pa'i don la 'dis so sor rtogs pas rnam par 'byed pa'o / / khyad par can du rnam par (line-4) 'byed pa ni rab tu rnam par 'byed pa ste / blo yis dngos bo'i cha rnam par phye nas 'di'i rang gi ngo bo ci zhes te / nye bar dmigs pa'i don la nges par snying bo ci zhig yod ces de lta bu'i rnam par (line-5) zhugs pa'o / / dper na chu shing gi sngong po la snying bo 'dod pas rnam par phye ba lta bu ste / ji ltar 'ga' zhig snying po 'dod pas chu shing gi sngong po shun pa dang shun pa tha dad du legs par rnam phye (line-6) nas btsal pa na snying bo cung zad kyang mi rnyed pa ltar blo gros dang dlan pas gang zag dang chos rnams kyi rang gi ngo bo yongs su btsal ba na snying po cung zad kyang mi dmigs so /

'Prajñā'---discriminating comprehension (pravicaya) of dharmas. 'Pravicaya' is analytical thorough consideration (pratyavekṣaṇa) with a given object which is a conglomeration of many entities. [In other words] discriminative discernment is 'pravicaya.' That is: having dissected the part[s] of an entity, with intellectual [analysis], one ascertains (pratipanna): What is the intrinsic nature of this [thing]?

What is the definite essence of the perceived object? For example, it is like dissection in search of the core of a plantain (kadalī). A person, who, in search of the essence of the core of a plantain, never finds any core by peeling off the skins of a plantain. Analogous to this, a person who is endowed with intellect never finds any core whatsoever in search of the intrinsinc nature of the internal person and the external dharmas by thorough analysis.

The foregoing interpretation of prajñā is similar to the statement of Ramanan based on the Ta-chih-tu-lun:

There are two kinds of prajñā. The one is the eternal prajñā. The other is (the impermanent prajñā) which functions along with the five pāramitās. (The latter is) the functional prajñā-pāramitā (while the former could be called the substantial or the stable prajñā).....The functional prajñā can put an end to the darkness of ignorance, and fetch the true (eternal) prajñā.....In the eternal prajñā (the undivided reality) there cannot be found (even the distinction of) ignorance and knowledge. (521b).....The functional prajñā is really the act of knowing which can be said to consist of I) analysis, II) criticism and III) comprehension. (Ramanan, "Philosophy of Nāgārjuna" pp. 116-117).

Next, the central theme of the Prajñāpāramitā literature is succinctly put forth by Conze as follows:

The thousands of lines of the Prajñāpāramitā can be summed up in the following two sentences: 1). One should become a Bodhisattva (or, Buddha-to-be), i.e., one who is content with nothing less than all-knowledge attained through the perfection of wisdom for the sake of all beings. 2). There is no such thing as a Bodhisattva, or as all-knowledge, or as a 'being,' or as the perfection of wisdom, or as an attainment. To accept both these contradictory facts is to be perfect. (Conze, Prajñāpāramitā Literature, p. 15).

However, these are not contradictory when we understand this statement in relation to the satya-dvaya theory. That is: from the standpoint of conventional reality, "one should become a Bodhisattva, i.e. one who is content with nothing less than all-knowledge, etc." for all exists in the locus of

saṃvṛti-sat. However, from the standpoint of ultimate reality, "there is no such thing as a Bodhisattva, or as all-knowledge, or as an attainment," for nothing exists in the locus of paramārtha-sat, which is the culmination of saṃvṛti-sat. This is clearly stated in the Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā as follows:

> Śāriputra: Is there then no attainment, is there no reunion? Subhūti: There is attainment, there is reunion, but not in ultimate reality. It is through worldly conventional expressions that attainment and reunion are conceived, that Stream-winners, etc. to: Buddhas are conceived. But in ultimate reality there is none of all this. (Conze, "The large sūtra" p. 191).

The point is: all the indications of dharmas, i.e., from rūpa to the special Buddha-dharmas, exist from the standpoint of conventional reality and not from the standpoint of ultimate reality (paramārthatas). For, if nirvāṇa exists in ultimate reality, there exist bifurcation of subjective entity and objective entity, i.e., a Bodhisattva who realizes nirvāṇa, and nirvāṇa which is to be realized. And if this bifurcation exists, then it is not nirvāṇa, according to the guiding principle of the Prajñāpāramitā. This point is repeatedly made in these lines of the Taishō Tripiṭaka:

Volume VI.	882c,16-19.	1018b11-1019b24.	1052c27.
	1053a2.		
Volume VII.	164c,18-19.	230b, 13-15.	335b, 23.
	350b, 25.	360c, 11.	383a, 21-23.
	395b, 6-10.	425b, 5.	533a, 22-26
	564b, 2-3.	604c, 15-16.	693c, 10.

	699c, 10-11.	704b, 11.	714a, 23-24.
	769a, 3-4.	949b, 7-8.	971a, 7-8.
Volume VIII.	883a, 27-28.	902a, 3.	835c, 18.
	898a, 20.	846a, 17.	839a, 3-4.

This frequency is significant when we find a few occurrences of the term paramārtha or paramārtha-śūnyatā.in the Gandha-vyūha, X, 798b, 28. 314a, 28. 554a, 118. 890a, 12.

e). The Ta-chih-tu-lun

The Ta-chih-tu-lun, being a commentary, is not a systematic treatise with a logical sequence. However, it provides us with the following detailed accounts which we translate:

Document 5

In Buddhist teachings, there are the dual truths, i.e., conventional and ultimate truth. From the standpoint of conventional truth, the existence of the sentient being is maintained. [However], from the standpoint of ultimate truth, non-existence of the sentient-being is maintained. From the standpoint of conventional reality, fruits [of action] is preached. It is not from the standpoint of the foremost (ultimate) reality, [for] cause, conditions and fruits cannot be preached in ultimate reality. The reason is: ultimate reality has no marks of existence and in-existence, conceptualization and expression (686a4-6, also see, 727a1-18). There are also two kinds of existence, i.e., one is known through expression and the other is not known through expression. (336b28-336c3).....The ancients super-imposed names for the different things[in order to dif-feremtoate them:] the posteriors cognize thse things through these expressions---thus, the things which have expressions came to have their [own intrinsic] nature.

Another important feature worth mentioning is: the dual truths are also explained in terms of the four siddhāntas, i.e., mundane (laukika), individual (prati-

pauruṣika), antidotes (pratipakṣika) and the ultimate (pāramārthika). These four are all true when it says (cf. Lamotte, Traité, p. 27, Ramanan, Nāgārjuna, pp. 136-141):

Question: Since it is called 'the foremost,' the foremost (ultimate) siddhānta is true and the rest of them are not?

Answer: No! It is not so. These four siddhāntas have truth in each of them.....[For example], 'a person' is real from the standpoint of mundane siddhānta, [but] unreal from the standpoint of the foremost siddhānta. (59c9-14).

However, it also should be noted that the teaching of 'reality' and 'unreality' of dharmas can be conventional and ultimate truths interchangeable according to the maturity of the audiences. There is no rigidness about it when it says:

The ring finger is both long and short: it is short see from the middle finger, but long from the little finger. Both 'long' and 'short' are true. The teaching of existence and non-existence of [dharmas] are the same way. The teaching of existence is [both] mundane and ultimate according to the occasion. The teaching of non-existence is [also both] mundane and ultimate according to the occasion. [Therefore], the Buddha's teachings concerning existence and non-existence of self are both true. (254a27-254b2, cf. Ramanan, Nāgārjuna, p. 134).

The relative position of a thing is also explained in the case of the spatial directions in regard to satya-dvaya:

Since [the spatial direction] is admitted in conventional reality, we do not fall into the negative view. Since it is negated in ultimate reality, we do not get stuck with the eternal view. (288b5-6, cf. Ramanan ibid., p. 203).

f. The Mādhyamika literature.

Now we come to the satya-dvaya theory of Nāgārjuna (second-third century), the founder of the Mādhyamika school. His name is "associated with the consolidation of the Prajñā-pāramitā," (Conze, Literature, p. 10). The relationship

between him and the Prajñāpāramitā literature is:

The lower terminus for the earliest extant version of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra is A.D. 172, the date of Lokakṣema's first Chinese translation (Matsumoto, Literatur, pp. 22-23). The lower limit for the Pañcaviṃśati is A.D. 286, the date of Dharmaraksa's translation. Thus some form of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā was established by Nāgārjuna's time, but it is possible that the Pañcaviṃśati was still in process of formation and may owe something to Nāgārjuna's influence. The Aṣṭasāhasrikā is the more suitable for the present comparison, since if it is connected with Nāgārjuna, he depends on it, not it on him. (Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, pp, 62-63).

Although there is no clear-cut contrast between the terms paramārtha-sat and saṃvṛti-sat in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, unlike that of the Pañcaviṃśati and Śatasāhasrikā, the intention is clearly there, for we cite the following instances:

1). For, as aiming at ultimate reality, the perfection of wisdom has been set up for the penetration by all beings into what all dharmas truly are. (Mitra, Edition, p. 225, Conze, Large Sūtra, p. 79).

2). The Lord: Where does a Bodhisattva course when he courses in perfect-wisdom? Subhuti: In ultimate reality. (Mitra, ibid., p. 356). Conze, ibid., p. 136).

3). Shakra:.....Through your might we have heard a sermon which has issued from ultimate reality, which is opposed to the whole world, and which gives no support to any of those beings who are established in any of the news which involve the assumption of an individuality, or who have settled down in any of the views which assume the existence of something that is not.

This is rather significant in view of the development of the Prajnāpāramitā literature. For, as we shall see later, the Pañcaviṃśati and the Śatasāhasrikā continuously repeat the contrasting terms of paramārtha-satya and

samvrti-satya. In his Mādhyamika-kārikā, Nāgārjuna does not qualify his statement either by paramārthatas or samvrtitas, although there are the celebrated passages concerning satya-dvaya which are as follows:

The Buddhas' Dharma-explanation relies on two truths: the worldly, conventional truth, and the absolute truth. Those who do not know the distinction between these two truths do not know the deep reality in the Buddha's teaching. Without reliance on the expressional [truth], the absolute is not taught; without arriving at the absolute, nirvāṇa is not reached (24.8-10)(Prasannapadā, pp. 492-94). (Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, pp. 48-49).

Here, only mutual dependency of conventional truth and ultimate truth, one expressible and the other inexpressible, is mentioned. However, the Ratnāvalī, which is attributed to Nāgārjuna, states clearly the point with which we are concerned.[5]

Document 6

28. From the point of view of the absolute truth it is wrong to say that there is an ego or that there is something belonging to the ego, because both these assumptions are impossible when one has fully understood the reality of things.

Here Tucci notes: The sentence: "From the point of view of the absolute truth" implies that the ego, etc., may be said to exist only from the point of view of the conventional worldly truth, samvrti, loka, vyavahāra-satya.

47. If a cause is born before the effect or along with it, in both cases, from the standpoint of the absolute truth [tattvatas] it cannot be the cause. In fact, the notion of birth cannot be conceived either from the conventional or from absolute point of view.

3. In this way from the standpoint of the absolute truth [the notion] of a self or of a non-self cannot be conceived. Therefore the Great Ascetic excluded both views.

64. From the standpoint of absolute truth, both this world as well nirvāṇa are equally non-existent, either in the future or in the past or in the prsent; how can then any difference between them be real?

Āryadeva says:

.....The Buddhas' Dharma-teaching always relies on the popular truth and on the absolute truth. Both these are true and not false speech. For example, though the Buddha knew that all the dharmas are markless, he told Ānanda, "Go into the city of Śrāvastī and beg food." A town cannot be perceived apart from earth, wood, etc. But because he accorded with popular speech, he did not fall into false speech. We, too, are without error, because we study according to the Buddha. (Robinson, ibid., p. 49).

Thus, as Tsong-kha-pa also says:

There are many instances [in the Mādhyamika literature] where the qualifications like paramārtha-[tas], satya, tattva[tas] are placed with the things to be negated. If not, there are many instances where there are qualifications such as---it cannot be established from the viewpoint of svabhāva, svarūpa and svalakṣaṇa. (Tōkyō Reprint, 152, 150, 4-2) / zhes don dam pa dang bden pa dang yang dag pa dgag bya la sbyar nas gsungs pa mang la de dag ma sbyar ba'i (line-3) che yang rang gi ngo bo dang rang bzhin dang rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa med pa'i khyad par sbyar ba ni shin tu mang ngo / (cf. Nagao, Chibetto Bukkyōkenkyū p.222).

Thus, we have made abundantly clear that the discrimination of the two realities (satya-dvaya-vibhāga) is not a new invention of Bhāvaviveka, but a continued thought in the Buddhist sūtras and śāstras. He only made this distinction as a key criterion of his system.

However, this criterion was criticized by Dharmapāla in his commentary on the Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva (Ta-ch'eng-kuang-po lun-shih-lun. Taishc, vol. 30, No 1571, p.246, b14ff).

6

Kajiyama translates:

(246,b14ff.) Here some people, replying to this objection, say, "We are not to be accused so, since defilement and good exist in the sense of the con-

ventional truth." When we pursue them and ask if convention is not a truth, they answer, "It is We call it a truth according to our conventional cognition [although not in the sense of the highest truth]." However, how can they say that one and the same thing is existent and non-existent at one and the same time, and that both [the existence and non-existence] are truths? The same fallacy can be pointed out with regard to origination and so forth. If a thing is at the same time originated and not originated, annhilated and not annhilated, having and end and not having an end, constant and not constant...these pairs are incompatible in themselves. How can both qualities of the pair be true? And yet they maintain, "The non-existence of a thing is meant in the sense of the highest truth and, at the same time, its existence is meant in the sense of the conventional truth. Since they are different in meaning, there is no incompatibility. For example, gift, which people call good, is not truly called good because it is in essence [not different from] a defilement; but it is also called good because it is morally good. These two aspects are both true, and there is no incompatibility in saying so." But this is not correct...

Vasubandhu deals with the same question in his <u>Fo-hsing-lun</u> (A treatise on the Buddha-nature, T31,793c, 8-794a-3).

Having introduced the opening round of question and answer, which tallies with the <u>Yogācāra-bhūmi</u>, Vasubandhu asks:

Question: Moreover, if you maintain that superimposition of own-being in [an entity] which has no-own-being is called saṃvṛti-[sat], then how could that superimposition be unreal?

Answer: Due to the perverted views, [one] maintains 'sat' in an unreal entity. That is to say; when one says, "there are the qualities (guṇa) of permanent, etc. in the dharmas [which

are really] impermanent, ill, selfless and [repulsive], then he is only designating reality where there are no substantial entities. These superimpositions are included [in the category of] the four perverted views. Likewise, thence, the superimposition exists, but [real entity] cannot be obtained.

Question: Then, this perversion is either real or non-real. If it is real, then [to say], "all the dharmas have no own-being," is not valid. [On the other hand] if it is unreal, then this superimposed perversion also does not exist. [Therefore,] your position, "the superimposed own-being in [an entity] which has no own-being is saṃvṛti-sat" is not valid.

Here, the basic point at issue is the phenomenology of the mind-constructed world, for the Mādhyamikas did not develop this aspect of Buddhist thought as the Vijñānavādins did. Another difference is the methodology, as Robinson says:[7]

> No two things could differ more in appearance than a Mādhyamika and a Yogācāra (Vijñānavādin) treatise. The former is dialectical, the latter didactic. The Mādhyamika criticizes Abhidharma, the Yogācāra writes a veritable Mahāyāna Abhidharma, with headings, sub-headings, lists and numbers ramifying luxuriantly. Mādhyamika dialectic works contain many negations and few affirmations. Yogācāra works are the other way around. Their major project is construction of a world-description, the same project as in Abhidharma, Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika.

In particular, the Yogācārin asserts, provisionally at least, that there are three own-beings (sva-bhāvas). However, the term own-being (sva-bhāva) was a forbidden word and the major target of criticism for the Mādhyamika. Thence, it is said that while the Mādhyamika holds satya-dvaya, the Yogācārin holds svabhāva-traya. However, this question, not so simple as it appears, needs a separate treatment.

IV.2 Svabhāva-traya in the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.

Thus, the rigorous qualification between saṃvṛti-tas and paramārtha-tas has capital importance in Bhāvaviveka's system. Therefore, his position on the doctrine of svabhāva-traya theory should be re-examined from this point of view. It is believed that while the Mādhyamika holds satya-dvaya ,the Yogācārin holds svabhāva-traya . For example, having studied the twenty-fifth chapter of the Prajñā-pradīpa , Yasui reached this conclusion when he says:

> Then, this controversy takes the special form of disputation as to the twofold truth (satya-dvaya) versus the threefold existence (svabhāva-traya). Therefore, with this controversy, we are able to ascertain that the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra were two opposing schools, and that the philosophical position of the former was the satya-dvaya theory while that of the latter was the svabhāva-traya theory. Thus we have a useful implement in distinguishing the chief characteristics of the two schools. (Yasui, Chūgan shisō, p. 5).

However, this question is not so simple as Yasui puts it, because:

a). There is svabhāva-traya theory in the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra which is one of the āgamas of the Mādhyamika.

b). Bhāvaviveka does not deny the necessity of posing para-tantrasvabhāva from the standpoint of conventional reality, as he clearly states in the very chapter which Yasui studied. 8

c). In fact, it is a natural thing for a leading Tibetan lama to compose a treatise entitled---Dbu ma thal rang gnyis gzhi bden pa gnyis dang mtshan nyid gsum 'chad byed kyi mdo dang bstan bcos cung zad 'god pa (A short treatise on the āgama and yukti concerning satya-dvaya and svabhāva-traya as the basis [of siddhāntas] in both the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika-[schools]).

Here, the basis (gzhi) is the first member of the three major divisions of the Siddhantās, i.e., gzhi, lam, 'bras bu gsum as we have seen in the Siddhānta section of this study. However, this term gzhi (āśraya) describes the point on which the whole controversy of satya-dvaya and svabhāva-traya hinges.

That is to say:

a). The doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda denies a self-existent āśraya (basis) of the occurrences.

b). However, in the occurrences, the importance of āśraya cannot be denied.

Here lies a basic difficulty of the doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda which is the corner-stone of Buddhsit thought. History attests this difficulty when we know the existence of the Pudgalavādins (the Personalists) who maintain, " Person also exists from the standpoint of ultimate reality." Later on, the development of ālayavijñāna theory , which is the major tenet of the Yogācāra, attests eloquently this state of affairs. The theory of svabhāva-traya, established firmly in the Saṅdhinirmocana-Sūtra, also represents this movement, i.e., search for āśraya.

The doctrine of svabhāva-traya tries to give an ideal solution for this paradoxical situation by posing paratantrasvabhāva which is the basis of the occurrences. However, if someone maintains the reality of paratantrasvabhāva

from the standpoint of ultimate reality, then it is against the doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda. Thence, it is not a Buddhist doctrine. This in a nutshell is the position of Bhāvaviveka which will be documented in this section.

The position of the Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra is undoubtedly the criticism and modification of the Prajñāpāramitā thought, when the Sūtra says:

By the first Turning of the Wheel of Doctrine, [Buddha] taught the doctrine of the āryasatya and on its basis the astivāda of the Abhidharma has been developed. This astivāda was negated by the Prajñāpāramitā and there has been established the śūnyavāda of the Mahāyāna. The amalgamation of both asti and śūnya-vāda is now done by the Sandhinirmocana, and it is the last and the highest Turning of the Wheel of Doctrine.....The ultimate doctrine of the Mahāyāna is no doubt taught in the Prajñāpāramitā, but its way of exposition is 'with an esoteric meaning,' or 'with a hidden intention.' (Lamotte, ibid., 85ff). (T. 16, 693c).

Thus, the hidden purpose of 'Sandhi-nirmocana,' i.e., 'the disclosure of the knotty [doctrine]' is, as Lamotte rightly observes:

"the establishment of the doctrine of svabhāva-traya in order to clarify the niḥsvabhāvatā of the Prajñāpāramitā literature." (Lamotte, ibid., p. 67).

There also exists a section where svabhāva-traya is preached by Buddha, as we shall see it presently. And if so, how could Bhāvaviveka deny that doctrine, since all the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras are the āgamas for Bhāvaviveka. Tsong-kha-pa deals with this question as he says in his Legs-bshad-snying-po (Tōkyō Reprint, 150, 203, 4ff).

The very meaning which appears in "the Chapter of Maitreya's

question" [in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā] is not yet known in details by the great Mādhyamikas. Therefore, [I] discussed this in some details. (153,205,3-1) byams zhus kyi le'u snang zhing de nyid kyi don dbu ma pa chen po dag gis zhib tu bkra ba yang mi spang bas zhib tu gtan la (line-2) phab pa'o /

Tsong-kha-pa's words are still valid today. For this reason, the partial translation of the work is not out of place here, prior to the discussion of the subject.

Tsong-kha-pa's exposition.

If we explain the establishment of the three aspects of [reality which is set forth] in the Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra, in the manner of the Yogācārins, then do we wish to understand the teaching of the three aspects of [reality] which is in the Maitreya Chapter in the manner of [the Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra] or not? If we do, then it is improper to take the terms of the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras according to [the Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra], because it [will become] the same as the Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra.

(153,203,4-4) gal te dgongs 'grel gyi mtshan nyid gsum gyi rnam gzhag rnal 'byor spyod pa'i lugs su 'chad na byams (line-5) zhus kyi le'u las mtshan nyid gsum gsungs pa yang de bzhin du 'dod dam mi 'dod / 'dod na yum gyi mdo rnams sgra ji bzhin par 'dod pa mi rigs te dgongs 'grel bzhin no /

If we do not take it that way, then [how do we explain the following] from the Sūtra, [The Bhagavat]:Maitreya, whatever imgained form, should be seen as unsubstantial. Whatever discerned form, because of its substantiality, should be viewed as substantial, although it never occurs as an independent reality. Whatever dharmic nature of form should

be viewed as neither unsubstantial nor substantial, but as manifestation of ultimate reality.

(153,203,4-6) mi 'dod na mdo les las:
Bhagavān āha: yan Maitreya parikalpitaṃ rūpam idam adravyaṃ draṣṭavyaṃ. yad vikalpitaṃ rūpam idaṃ vikalpitaṃ rūpaṃ sadravyatām upādāya sadravyaṃ draṣṭavyaṃ na tu svatantra-vṛttitah. yad dharmatā-rūpan tan naiva-adravyaṃ na sadravyam paramārtha-prabhāvitaṃ draṣṭavyam.9

One might say: Thus, [these passages] tally with the Sañdhinirmocana-sūtra, because the following three guiding principles (nīti) are established here. 1) Bhagavat says that [Discerned form which is] paratantra [should be viewed] as substantial. 2). All dharmas, from form to the Buddhadharmas, are mere names. 3). If the foregoing is proved, then previous understanding of [existence] is nullified. This needs [further] elucidation.

(153,203,4-8) / zhes gzhan dbang rdzas yod du gsungs shing / gzugs nas sangs rgyas kyi bar gyi chos rnams ming tsam du sgrub pa na ming gi snga rol blo med phyir la sogs pa'i rigs (153,203,5-1) pa gsum gyis bsgrubs pas dgongs 'grel dang mthun no zhe na bshad par bya ste /

Maitreya: [If, O Bhagavat, all dharmas have no own-being,] how then should the Bodhisattva, who courses in Prajñā-pāramitā [and who wants to train in the training of a Bodhisattva] train in [all dharmas, i.e.,] from form to the Buddhadharmas?

(P. 578a5) [atha khalu] Maitreyo [bodhisattvo mahāsattvo Bhagavantam etad avocat:] [yadi Bhagavann abhāva-svabhāvāḥ sarvadharmās tadā Bhagavan] prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caratā bodhisattvena mahāsattvena [bodhisattva-śikṣāyāṃ] śikṣitu-kāmena yāvad rūpe tāvad Buddhadharmeṣu kathaṃ śikṣitavyam?

Being asked thus, the Bhagavat replied: [A Bodhisattva] should train that [all thing from form to the Buddhadharmas] are mere names.

evam ukte Bhagavān.....evam aha:.....nāmamātrakaṃ rūpam iti śikṣitavyam.....nāmamātram yāvad buddhadharmā iti śikṣitavyaṃ.

[Tsong-kha-pa paraphrases the passages which we quote in full]. Maitreya: If, O Bhagavat, when this name, i.e., from 'this is form' to the Buddhadharmas were apprehended as something which has a corresponding entity on account of its being taken for the sign of something conditioned, how then could a Bodhisattva train in that from form to the Buddhadharmas are mere names? But since it is without a corresponding entity, is it not improper to say of this name even that it is a mere name, or to say it is from 'this is form' to 'the Buddhadharmas' are mere names?

Maitreya: yadā Bhagavan savastukam idan nāmadheyam upalabhyate yad idaṃ rūpam iti.....savastukam idan nāmadheyam upalabhyate yad idaṃ yāvad buddhadharmā iti, yad uta saṃskāra-nimittam upādaya, tadā kathaṃ bodhisattvena mahāsattvena nāmamātrakaṃ rūpam iti śikṣitavyam?.....nāmamātraṃ yāvad buddhadharmā iti śikṣitavyam? atha-avastukam evaṃ sati tasya nāmnas tad api nāmamātraṃ na prayujyate, yad idaṃ rupaṃ iti nāmamātram na yujyate.....(P. 579a) yāvad buddhadharmā iti nāmamātram na prayujyate.

[Tsong-kha-pa comments:] thus being asked by Maitreya, [which amounts to] if there is a corresponding entity to the meaning [of name], then

(153,203,5-3) don gyi (line-4) dngos po yod na tsam gyi sgras gcad rgyu med la med na (ming) 'jug pa'i gzhi med pas ming yang med ces pa'o /

The Bhagavat: As something adventitious has that name been added on to that entity which is the something conditioned, i.e., when one says that from "this is form' to 'the Buddha-dharmas.'

evam ukte Bhagavān.....etad avocat: āgantukam etan nāmadheyaṃ prakṣiptaṃ tasmin saṃskāra-nimitte vastuni yad idaṃ rūpam iti, āgantukam etan nāmadheyaṃ prakṣiptaṃ..... yad idaṃ yāvad buddhadharmā iti.

Something adventitious (āgantuka) means something ficticious here. Thereby own-being is repudiated. [One might take as follows] by this [statement]: real existence of rūpa, etc., are not negated here, like vijñāna, but real existence of rūpa, etc., as far as its being of conventional designation (nāma-saṃketa-svabhāva) is concerned, are negated. If it is so, then the hidden meaning of the foregoing statement of Bhagavat, i.e., "[all dharmas], from form to the Buddha-dharmas are mere names," will be to say 'this is form,' etc., are nothing but nominal designation (nāma-prajñapti) as far as its designational being (prajñapti-svabhāva) is concerned, however, form, etc., as the basis (āśraya) of designation, are not mere conventional terms (nāma-saṃketa-mātra).

(153,203,5-5) / glo bur ba ni 'dir bcos ma'i don yin pas rang zhing 'gog pa'o / / 'dis rnam rig pa ltar gzugs sogs bden (line-6) grub mi 'gog par gzugs la sogs par ming btags pa'i ngo bor gzugs sogs bden par grub pa bkag na ni / sngar gzugs nas sangs rgyas kyi bar ming tsam du gsungs pa'i dgongs pa ni (line-7) 'di gzugs so zhes sogs su btags pa'i ngo bo mind du btags pa tsam yin gyi 'dogs pa'i gzhi gsugs sogs ming du btags pa tsam min zhes bstan par 'gyur ro /

[Tsong-kha-pa]: Then, [consider] the following (de lta na 'og nas):

Maitreya: Do then from form, etc., to the Buddhadharmas altogether not exist by way of their own-marks?

(kiṃ punar Bhagavan sarvaśaḥ svalakṣaṇena na-asty eva rūpam? .....na santi eva yāvad buddhadharmāḥ?

Bhagavat: I do not teach that!

(na-aham [Maitreya sarvaśaḥ svalakṣaṇena rūpan] na-asti-iti vadāmi.....[yāvad buddha-dharmā] na santi-iti vadāmi).

Maitreya: How then do form, etc., exist?

(kathaṃ [Bhagavaṃ rūpam]asti.....[yāvad buddhadharmāḥ santi?]

Bhagavat: From form, etc., to the Buddhadharmas exist by way of worldly social agreements and conventional expressions, but not in ultimate reality.

(loka-saṃketa-vyavahārato Maitreya rūpam asti, na tu paramārthato.....yāvad buddhadharmāḥ santi, no paramārthataḥ.

Thus, it will be illogical to say, "all [dharmas], from form to the Buddhadharmas, do not exist at all from the standpoint of ultimate reality, but [exist] by way of worldly social agreement," [when we consider the proceeding statements of Bhagavat]. For this reason, [some] claim that is is illogical to say: We interpret the purport of hidden meaning as the provisional meaning (neyārtha) when Bhagavat says "all dharmas do not exist in ultimate reality, but exist as a conventional expression" in the foregoing chapters of the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras. If it is so, then dharmas which are indicated by names, are fictitious, since they are postulated as beings

by means of conventional expressions (vyavahāra). There is no contradiction in the meaning when Bhagavat states, "that [basis] exists and that [basis] is only nominal indication (nāma-prajñapti)," for this reason: [We] negate the basis, which is constituted by name [or] which is not postulated as being by means of conventional expression. On the other hand, we do not [totally] negate, in general, the property (vastu) of the basis which is constituted by name.

(153,204,1-1) zhes gzugs nas sangs rgyas kyi bar thams cad don dam par med mnyam dang tha snyad du yod mnyam du gsungs pa mi rigs par 'gyur ro / / de'i phyir le'u 'dis yum gyi mdo las sngar chos thams (line-2) cad don dam par med cing tha snyad du yod par gsungs pa'i dgongs pa bstan nas drang don du bkral lo zhes pa ni mi rigs pa smra ba'o / des na ming du btags pa'i chos rnams ni tha snyad kyi dbang gis (line-3) yod par bzhag pa'i bcos ma yin pas / tha snyad kyi dbang gis yod par bzhag pa tsam min pa'i ming 'jug 'jug pa'i gzhi med kyi spyir ming 'jug pa'i gzhi'i dngos po med pa min pas de yod pa dang (line-4) ming du btags pa tsam du gsungs pa mi 'gal ba'i don no /

Thus, if we imagine that 'this is form' by means of seeing the property of form without name, i.e., 'form,' then [we postulate] the produced form, which is adventitious are nominal indication, by means of unproduced name! How could this be logical? This is a question [by Maitreya] which amounts to: it is logical to say that if form is postulated by means of conventional expression (vyavahāra), then even the time when that name is not indicated, the thought of 'this is form' will be born, because there is the postulated [being] by means of conventional expression.

(153,204,1-4) / de la gsugs zhes bya ba'i ming med par gzugs kyi dngos po mthong ba'i dbang gis 'di gsugs so snyam pa mi skye'o ming gi dbang (line-5) gis skye bas gzugs zhes bya ba ni glo bur du ming du btags pa'o zhes ji ltar rigs zhes dris te / gzugs tha snyad kyi dbang gis bzhag na de'i ming ma btags pa'i dus su yang tha snyad kyi dbang gis (line-6) bzhag pa yod pas gzugs so snyam pa skye bar rigs zhes pa'o /

Then, Bhagavat put a question to Maitreya: Without depending on a name, does that thought of ['this is] form' arise in that entity? When [Maitreya] answered, "No! It does not arise," then Bhagavat proclaimed: By this reason, form, etc., are something adventitious and nominal indication.

(153,204,1-6) / de nas byams pa nyid la ming la ma brten par de nogs bo la gzugs so snyam pa'i blo skye 'am zhes dris pa na mi skye'o zhes zhus pa'i tshe (line-7) rgyu mtshan de nyid kyis gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni glo bur du ming du btags par gsungs so /

Hereby, that reason proves that form, etc., are postulated by means of conventional expression (vyavahāra). However, from that (reason?), the reverse is not established, when it is said, "if form, etc., exist by own characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), then that production of thought, i.e., 'this is form' should arise without attending to conventional expression," similar to the following example, i.e., if a sprout exists by own characteristic, then it comes out without depending on a seed, [this is untenable].

(153,204,1-7) / 'dis rgyu mtshan de gzugs sogs tha snyad kyi dbang gis bzhag pa'i sgrub byed yin (line-8) gyi de las bzlog pa'i sgrub byed min par bstan pa ni / gzugs sogs rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub na de la gzugs so snyam pa skye ba de ming btags pa la mi ltos par skye dgos zhes pa ste dper (153, 204,2-1) na myu gu rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub na sa bon la mi ltos par 'phen pa dang 'dra'o

It is also said by Bhagavat: "[There can be] several similar names for the thing, and aslo one name for several things. By this reason, [you should know that] form, etc., are indication and something adventitious." This means to say that if form, etc., are not something adventitious which is postulated by means of conventional expression, then these names, which are conventional expression, have to manifest by means of own characteristics---these [statements] are wrongly reasoned. [The above] is proved by these reasonings, therefore, it is not necessary at all to prove this according to the Mahāyānasamgraha.

(153,204,2-1) / dngos po gcig la ming 'dra ba du ma dang don du ma la ming gcig 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis (line-2) kyang gzugs sogs su btags pa glo bur bar gsungs pa yang gzugs sogs tha snyad kyi dbang gis bzhag pa'i glo bur ba min na ming gi tha snyad rnams mtshan gyi dbang gis 'jug dgos la de lta na (line-3) de rnams mi rigs pa'i don no / / rigs pa 'di rnams kyis bsgrubs pas theg bsdus ltar sgrub dgos pa'i nges pa ci yang med de /

[Because] it is also said in the Vaidalyasūtra: Since that also does not exist from the standpoint of ultimate reality, then the denotation (vācaka) and the denoted (vācya) do not exist [ultimately], because the fallacy of mixture of many aspects is detected and the fallacy of indefinite [conclusion exists].

(153,204,2-3) zhib mo rnam 'thag las / de yang don dam par grub pa yang (line-4) ma yin pa de'i phyir rjod par byed pa dang brjod par bya ba dag rnam pa du ma 'dres pa'i skyon mthong ba'i phyir dang ma nges pa'i phyir ma grub pa yin no /

Thus, ultimate existence is negated by the last two [nyāya] among the threefold nyāya.

(153,204,2-4) / zhes rigs pa gsum po'i phyi ma gnyis kyis don dam par (line-5) grub pa bkag pa bzhin no /

[Maitreya] asked: If it is so, then, having referred (upadāya) what entity, [all dharmas], from form to the Buddha-dharmas, do we not apprehend the intrinsic nature of form, etc., which are name, conventional expression and indication (prajñapti)? [Maitreya] means to say: as for form, etc., is there not the intrinsic nature which is real by own accord, because of the presence of an entity which is the basis of name and indication?

(153,204,2-5) / de nas de lta yin na gzugs zhes pa nas / sangs rgyas zhes pa'i bar du dngos po gang nye bar bzung nas ming dang tha snyad 'dogs pa'i gzugs sogs kyi ngo bo nyid dmigs (line-6) pa kho nar mi 'gyur ram zhes zhus pa ni / ming 'dogs pa'i gzhi'i dngos po 'dug pas gzugs sogs la rang bzhin gyis grub pa'i ngo bo nyid yod pa ming nam zhes pa'o /

Bhagavat: Does the meaning of [the terms, i.e.,] name, conventional expression and indication of form, etc., mean the intrinsic nature of form, etc., or nothing but indication (prajñapti)? When Maitreya answered, "it is nothing but indication," Bhagavat said: then, how do you think about the former question?

(153,204,2-6) / de'i lan du gzugs zhes (line-7) pa la sogs pa'i ming dang tha snyad 'dogs pa'i don de gzugs sogs kyi ngo bo nyid yin nam btags pa tsam du zad ces gsungs pa na / btags pa tsam du zad ces zhus pa'i tshe 'o na dri ba snga ma ltar sems (line-8) pa ji ltar yin zhes gsungs so /

This clarified [the point]: there is no contradiction between 1). Although this is no intrinsic nature which is real by own accord, but there is an entity which is the basis of name, and 2). There is only nominal designation there. Then,

[Maitreya] asked: If form, etc., are only name and conventional expression, do we not apprehend the intrinsic nature of form, etc.?

(153,204,2-8) / 'dis ni rang mtshan gyis grub pa'i ngo bo med kyang ming gi gzhi'i dngos po yod pa dang de la ming du btags pa tsam du gsungs pa yang mi 'gal bar bstan no / / de nas (153,204,3-1) gzugs sogs ming dang tha snyad tsam yin na gzugs sogs kyi ngo bo nyid dmigs par 'gyur ram

Maitreya's question is: If [form, etc.,] are nothing but indication as previously stated, then do we not apprehend the intrinsic nature [of form, etc.,]. [By] saying this, a contradiction between [these] two [statements] is pointed out. Against this objection, [Bhagavat meant to answer]: Although I state that [form, etc.,] are nothing but indication, nevertheless the basis of indication and the indication are retained. If it is so, then there is no contradiction by saying it is necessary to postulate the intrinsic nature of form, etc.

(153,204,3-1) zhes zhus pa ni sngar btags pa tsam du zad na ngo bo nyid dmigs par mi 'gyur ram zhus pa gnyis 'gal (line-2) bar bstan pa la / btags pa tsam du smra bas kyang 'dogs gzhi dang 'dogs byed khas blang dgos la de lta na gzugs sogs kyi ngo bo nyid yod dgos pas mi 'gal zhes pa'o /

Bhagavat answered: Is there any production, annihilation, defilement (saṃkliṣṭa) and purification (vyavadāta) in that place which is only nominal indication? When [Maitreya] answered, "No! There is none." Bhagavat said: Then, how can [your] question---if it is only indication, is there not the intrinsic nature [of form, etc.,]---be reasonable?

(153,204,3-2) / de'i lan du (line-3) ming du btags pa tsam de la skye 'jig dang kun byang yod dam gsungs pa la med do zhes zhus pa na / 'o na btags pa tsam yin na ngo bo nyid yod par mi 'gyur ram zhes 'dri ba ji ltar 'thad ces gsungs (line-4) so /

Thus, by answering the question put forth by [Maitreya], as previously mentioned,---"Is there not [the intrinsic nature] of form, etc., in every aspects?"---Bhagavat said: The negation of the intrinsic nature and production, annihilation, defilement and purification [is preached] in ultimate reality. On the other hand, we proclaim: form etc., exist in conventional expression. Consequently, to say, "it is only indicated in name" is also conventional expression. Therefore, where could we reconcile the method of exposition [of this doctrine] and [that of] the <u>Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra</u>?

(153,204,3-4) / de nas sngar bshad pa ltar gzugs sogs rnam pa thams cad du med dam zhes pa'i dris lan mdzad pas ngo bo nyid dang skye 'gag dang kun byang bkag pa don dam par yin la / tha snyad du (line-5) gzugs sogs yod par bstan pas ming du btags pa tsam yang tha snyad du yin pas dgongs 'grel dang 'chad tshul ga la mthun /

The ācārya brothers [Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] also did not interpret the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra as the provisional meaning (<u>neyārtha</u>), because of the [Maitreya] chapter. They might have intended this by thinking: [considering] the standard of interpretation according to the <u>Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra</u>, this [Maitreya chapter] also has the following statement: All dharmas do not exist from the standpoint of ultimate reality, but exist as conventional expression only. There-

fore, it is just not logical to take [this] literally.

(153,204,3-5) slob dpon sku mched gyis kyang le'u 'dis yum gyi mdo drang (line-6) don du mi 'grel zhing dgongs 'grel gyis 'grel ba'i rgyu mtshan yang 'dis kyang chos thams cad don dam par med la tha snyad tsam du yod par bstan pas sgra ji bzhin par gzung du mi rung ba 'dra'o snyam (line-7) du dgongs so /

[The foregoing] does not contradict the following statement by Bhagavat, i.e., "paratantra[svabhāva] has substantial entity (dravya)." [However], since firstly we have to know the method of the teaching of the three marks in that [Prajñāpāramitā]sūtra, we shall elucidate it in the following:

(153,204,3-7) / gzhan dbang rdzas yod du gsungs pa dang mi 'gal ba ni thog mar mdo de las mtshan nyid gsum gsungs tshul shes dogs pas bshad par bya ste /

[We quote] from that [Maitreya chapter]: Imagined form, Maitreya, is the false imagination [caused] by the own-beingness of form and which is based on the name, notion, social agreement, concept and conventional expression, i.e., form in that entity which is the sign of something conditioned. .....[the same thing can be said] up to the imagined Buddha-dharmas.

Bhagavān āha: yā Maitreya tasmin saṃskāra-nimitte vastuni rūpam iti nāma-saṃjña-saṃketa-prajñapti-vyavahāran niśritya rupa-svabhāvatayā parikalpanā-idaṃ parikalpitaṃ rūpam..... yāvat ime parikalpitā buddhadharmāḥ.

Thus, imagined [aspect] is treated. "Having based on (āśritya)"--- having apprehended the object of form which is postulated through name. "False imagination [caused] by the own-beingness of form (rūpa-svabhāvataya [pari] kalpanā)"---it is not discrimination through this [object itself], but when-

ever the own-being of discrimination [is postulated there is] a false imagination. [The above] is the explanation [of the first].

(153,204,4-1) / zhes kun brtags ngos bzung nog (line-2) brten nas zhes pa ni ming du btags pa'i don gzugs la dmigs nas zhes pa'o / / gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid du rtog ces pa ni 'dis rtog pa min gyi gang du rtog pa'i ngo bo nyid kun brtags su (line-3) ston no /

Discerned form, moreover, is the stable state (avasthānatā) of that entity which is the sign of something conditioned in [its] dharmic nature [and] mere discernment. [And] having depended on the discernment, there is a verbal expression, i.e., [from] 'this is form' to 'these are the Buddhadharmās which are name, notion, social agreement, concept and conventional expression. This is discerned form..... these are the discerned Buddhadharmās.

yā punas tasya saṃskāra-nimittasya vastuno vikalpamātra-dharmatāyām avasthānata vikalpa-pratītya-abhilapanatā tatra-idaṃ nāmasaṃjñāsaṃketaprajñaptivyavahāro rūpam iti..... yāvad buddhadharmā iti. idaṃ vikalpitaṃ rūpam.....ime vaikalpitā buddhadharmāḥ.

1). Although the terminology differs from the Sandhi-nirmocana-sūtra, there exists clearly the doctrine of svabhāva-traya in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra. It is also declared by Bhagavat:;
"yad vikalpitaṃ rūpam idaṃ vikalpitaṃ rūpaṃ sadravyam upadaya sadravyam drastavyam na tu svatantra-vrittah.
"Whatever discerned form, because of its substantiality, be viewed as substantial, although it never occurs as an indpendent reality".

This is another way of establishing sadravya of paratantra-svabhāva which is the āśraya (basis) of the events.

2). At the same time, there are repeated occurrences of the familiar theme, i.e., "loka-saṃketa-vyavahāro rūpam asti, na tu paramārthataṣ. (Form exists by way of worldly social agreements and conventional expressions, but not in ultimate reality).

Thus, as Tsong-kha-pa correctly observes, if paratantra-svabhāva is sadravya, then it will be illogical to say:

all [dharmas], from form to the Buddhadharmas, do not exist at all from the standpoint of ultimate reality, but [exist] by way of worldly social agreement. (153,204,1-1).

Then Tsong-kha-pa continues by saying that there is no contradiction, because,

"[We] negate the basis, which is constituted by name [or] which is not postulated as being by means of conventional expression. On the other hand, [we] do not totally negate, in general, the property (vastu) of the basis which is constituted by name."

However, as long as, Tsong-kha-pa deals with 'existent' and 'non-existent' of paratantra-svabhāva in the same locus, i.e., either saṃvṛti-sat or paramārtha-sat, one cannot but feel a contradiction in spite of all the niceties of his argument. At any rate, this important but difficult text needs an altogether independent investigation.

Another interesting fact in the Legs-bshad-snying-po is the several occurrences of Yüan-ts'e(612-696), contemporary with Hsüan-tsang, and his Commentary to the Sandhinirmocana-Sūtra which is translated from Chinese to Tibetan. This is an important fact, because as Hatani says:[10]

"Yüan-ts'e has a striking tendency to interpret the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra with the doctrines of the Vijñānavāda. For example, there is the following passage in the Jen-wang-ching

(Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra explaining how benevolent kings may protect their countries):

Pu chu se, pu chu fei se, pu chu fei fei se. ([A bodhisattva] does not dwell upon form, does not dwell upon non-form and does not dwell upon non-non-form). Yuan-ts'e comments:.....Just as in the case of the Mahāyānasamgraha, there are three kinds of form; first, imagined form (parikalpita-rūpa) which is parikalpita; second, discerned (vikalpita-rūpa) which is paratantra; third, dharmatā-rūpa which is parinispanna. Adhering to no-triple-svabhāva [theory], triple-svabhāva is negated. Thence, it is said, "[A bodhisattva] does not dwell upon from form to non-non-form." (T. No. 1708, Vol.33, 381b, 25-28).

Yüan-tse perhaps quotes this terminology of triple-svabhāva from the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra quoted in the Mahāyāna-samgraha (T. 31, 399b, 28-399c, 13), since, for some reason, "The Maitreya's question" is not only lacking from all Chinese sources, but also from the Śatasāhasrikā, and also from the Gilgit Ms. of Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā. However, Yuan-ts'e's position of commenting on the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra from triple-svabhāva theory is not entirely unique, because Dignāga summarizes, as we have mentioned elsewhere, the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras from the standpoint of the doctrine of the triple-svabhāva.

Yüan-ts'e notices the controversy between Bhāvaviveka and the Yogācārins over the status of paratantra-svabhāva which he concludes as follows (T No. 1708, 360c, 5-7);

As it is explained in the Kuang-pai-lun volume ten (T.30, 246 ff.), there are three masters' comments on this. First, the Yogācārins maintain the reality of paratantra-svabhāva, while Bodhisattva Bhāvaviveka maintains śūnya of paratantra-svabhāva and Bodhisattva Dharmapāla refutes the inclinations of both [position].

This is a neat picture, but rather an oversimplification of the matter. The reason is: as we have been stressing the point, it is necessary to qualify all negation, in Bhāvaviveka's system, either by samvṛtitas or paramārthatas. According to the Prajñāpāramitā-nīti, Bhāvaviveka will not deny the reality of paratantra-svabhāva, i.e., the basis of all occurrences as samvṛti-sat. He only negates any substantial entity as the basis of the occurrences from the point of view of ultimate reality, since if any substantial reality is admitted in the locus of paramārtha-sat, the fallacy of samāropa (superimposition) is commited. Also it is no longer a Buddhist theory, because it negates the doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda when a substantial entity is recognized in ultimate reality. On the other hand, if the reality of paratantra-svabhāva is negated in the locus of samvṛti-sat, the fallacy of apavāda (depreciation) is committed.

Here, Bhāvaviveka attempts to establish a basis of human existence which is free from these fallacies, i.e., superimposition and depreciation. His effort is valid, if it is not successful, for one of the basic questions of Indian Philosophy is: In the ultimate sense, what are the modes and bases of human existence in regard to the liberation of man?

NOTES

Chapter V

1. Kajiyama, Yuichi, "The Svātantrika Mādhyamika Philosophy", p.302, note 1.

2. Cf. La Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'Abhidharma--les Deux, les Quatre, les Trois Vérités ", MCB, Vol.V, 1936- 1937, pp.159-187.

3. Sikdar, Jogendra Chandra, Studies in the Bhagavatī-Sūtra, (Research Institute of Prakrit,Jainology & Ahimsa, Muzaffarpur, Bihar), 1964,pp.557-558.

4. Cf. Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā (Ogihara edition),p.127, lines 27-28,cited by Yamaguchi,Susumu in his " Gessho Gounron ni okeru E no Shinjo no Kaishaku"(Interpretation of caitasika of prajñā in the Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa of Candrakīrti), Kanakura Kinen-Ronbunshū, p.300, note 2

5. Tucci, Giuseppe(ed.),"The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna", JRAS, April,1934,pp.314,318,322 and 1936 p.240

6. Kajiyama,"Bhāvaviveka,Sthiramati,and Dharmapāla",pp.8-9

7. Robinson,"Classical Indian Philosophy"(Part I),p.211.

8. Bstan pa rgyal mtshan (see p.v. of this study).

9. This Sanskrit text is edited by Conze,Edward and Iida, Shotaro. see " 'Maitreya's Questions' in the Prajñāpāramitā" Renou Commemoration Volume, Paris, 1968,pp.229-242.

10. Hatani,Ryotai,"Yuishiki shū no Iha"(A different branch of Vijnanavadin [in China]), Shūkyō Kenkyū, Vol.1,No.1, 1916.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

Bhāvaviveka, as a "perenial philosopher", admits degrees of reality and a hierarchy of insights about the reality dependent on spiritual maturity and degrees of samādhi. This contradicts our familar picture of Bhāvaviveka who is only a man of priyānumāna which has been drawn by several scholars, starting from Candrakīrti. In fact, Bhāvaviveka describes how the world looks to someone who is in the process of samādhi. However, we are not in a position to decide whether he had an actual experience or did not have. He stresses the point that all serious inquiry starts from re-examination of common appearances of the world, as he says:

> After [a yogin] generates the concentration of his intelligence, he should investigate, with his insight, these [natures], i.e., solidity, wetness, heat, motion, etc., which are the properties (vastu) of the earth, water, fire, wind, etc. These dharmas are established by the method of saṃvṛti which can be understood by the conventional expression (vyavahāra) [of the mundane world].---While he is making investigation with his intelligence, he ponders in this manner: whether or not these entities are acceptable from the ultimate point of view. (p.94 & 95 of this study).

That is: No one denies the fact that there are the inherent powers of the four elements in conventional reality --earth which is the solid energy that sustains things in space, water the wet energy that consolidates, fire that heat energy that transforms things, and wind the mobile energy that expands.

However, in ultimate reality, those elements lose their rigid own-beings (=identities), for they are only conventional designations. Then Bhāvaviveka tries to prove this absence of own-being (=niḥsvabhāva=śūnyatā) with his speculative reasoning (tarka). He, having introduced his subject, proceeds to demolish the view "held" by other schools. Thence, the validity of Bhāvaviveka's refutations depends on the accuracy of his pūrvapakṣa, i.e., representation of his opponents' views on the subject. According to our observation, Bhāvaviveka misrepresents the opponent's views as Nāgārjuna does which is shown by Robinson:

1) He holds that whatever has extension is divisible, so is composite, impermanent and unreal. An indivisible, infinitesimal thing could have no extension. But several schools -- Vaiśeṣika, Sarvāstivāda and the Śūnyavādin Sūtras, not to mention the Upaniṣads - - consider ākāśa (either, space) to be omnipresent and indivisible. Thus there is at least one entity that is not composite, has extension and is permanent. This being so, it is not absurd to hold that there are others. And if extension is admitted, then duration must be admitted, too, because the arguments against duration are like those against extension.

2) He holds that to exist means to be arisen, so that existence is synanymous with manifestation and there is no unmanifested existence. Sāṅkhya, though, affirmed that arising is the same as manifestation, and that things 'exist' in another state before they arise and after they cease. The difference is largely though not wholly definitional. Nagarjuna does not point out this difference of definition, and he does not refute the Sāṅkhya axiom. He just denies it.

3) A real thing would have to be an utterly simple entity that contains no diversity. If it had diversity, it would have extension and so would not be indivisible and real. This axiom is not accepted by the pariṇāmavādins -- Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Rāmānuja, for example. The Sāṅkhya world nature (prakṛti), as we have seen, consists of the three properties (guṇas) and hence has diversity as its intrinsic nature. Again, Nāgārjuna does not refute this theory. He asserts an axiom of his own against the contradictory one of his adversaries. (Robinson, "Classical Indian Philosophy" Part II, p.207).

However, it is also undeniable, that these pūrvapakṣas have great value for the history of Indian Philosophy.

The object of Bhāvaviveka's logical argument, as we have seen, is not to establish any positive description of ultimate reality itself, but quite simply to pave the way to ultimate reality itself and to demonstrate the limit of reasoning. Because he maintains:

1. ultimate reality is uncognizable by the knowledge of other (a-para-pratyaya).
2. mundane ultimate reality is knowable by the non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpa-jñāna).

Thus, Bhāvavaviveka maintains the power of svatantra anumāna into the room of realm next to ultimate reality itself. This understanding is accessible only to highly trained introspection where flame of reasonings (tarka) are consummated. Then, prajñā is born like the new phoenix from the ashes, as Bhāvaviveka says:

atra vāco nivartante cittasyāyam agocaraḥ /
nivartta[te ca] saṃkalpo jñānamaunaṃ ca jāyate//III-277//
Words stop here; this is not a domain of thought,
Conception turns back; and the silence of knowledge
is born.

----------o 0 o----------

यः [illegible] ज्ञानं प्रपञ्च [illegible] तत्त्वलिङ्गाद् [illegible] धीमां [illegible]
[illegible] बोधा । [illegible] (1) [illegible] न [illegible]
[illegible] ॥ मालिन्यात् ([illegible])

दयादेव [illegible] फलस्य [illegible] (1) [illegible]
ति [illegible] (1) तस्मात् [illegible]
प्रकाशते [illegible] (1) [illegible]
सा च [illegible] विकिया [illegible] (1) तथा [illegible] प्रविबेकानु
[illegible] तेषां [illegible] (8ab)

तस्मात् [illegible]

[illegible] ज्ञानं [illegible]

[illegible] किमर्थं [illegible] (22ab) [illegible]
न [illegible] (23ab) [illegible]
[illegible] (24ab) [illegible]
[illegible] (1) [illegible]
[illegible] (1) [illegible] हेतु

(27ab) [illegible]

(29ab)

[illegible]

(44ab) [illegible]

(49ab)

(50ab)

(51ab)

(52ab)

(53ab)

(54ab)

(55ab)

56ab

57ab

58ab

59ab

63cd

60ab

64ab

60cd

62cd

65cd

66cd

67cd

69ab (70)

69cd

72ab

(1)

79ab

94ab

(89) (90)

(92ab) (93cd) (94cd) (94ab) (95cd) (95ab) (96cd) (96ab) (97cd) (97ab) (98cd) (98ab) (99cd) (100ab) (100cd) (101cd) (102cd) (103cd) (103ab) (104c (105ab) (105cd) (106ab) (106cd) (107ab) (107cd) (108ab) (108cd) (109cd) (109ab) (110cd) (111cd) (111ab) (112cd) (113cd) (113ab) (114cd) (114ab)

(115cd) (115ab) (116cd) (116ab) (117cd) (117ab)

118ab
118cd 119ab
119cd 120ab
120cd 121ab
121cd 122ab
122cd 123ab
123cd 124ab
124cd 125ab
125cd 126ab
126cd 127ab
127cd 128ab
128cd 129ab
129cd 130ab
130cd 131ab
131cd 132ab
132cd 133ab
133cd 134ab
134cd 135ab
135cd 136ab

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works listed in the text, especially Chapter II.2, are not listed here. Works cited in shortened form in the notes are listed here in full.

Abhyankar, Vāsudev (ed.). Nyāyakośa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy by Jhalakikar. Poona: The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1928.

Beal, Samuel. Records of Western Countries. London: Kegan Paul, 1906.

Conze Edward. Buddhist Thought of India. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962.

-------. The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom, with the divisions of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra, Part I. London: Luzac & Co., 1961; Part II and III, Madison, 1964.

-------. Prajñāpāramitā Literature. Hague: Mutton & Co., 1960.

Edgerton, Franklin. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.

Frauwallner, Erich. "Landmarks on Indian Logicians," WZKSO, 5 1961.

Gokhale, V. V. "The Vedānta-Philosophy, described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakahṛdaya."

-------. "Gotama's vision," Brahmavidyā, vol. XXX, Adyar: 1966.

-------. "The Text of the Abhidharmakośakārikā of Vasubandhu," JRAS, (Bombay Branch), NS. vol. 22, (1947), pp. 73-102.

Guru Deva. Tāranātha's Chos-'byun. Sāranāth: 1964.

Hatani, Ryōtai. Kokuyaku Issaikyō. Chūganbu I.

Hikata Ryūshō. Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra. Fukuoka: Kyūshū University, 1958.

Horner, Isaline Blew. Milinda's Questions, Vols. II, SBB, Vol. XXII, XXIII, London: Luzac & Co., 1964.

Johnston, E.H. and Arnold Kunst. "The Vigrahavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna," Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, IX (1951), pp.1-54.

Julien, Stanislas. Mémoires sur les contrées occidentales par Hiouen-thsang. Paris: Impr. Impér., 1858.

Kokuyaku Issaikyō. Iwano Masao (ed.). Tokyo: Daitō Shuppan, Indo senjutsubu, 156 vols., 1928-36; Wakan senjutsubu, 66 vols., 1936-45.

Yenshō Kanakura, Ryujō Yamada, Tōkan Tada and Hakuyū Hadano (ed.). A Catalogue of the Tōhoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism, Sendai: 1953.

Kajiyama, Yuichi. An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, (An annotated translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta). Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10, 1966.

Kitagawa, Hidenori. Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū (A Study of Indian Classical Logic---Dignāga's system), Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan, 1965.

La Vallée Poussin, Louis de. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā de Candrakīrti (Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. IV). St. Petersberg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1913.

-------. L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Paris: Geuthner, 1923-31.

-------. "Nanjio's 1185, Bhāvaviveka," Album Kern, (1903), pp. 581-3. See also JRAS (1903). p. 581.

Lokesh Chandra. Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary, Vols. 12, New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1959-1961.

Mahāvyutpatti, 2 vols. (R. Sakaki, ed.). Kyoto, 1916-25; reprint, Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan, 1962.

Milindapañho, (V. Trenckner, ed.). London: Williams & Norgate, 1880.

Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London: Allen and Unwin, 1955.

Nagao, Gadjin. Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964.

-------. (ed.). Daijō Butten, (The Mahāyāna Buddhist texts), Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1967.

--------. Chibetto Bukkyō Kenkyū (A Study of Tibetan Buddhism), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1954.

Nanjo, Bunyu. A Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883.

Nozawa, Jōchō. "Chūgan ryōgakuha no tairitsu to sono shinri-kan," in Miyamoto ed. Bukkyō no konpon shinri, Tokyo: Sanseido, 1956, pp. 455-485.

Obermiller, E. "The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as Exposed in the Abhisamayālaṁkāra of Maitreya," Acta Orientalia, XI (1933), pp. 1-33.

Ōtake, Shōshin. "Shōben to funbestumyō," Mikkyō Kenkyū, 39, (1930), pp. 114-126

Potter, Karl H. Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963.

Robinson, Richard, H. Early Mādhyamika in India and China, Madison, Milwaukee, and London: 1967.

--------. " Classical Indian Philosophy " (Part I & II), Chapters in Indian Civilization, Vol. I, (Classical & Medieval Period), edited by Joseph W. Elder, Department of Indian Studies of the University of Wisconsin, Madison 1967, pp. 127-227

Ramanan, K. Venkata. Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as presented in Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1966.

Śāstri, N. Aiyaswami. "Karatalaratna," Visva-Bharati Annals, 2.

--------. "Madhyamārthasaṃgraha of Bhāvaviveka," JORM, 5, 1. (1931).

Schayer, Stanislaw. "Notes and Queries on Buddhism," Rocznik Orjentalistyczny, 11, (1935).

Schiefner, Anton. Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhisms in Indien. St. Petersburg: 1869, Reprint series 3.

Staal, J.F. "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian thought," BSOAS, XXV, 1, pp58-59.

Stcherbatsky, Theodore. Buddhist Logic, Leningrad: 1930-32.

--------/ The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa. Leningrad: Office the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 1927.

Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō. Takakusu Junjirō and Watanabe Kaikyoku (eds.). 100 vols. Tokyo: Daizō Shuppansha, 1924-34.

Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Reprint, (Tokyo-Kyoto; Suzuki Research Foundation, 1957.

Tucci, Giuseppe. Tibetan Painted Scrolls, 2 vols. Rome: 1959.

--------. Minor Buddhist Texts, part 1. Rome: Istituto Italiano il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1956.

Ui, Hakuju. Indo tetsugaku kenkyū, 5, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1929.

--------. Bukkyō jiten, Tokyo: Tōsei Shuppansha, 1954.

--------. The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1917.

Wassiljew, W. Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur, St. Petersburg, 1860.

Watters, Thomas. On Yuan-Chwang's Travels in India. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904.

Wayman, Alex. Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961.

TITLE OF THESIS An Introduction to Svāntantrika-Mādhyamika

Full Name Shotaro Iida

Place and Date of Birth Gotsu, Shimane Prefecture, Japan, July 17, 1926

Elementary and Secondary Education

Colleges and Universities: Years attended and degrees 1945-48 Minobusan College, Yamanashi Prefecture, Japan; Tōhoku University, Sendai, Japan, B.A. degree, 1953; University of Kyoto, Japan, 1953-1955; Messiah College, Grantham, Pa., 1955-56; Columbia University, 1956-57; University of Toronto, 1960-61; University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 1961-65; 1965-66, research in India, Delhi University.

Membership in Learned or Honorary Societies

Publications see attached page

Major Department Buddhist Studies

Minor(s) Philosophy

Date 6-24-68

Signed Richard H. Robinson
Professor in charge of thesis

Publications and Papers:

Book to appear:

1. English translation of Apollo Buddha by Susumu Yamaguchi. Translated in collaboration with Lewis Lancaster. Risōsha, Kyoto. Publication scheduled for 1968.

Articles:

1. "Āgama (Scripture) and Yukti (Reason) in Bhāvaviveka." Kanakura Festschrift, October 1966, Heirakuji-shoten, Kyoto, Japan, pp. 79-96.

2. "'Maitreya's Questions' in the Prajñāpāramitā," in collaboration with Edward Conze. Louis Renou Commemoration Volume, Paris 1968, pp. 229-237.

3. "A Lotus in the Sun - Analysis of the Sōkagakkai," Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Annual Report, Simla, India. Transactions of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, vol. one, 1965. Rashtrapati Nivas, Simla-5, pp. 57-66.

4. "Indojin to Nihonjin--Mono no kanjikata, Kangaekata, arawashikata. (Indians and Japanese--their ways of feeling, thinking and expression.) Asahi-shimbun National Edition. November 11, 1966.

5. "New York no futatsu no hōtō." (Two dharma-lights in New York), Chugai-nippo, Kyoto, 1959.

Reviews:

1. Dynamic Buddha and Static Buddha (A System of Buddhist Practice), written by Susumu Yamaguchi, translated by Shoko Watanabe, Philosophy East and West, Vol. XII, No. 3, October, 1962, in collaboration with Lewis Lancaster.

2. Shinnran's Gospel of Pure Grace by Alfred Bloom, the University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1965. Pacific Affairs, 1968.

Books in Manuscript and in Progress:

1. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, Chapter fifteen.

2. A Tibetan-English Index to My Land and My People by Dalai Lama.

3. An Introduction to Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (Ph.D. thesis submitted in June, 1968.)